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ABSTRACT
The aim of this essay is to begin the process of a reconfiguration of the theological
category of doctrinal development and to integrate an “emergent doctrinal ethics of belief” as an
inextricable dimension of this category. Most scholarly writing on doctrinal developmment has
taken place in the wake of the Enlightenment with its focus on epistemology, and doctrine is
conceived of as “referencing” a quasi-metaphysical “res.” I attempt to “update” the guiding
metaphors of doctrinal development with the goal of moving discussions away from an over
emphasis on epistemology and “ossified” notions of doctrine. Information theory, with its unique
property of “ intangible transformability,” allows for this possibility. Since virtually all
discussions of doctrinal development since Newman accept various tropes such as organic or
biological growth, it is natural to appeal to more contemporary ideas of biological evolution.
Today, new research in the areas of systems biology refer to flows of information and
environmentally influenced “rule evolution” as defining features of biological sciences. I suggest
that this “rule evolution” may be a helpful corrective to Lindbeck’s “rule theory” of doctrine.
Conceiving doctrinal development in terms of information flow describes the way that
unexpected ethical dilemmas emerge in the course of time. By appealing to Augustine’s de
doctrina where the endless play of signification observed in both World and Scripture is limited
only by the uncontrollable hermeneutical key of Caritas, I suggest that an expanded notion of
Caritas as an emergent ethics of belief can provide a guardrail for the type of open-ended
evolution observed in doctrinal development.
vi

INTRODUCTION:
A RECONFIGURED DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND AN EMERGENT ETHICS
The aim of this project is to begin a process of reconfiguring the theological category of
doctrinal development with ‘updated’ evolutionary metaphors that includes an ‘emergent ethics
of belief” as an inextricable dimension within that developmental process. Therefore, these two
aspects: ‘reconfiguring” the model of doctrinal development, and integrating an ethical
dimension, comprise the thesis of the dissertation. It should not be surprising that a concept that
claims that all doctrines must develop should find itself in need of development. What is
somewhat surprising, is that previous discussions of the development of doctrine have waxed and
waned over the decades, only to be finally dropped as no longer interesting to many theologians
or philosophers.
In addition to why a renewed discussion of doctrinal development is important, some
may ask why should we think about concepts such as ‘doctrine’ at all, when they are typically
portrayed as so rigid and essentializing? Most reflections are now on ‘religious’ ways of living,
acting, or speaking, rather than anything like doctrines. Furthermore, since most areas of
philosophy, theology, or the social sciences have largely abandoned attempts to articulate
something such as ‘essences,’ or unchanging definitions, what is the point of discussing
‘doctrine?’ Much of this will be addressed throughout the project. For now, I would like to
express that I too am suspicious of ‘essentializing’ and do not see philosophy’s task as
‘discovering’ such unchanging concepts. There are many legitimate concerns. Some of these
1

2
will be examined in later chapters.1
In De Doctrina Christiana (DDC), written more than fourteen hundred years before
Newman’s work on doctrine, Augustine stressed that ‘the thing’ that the Christian faith is
essentially about, is not necessarily the Bible, nor is it doctrine.2 The ‘res’ of the Christian faith
is Caritas, the double commandment to love God and neighbor. Towards the end of Book I
Augustine explains that with Caritas a person “has no need of the scriptures except to instruct
others” (DDC 1.39.43). This commandment of love becomes the ‘hermeneutical key’ for the
Christian faith. Augustine continues by stating that when strengthened by “faith, hope, and
love…many people relying on these three things, [may] actually live in solitude without any
texts of the scriptures” (DDC 1.39.43). For Augustine—just as God’s love is infinite—God’s
revelation too may be open-ended, being limited in meaning only by Caritas. Thus, there may be
an indefinite number of valid interpretations of scripture. Neither doctrines nor scriptures, nor

1

As we will see, I view my project as quite similar to Kathryn Tanner’s work in Theories of Culture: A New Agenda
for Theology (MN: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1997). My approach uses different metaphors, drawn from
evolutionary biology and mathematical and logical ideas from information theory central to the notion of evolution
as “flows of information,”—as opposed to some ‘unchanging essence’ underlying entities. Furthermore, the
influence on these ideas drawn from Godel and Turing’s incompleteness, undecidability, and open-endedness arise
from self-referentiality—it therefore comes as no surprise that there are some “family resemblances” here with
certain discussions found in post-structural thought as well. I agree that much philosophy and the social sciences
have similar thought. For example, Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific
Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge (CT: Wesleyan University, 2005); in so-called continental philosophy
(outside of more conservative circles, e.g, in France) there is a fair consensus with the notion that concepts are
constructed, not discovered. Obviously, there are too many to cite here. To cite one example, see Giles Deleuze and
Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? Translated Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London, Verso Press, 1994);
in Pragmatism we see this direction as well. See Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (MN: University of
Minneapolis, 1982); Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (UK: Cambridge Press, 1989); Richard J. Bernstein,
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (PA: University of Pennsylvania, 1983);
This is a general direction in most hermeneutical thought as well. To cite just one example, we will be looking at
Gianni Vattimo in latter chapters. Even in so-called analytic philosophy there is a turn from “essentializing” and
metaphysics, at least as traditionally conceived. See Samuel C. Wheeler III, Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy
(CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). Especially after Quine, Davidson, and Putnam, the legitimacy of modal logic
has been questioned, as well as any strict division between so-called necessary a priori propositions versus a
posteriori contingent assertions. The division between continental and analytic thought may well become more
blurred as time goes on.
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anything else in the world of creation constitute the ‘res’ of the faith. All of these ‘things’ are
signs—representations to be understood in light of Caritas which is the ‘res’ of the faith. In book
IV Augustine discusses how best to present this core insight—Caritas, the Christian ‘res’—to
people. For Augustine, rhetorical style should aim for plain speech (for example Cicero’s
‘restrained’ style) and yet find ways to exhort the audience (via the grand style of rhetoric) to
absorb the message of love, be transformed by it, and be empowered to act on it. Again, for
Augustine, neither doctrine nor the Bible are the ‘res’ of faith. The interpretive key for teaching
(doctrine) is Caritas. Augustine’s concern was to transform lives to live the Christian faith in
service to others. This is his orthopraxy. The faith is not primarily about knowing the right things
or defending the correct statements. Rather, it is living according to Caritas and finding the
means of aiding others to this insight that most concerned Augustine.
During the late seventeenth, and throughout the eighteenth-century, philosophy and
theology were forever altered in emphasis. The Enlightenment’s focus on epistemology and the
accompanying goal of discovering ‘correct methodology’ emerged with the era’s ‘turn to the
self.’ More specifically for our concerns here, it should be noted that all of the authors writing
about doctrine or doctrinal development from Newman onwards have composed their works
within a culture that emphasized precisely these ‘Enlightenment’ concerns. So, for example,
reflections upon ‘doctrine’ usually appear focused on issues of epistemology, and an almost
‘quasi-metaphysical’ sense that the propositions of doctrine represent the ‘res’ of the religion.
(Remember, for Augustine, the ‘res’ of the faith is Caritas). Similarly, many authors seem to

2

Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Translated by R.P.H. Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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suggest that doctrines are to be primarily understood as statements that, if correct, would
correspond or refer in some way to some ‘res.’
One can see how this ‘after-the-Enlightenment’ view of doctrine is at odds with
Augustine’s concerns. For Augustine, the first three books of De Doctrina are not primarily
books delineating epistemological ‘rules,’ nor are they his description of ‘sign theory,’ as we will
see in the second chapter. Of course, conditions have changed considerably since the late
Roman Empire. One example would be to recognize that in Newman’s era, the category of
history was emphasized more than earlier centuries. This recognition of history is central for this
discussion. Furthermore, in this project I suggest ‘updating’ Newman’s organic metaphors of
development and change by utilizing Darwinian categories, or more specifically, by drawing
upon current understandings of information theory that are shedding much light on contemporary
biology. The value of this is to take advantage of the non-essentialist, non-teleological character
of evolution. In short, evolution has no need for ‘res,’ essences, or substances as traditionally
conceived. Evolution is about ‘flows or streams of information.’
My hope is to move doctrinal development away from the epistemological, quasimetaphysical notion of doctrines as having a ‘res,’ and towards the type of open-ended,
undecidability, and incompleteness that one finds in contemporary understandings of evolution
and the mathematical and logical underpinnings in those disciplines. By thinking notions of
doctrinal evolution as in some ways analogous to the ‘information flows’ of biological evolution,
we will be able to consider the concepts of ‘complexity’ and ‘emergence’ as inherent elements of
any evolving doctrinal tradition as well. This allows an explicit turn to viewing doctrinal
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development through the lens of ethics and Caritas.3 Towards this end, the final two chapters of
this work will look at the ethical dimensions of this type of ‘reconfigured’ doctrinal development
(or perhaps in some way, a ‘retrieval’). By analyzing the unforeseen and complex development
of two doctrines—sovereignty in monotheism, and the doctrine of creation—we will see how
‘negative’ effects ‘emerge from the evolutionary complexity of these traditions,’ thereby opening
a space for ethical reflection that could not have been predicted from the outset. The final chapter
balances this ‘negative’ sense of an ‘ethical dilemma emergence’ discussed in the penultimate
chapter, with a more ‘positive’ emphasis on how this category of a reconfigured doctrinal
development may be interpreted within an ‘integrated’ ethical dimension or focus. The following
section provides a brief overview of the content of the chapters. This will be followed by some
reflections on the background and context of the project.
Overview of the Chapters
Chapter One
The literature review is to be found in Chapter One. A brief discussion of how doctrinal
development was understood prior to John Henry Newman comes from Owen Chadwick’s From
Bossuet to Newman and Jaroslav Pelikan’s Development of Christian Doctrine.4

3

For a few examples dealing with issues of “chaos, complexity, and emergence,” see Mark C. Taylor, The Moment
of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Malcolm Gladwell, The
Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, 1st ed. (New York: Little, Brown and Company,
2000). Gladwell discusses how concepts such as webs or networks, positive feedback, tiny changes, and tipping
points, may lead to the emergence of large-scale effects in life. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging
Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). For a clear description of the
science of chaos, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, with a new afterward (New York: Penguin
Books, 2008).
4

Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman 2nd edition (UK: Cambridge, 1987). Jaroslav Pelikan, Development of
Christian Doctrine (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1969).
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The focus of this review chapter, however, will be an explication and discussion of the
key ideas regarding the category of development of doctrine. Newman, of course, provided the
modern metaphors and conceptions of the process. After pondering Newman’s model, which set
much of the tone for subsequent discussions on the subject, we will look to Kathryn Tanner,
George Lindbeck, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Alister McGrath, and Maurice Wiles. We will also refer
(at times) to works on the subject by Jan Hendrik Walgrave, Nicholas Lash, Charles Bent, and
Bernard Lonergan. The notion of doctrinal development in these works may be understood as
primarily concerned with issues of orthodoxy, or the ‘irreformability’ of doctrine, as well as
questions regarding what criteria may be established so as to set limits to the process.

We will

also note how—as thinkers writing in the wake of the Enlightenment—the emphasis of their
writing is also upon epistemology, semiotics, and doctrine as ‘referencing’ a quasi-metaphysical
‘res.’ I suggest that although these thinkers differ greatly on the process of development—
organic growth, dialectic, deductive, paradigm shifts, and so on—many work within a
framework that considers doctrine as essentially propositional (with the exception of Wiles, who,
I will argue, views doctrines within something of a coherence theory of truth. Lindbeck is also
committed to a notion of a coherence theory within his cultural-linguistic model. He is
‘probably’ [this ‘probably’ will become clear in Chapter One] appealing also to a type of
correspondence theory of truth, although this is contested by McGrath as we will see. Tanner is
working within a postmodern or perhaps post-structural framework).

7
Chapter Two
Although discussions of ‘doctrine’ are dealing with only one dimension of religious
attitudes or other religious phenomena, it is nevertheless an important one. Doctrines are about
beliefs, and beliefs have consequences. Using Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana as a heuristic
device or ‘paradigm’ we can see how doctrine tends to be viewed with an overly
epistemological/ quasi-metaphysical ‘res’-like focus. The other key idea here is that although
there are many ways of ‘mapping’ the concept of doctrine, most articulations assume that
doctrines do ‘have’ a ‘true res,’ however distant this infinite truth may be from our limited finite
minds. This heuristic model will be used to examine two theologians whose thought are, in a
sense, ‘inversely related’ to one another. Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jon Sobrino both utilize a
dialectical approach to history, although the former represents the Hegelian idealist tradition,
while the later writes from a perspective also shaped by the social sciences and experience drawn
from Central and South America. By looking at Pannenberg’s notion of doctrine as essentially
‘hypotheses’ with an eschatological verification and comparing this with Sobrino’s view of the
‘res’ of religion being one of attending to the marginalized poor—to “Take the crucified people
down from the cross”5—I suggest that although very different notions of the ‘res’ are present in
these thinkers, Sobrino’s vision is closer to Augustine’s conception of Caritas as the ‘res’ of the
Christian faith.
Chapter Three
The goal of this chapter is to ‘update’ the guiding metaphors of doctrinal development
with the hope that we may begin to move discussions of ‘doctrine’ away from an over-emphasis

5

Jon Sobrino, Christ the Liberator: A View From the Victims, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001), 48.
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on epistemology and ossified notions. Basically, all discussions of doctrinal development after
John Henry Newman accept his tropes of organic, botanical, or biological development. I am
suggesting a move away from teleological and essentialist notions of some underlying,
unchanging, and enduring ‘res’ or essential core, and instead adopting Darwinian concepts as
more appropriate to reflection on doctrinal change. Contemporary developments in systems
biology, genetics and evolutionary biology speak of ‘streams,’ ‘patterns,’ ‘clusters,’ or ‘flows’ of
information—not some underlying enduring substance or essence. Therefore adopting these
metaphors for doctrinal development may assist our goal of moving this theological category
away from the over-emphasis on matters of epistemology and what I have called an almost
‘quasi-metaphysical’ res to doctrine, and towards a kind of ‘weak thought’ in which doctrinal
development and change may avoid the ‘strong thought’ assertions of ossified propositions of
doctrine—assertions that are violent in their intransigence—both ‘soft and harder’ forms of
violence.
We will see that evolution does proceed by ‘rules’ such as the information in the genome,
the DNA ‘triplet codon’ for amino acid expression, or the ‘update rules’ governing the evolution
of Cellular Automata. But in all these cases—and this is crucial to my project—these ‘rules’
evolve over time. Rules are ‘state dependent”—they interact with the environment and are both
affected by and in turn affect the environment. This ‘state dependent rule evolution’ may be used
to critique George Lindbeck’s assertion of a ‘rule theory of doctrine.”6 Contrary to Lindbeck, and

6

George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 25th edition (KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2009). The phrase “State dependent rule evolution” comes from Paul Davies, The
Demon in the Machine: How Hidden Webs of Information are Solving the Mystery of Life. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2019), 82; 215. The origin of the term, as we will see in Chapter Three is from Alyssa Adams, et
al., “Formal Definitions of Unbounded Evolution and Innovation Reveal Universal Mechanisms for Open-Ended
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in keeping with my Darwinian analogy of rule evolution, I assert that doctrines as rules may
evolve over time quite naturally through interaction with the environment. Furthermore, they
may be ‘edited’ intentionally just as a biologist might ‘edit’ some gene expression.7
Finally, I argue that Kathryn Tanner’s critique of post-liberalism—which certainly covers
Lindbeck’s position—is quite close to what I am suggesting as a reconfigured doctrinal
development.8 She is using what she refers to as postmodern anthropological categories, and I
am appealing to Darwinian metaphors and the underlying notions of incompleteness,
undecidability and open-endedness, but I suggest that the projects are similar. Just as Sobrino is
closer than Pannenberg to Augustine’s vision, Tanner is closer than Lindbeck. Tanner’s
insistence that all Christian material is already “borrowed material,” is precisely the same idea
that I am attempting to express albeit with evolutionary metaphors instead of concepts from poststructural social sciences.9 She suggests that what makes ‘Christian identity,’ is not the ability to
provide exact answers or orthodox statements. For Tanner—and I am in agreement with her
here—what allows us to speak of these shifting boundaries as ‘Christianity,’ is in part that
Christians tend to ask certain similar questions, think with similar ‘motifs’ such as ‘dying and
rising,’ ‘love of neighbor,’ and so on, and discuss the ways in which one is best able to live this

Evolution in Dynamical Systems” in Scientific Reports Nature, vol 7 (2017), 13-14. Her original phrase was “state
dependent dynamics” referring to “update informational rules,” 13-14; 2-3.
7

I am thinking of Lindbeck’s “rule theory” of doctrine. Lindbeck argues that doctrines are like rules of a game, or
grammar to a language. In this way he hopes to avoid thinking of doctrine as either referring to anything objective or
as expressing some inner experience. Doctrines, for Lindbeck, are basically hermeneutical or nomological rules that
are neither true nor false. Lindbeck argues that most doctrines are immutable rules, and it is this point that I am
primarily disagreeing with, as can be seen by my attempt to articulate an ‘evolving notion of doctrine as rule,’ or, as
stated above, “state dependent ‘rule evolution.’” This will be examined further in Chapter Three.
8

Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (MN: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1997).

9

Tanner, 114.
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way of life.10 Where Tanner uses the term ‘motif,’ I am thinking of doctrine, and yet the
parallels are quite similar. (For Tanner, ‘motifs’ may change, be altered or even dropped.
Likewise, I am suggesting that ‘rules’ may similarly evolve or be edited). And this is also a
further illustration of my suggestion for thinking in less dogmatic ways or with ‘weaker thought.’
To my mind, using the non-essentialist language of evolution provides a move away from the
over-emphasis on seeking the correct epistemology, sign theory, or some quasi-metaphysical
‘res’ of doctrine. Tanner, if I am following her correctly, is thinking similarly (although not
referring specifically to doctrine or doctrinal development, but rather a ‘task’ for all Christians)
albeit using language of postmodern cultural anthropology.
Chapter Four
In Chapters Four and Five I turn to the ethical interpretations of doctrine. Chapter Four
analyzes the ‘negative,’ or critical side to this ethical reflection while Chapter Five attempts to
provide a ‘positive’ suggestion for how an idea of development of doctrine might include an
ethical dimension. So, Chapter Four continues to articulate further implications for a model of
doctrinal development that accepts ‘Darwinian’ metaphors or analogies: especially the key ideas
of ‘information flow,’ complexity, emergence, or downward causation. We may view the
phenomena of ‘complexity’ and ‘emergence’ everywhere, from flocks of birds to traffic jams.
We may also see how complexity leads to unpredictable ‘behaviors’ that emerge quite
unexpectedly from a process of development. The complex, and potentially unintended
consequences that may emerge from such a process of development (or a tradition) may ‘open
up’ dangerous ethical consequences that could not be observed or expected from the apparently
10

Tanner, 124.
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simple innocuous beginnings. It is in this way that I suggest that we may find ourselves in a
situation of an ‘emergent crisis point’ that ‘opens up’ the space for an ‘ethics of belief.’
Therefore, in this chapter we will ponder and analyze the unexpected emergent and top/down
effects brought about in the ‘doctrine of sovereignty in monotheism’ and the ‘doctrine of
creation.’ I will be arguing that from innocuous beginnings, unpredictable and complex
developments may arise, producing quite unexpected ‘emergent features’ that then produce
top/down effects. Effects that were unforeseeable from the outset, but that in current
circumstances may demand a re-consideration. In precisely this way, a kind of ‘ethics of belief’
may emerge from doctrinal developments. We observed that doctrines do emerge, evolve, and
may be intentionally ‘edited’ in Chapter Three. Now with this notion of an ‘emergent ethics of
belief’ within the process of doctrinal development, we may ask if a doctrine should be altered or
reconsidered. It is my suggestion that we adopt a reconfigured category of doctrinal development
so as to take seriously the changing ‘one world’ that we all inhabit.
Chapter Five
In the final chapter I will attempt to articulate how the notion of Caritas—the
hermeneutical key for Augustine for the purposes of doctrine or teaching—can be integrated into
this reconfigured sense of doctrinal development. This chapter will discuss some possible
directions for understanding the ethical aspect of doctrinal development. In keeping with the
Darwinian metaphors employed in this project, I am suggesting that we adopt a ‘Teleonomic
Caritas’ as the ‘limiting’ principle for development of doctrine. In evolutionary biology,
scientists such as Douglas J. Futuyma and Ernst Mayr have expressed that evolution happens in a
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teleonomic rather than a teleological manner.11 In short, whereas teleology deals with final end
goals, causes, and ideas of some innate essential direction present within an organism, teleonomy
acknowledges that certain ‘rules,’ conditions, specific physical and environmental contexts,
phenotypic constraints, or phylogenetic constraints, all act as limiting principles to evolutionary
development. For example, an evolutionary biologist would not appeal to teleology but rather
natural selection to explain the evolution of an oak tree. And yet teleonomic limits ensure that an
acorn will grow into an oak tree and not a frog. This does not suggest, however, that the genetic
‘rules’ that govern the development of the acorn cannot, over fundamentally long periods of
time, evolve and allow the eventual emergence of a new ‘speciation event.’ Rules that govern
evolution may themselves evolve although there are limiting aspects to this development. In this
way, I suggest that the kind of open-ended, undecidability, and incompleteness associated with
the evolution of doctrine or more broadly Christianity, does not have to be viewed as a nihilistic
open-ended absurdity that may evolve into anything whatsoever—(if that conclusion seems to be
the direction at the end of Chapter Three). Rather, it is the notion of a ‘teleonomic Caritas’ that
is, in a sense, ‘un-deconstructable,’ and provides a limiting influence to the otherwise
undecidability and open-endedness. Perhaps one way to express what I am trying to say in
appealing to the evolutionary paradigm and the logical ‘foundations’ of incompleteness, is that
one needs to “throw away the ladder, after he (sic) has climbed up it.”12 Indeed something like
this is necessary so that my attempt to avoid the quasi-metaphysical ‘res’ of doctrine does not

11
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Douglas J. Futuyma, Evoutionary Biology, 3rd edition. (Mass: Sinauer Associates, 1998), 342.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961). 6.54.
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itself turn into a new metaphysics. Inspired by Gianni Vattimo, I am therefore suggesting a
‘weakened,’ ‘ironically held,’ or ‘twisting’ of metaphysics, rather than an outright attempt at
‘overcoming’ metaphysics completely.13 Such ‘weak thought’ is required to get past the
impasses of the ‘res’ and the overemphasis on epistemology in an attempt to reconfigure
doctrinal development with an ethical lens. The chapter will conclude with a reflection on the
future of doctrinal development by drawing upon George Coyne’s “The Evolution of Intelligent
Life on Earth and Possibly Elsewhere: Reflections from a Religious Tradition.”14 This will also
open up some possible avenues for developing the work presented here in some new directions.
Background, Context, and Importance for a New Discussion of Doctrinal Development
In any case, the early twenty-first century is a very different world than the late
nineteenth or mid-twentieth century situations in which previous discussions of doctrinal
development have primarily occurred. I would suggest that the quite different context in which
we do currently find ourselves provides important conditions for re-opening discussions
regarding this somewhat neglected category. For example, Christianity must finally begin to
acknowledge that it is only one of many ‘religions’ in this rapidly changing world. Data
collected between 2018 and 2019 from the Pew Research Center shows that sixty-five percent of
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Claiming to have moved totally “beyond metaphysics,” can surreptitiously become a new metaphysics. It is better,
to my mind, to acknowledge this danger, as I believe Vattimo is doing with the notion of Verwinding rather than an
Uberwinding. For a clear presentation of Vattimo’s use of these two terms see “Nihilism and the Post-Modern in
Philosophy,” in The End of Modernity (MD John Hopkins Press, 1988), 164-181.
14

George Coyne S.J., “The Evolution of Intelligent Life on Earth and Possibly Elsewhere: Reflections from a
Religious Tradition,” in Many Worlds: The New Universe, Extraterrestrial Life & the Theological Implications,
edited by Steven J. Dick, (PA; Templeton Press, 2000), 177-188.
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U.S. adults identify as Christian which represents a twelve percent decrease since 2008-2009.15
At the same time, those who self-describe as atheist, agnostic, or ‘nothing in particular,’
comprise twenty-six percent of the population. In 2009, that number stood at seventeen percent.16
Importantly, Christians comprise only a little more than thirty-one percent of the global
population.17 Furthermore, worldwide, the data shows that “roughly one-in-six people around the
globe (1.1billion, 16%) have no religious affiliation. This makes the unaffiliated the third-largest
religious group worldwide.”18 Therefore, to my mind, any new discussion of doctrinal
development should take account of the rapidly changing religious demographics, as well as the
reality that the world is growing smaller, while global immigration/emigration and
communication are increasing.
If the message of Gaudium et Spes was one of encouraging the Church to explicitly
recognize itself as truly global and not merely western, then I would suggest that a new way of
thinking about development of doctrine is needed.19 This new approach should include a few
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The Vatican II “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” Gaudium et Spes (GS) 7 Dec. 1965,
starts with the dignity of human beings as the point of intersection between the world and the Church (GS, esp.
paragraphs 1-3, 12-18). The document recognizes that the profound changes, upheavals, interconnections, and
transformations occurring in the world are simultaneously experienced in all aspects of social, economic, moral, and
religious phenomena (see esp. GS, 4-10). Some of the global transformations recognized are the emergence of
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elements: (1) It should be open to an explicitly comparative theological perspective in terms of
doctrinal formation and development. Christianity is only one of many religions in the world.20
(2) It should recognize that we live after the time of Darwin.21 Previous discussions of doctrinal
development seem to operate with a pre-Darwinian set of categories including teleology and an
assumption of some internal ‘essence’ underlying all significations or representations. But the
idea that there is some ‘res’—some ‘thing’—some unchanging absolute truth underlying our
‘doctrinal representations,’ may be part of the problem. Does an assumption of a ‘res behind’
doctrines lead to exclusiveness, divisions, and even violence? Are doctrines even the main ‘res’
of any ‘religion’? Can we ‘move away’ from this over-emphasis on epistemological and quasimetaphysical ‘res’ views of doctrine? Briefly, I would suggest that if philosophers and
theologians are concerned to avoid the pitfalls associated with onto-theology, or the notion of
attributing ‘Thingness’ to God, then we should ask, “why should we attribute to doctrine that

“systematic atheism (GS, esp. 20-21),” the “development of cultures” (see GS, esp. 53-62)—both in terms of greater
global unity as well as the need for more recognition of diversity, and the need for the “international community”
(including the international Church) to identify and ameliorate the major roots of war and suffering in the world,
especially economic inequalities, and the need for social justice in general (GS, esp. paragraphs 83-90). See GS,
paragraphs 63-93, for exhortations on social and economic injustice and the Church’s insistence upon social justice
(esp. GS, 66, a call to remedy economic inequalities in the world). The recognition of the increasingly
interconnected and global world has only accelerated since the 1960’s. In the spirit of the council, I suggest that any
renewed discussion of doctrinal development needs to likewise recognize these changes. Similarly, the Pastoral
Constitution’s emphasis upon ethical dimensions of these global transformations also underlines the need for an
ethical aspect to any renewed discussion of the category of doctrinal development.
20
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In Chapter Three I will suggest ‘updating’ metaphors in an “after Darwin” fashion. We may adopt metaphors of
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subject to evolution. In short, in Chapter Three we see that doctrine may be altered and evolve completely; in
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which we would not attribute to God?” (3) It should recognize that an ethical dimension within a
development of doctrine is vital. Our era is on ‘the other side’ of many cultural shifts that have
not figured into previous discussions of doctrinal development. It is my hope that a
“reconfigured doctrinal development with an ethical dimension,” may be of use in integrating
and working towards acknowledging them. The aim is to begin articulating a notion of doctrinal
development that accepts ‘Darwinian’ metaphors, with the key idea of ‘information flow,’
instead of ‘essences,’ as best describing doctrine. And by simply extending the implications of a
more ‘Darwinian’ form of doctrinal development, the concepts of complexity, emergence, and
downward causation may allow for the recognition of situations where a doctrine may lead to an
‘emergent crisis point,’ thus opening up the space for an ‘ethics of belief.’ In such a ‘space,’ we
may then feel inclined to ‘edit the genome’ of our doctrine, if unintended consequences have
emerged from the ‘tradition,’ or process of doctrinal development that are no longer morally
acceptable. Thus, as discussed earlier, Chapter Four will examine some ‘emergent’ ethical
dangers from within doctrinal development whereas Chapter Five will provide some more
‘positive’ and possible directions that a reconfigured doctrinal development might look like in
the early twenty-first century.

Chapter Four we see ‘emergent’ situations when we ask whether doctrines should change. In this way, I see Chapter
Four as coming full circle to the issues raised in this Introduction.

CHAPTER ONE
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE FROM NEWMAN TO WILES
A cursory look at the history of the Christian faith would very likely leave one with an
impression that doctrine has never been a static concept. Development of doctrine is a category
that cannot be denied. The main questions that theologians have typically asked regarding this
fact are these: How may one distinguish between authentic or corrupt developments? Are there
any limits to the process itself? Is there any framework, ‘theory,’ or paradigm for understanding
how such development occurs? Did revelation end with the deposit of faith at the close of the
Apostolic era, or is there in some sense an ‘ongoing’ revelation? How may one determine the
difference between new understandings of what was implicit in the original deposit versus an
assertion of an entirely new revelation?
Determining what authors should be included in a literature review is itself an act of
interpretation. Just as any writing of history involves not only attention and attempts at fidelity to
both (necessarily interpreted) ‘facts,’ as well as a choice of narrative style, the simple act of
deciding who is to be included in a review will inevitably shape the terms of the debate.1
Therefore, I feel obligated to provide a brief word on some possibilities that were excluded from
this chapter. For example, Bernard Lonergan who looked to the similarities of ‘method’ within
both science and theology, wrote a treatise on doctrinal development that is thoroughly

1
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dialectical in process with a faith in a critical realist epistemology.2 For Lonergan, method “is a
normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding accumulative and progressive
results.”3 This assumption of an ‘accumulation’ or progression of doctrinal results may be
questioned by ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘community consensus’ based approaches such as one finds in
the notion of ‘paradigm shifts.’ According to this view, new models emerge over time that are
not necessarily closer to reality but are considered more adequate than alternative models, as
judged by their fruitfulness, coherence, ability to stimulate new research and so on. Taken to an
extreme—and this is controversial, and also outside the scope of this essay—different paradigms
may be incommensurable. In doctrinal development, a mild but roughly analogous approach to
this will be examined in this chapter when we turn to Maurice Wiles. Ernst Troeltsch, the
theologian of the ‘History of Religions’ school, proposed a thoroughly historicist approach to
doctrine in which the ‘idea’ of Christianity encounters new cultures or situations and becomes
applied in unique and valuable ways relevant to that context.4 The notion of any unvarying
‘idea,’ however, is something controversial as postmodern theorists have demonstrated. This
type of critique will be examined further when we turn to Kathryn Tanner.
So, the question remains as to why I chose to include the theologians that we do find here
in this chapter. The authors that have been included in this review were chosen according to
three concerns. One, some of them have projects that are similar to my own goals. Two, some of

University Press, 1978). Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to
the Postmodern Challenge, (CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2005).
2
Bernard Lonergan, The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology, (NY: Herder &
Herder Press, 1976).
3

Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd. Ltd., 1972), 4.
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them were chosen as a contrast to my own goals. Three, all of them are important thinkers for
any discussion of doctrinal development. And all of them are deeply impressive thinkers that
were a pleasure to study.
Literature Review
John Henry Newman
There are many theologians who laid the initial groundwork for a theory of doctrinal
development—J.S. Drey, J. A. Mohler, J.E. Kuhn from the University of Tubingen to name a
few. G.W.F. Hegel and the re-introduction of Trinitarian thought for the purpose of delineating a
world-history provides another important moment. But it was John Henry Newman who put
forth the category of doctrinal development that appears in virtually all contemporary discussion
on the topic. So, it is to the Roman Catholic convert from Anglicanism that I will start this
literature review.
As Newman was undergoing a spiritual journey that would eventually lead to his joining
the Catholic Church, questions surrounding the issue of doctrinal development were paramount
in his mind. Newman asked whether the obvious historical ‘difference’ in Catholic doctrine over
the years were ‘corruptions’ or authentic additions and elaborations? By what criteria might one
know? It was plainly the case that the decrees at Nicaea or the Definition pronounced at
Chalcedon were a result of ‘development”—but unless this is rejected, or considered as
unwarranted accretions, what reason could one have for asserting that development stopped in
451? Why could not development continue through the years? What grounds exist for stating that

4
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the Creed of Pius IV or the Council of Trent were not authentic developments?5 The dictum of
Vincent of Lerins that states “Christianity is what has been held always, everywhere and by all”
cannot resolve the issue. As Neman explains the difficulties with this dictum:
It admits of being interpreted in two ways: if it be narrowed for the purpose of disproving
the catholicity of the Creed of Pope Pius, it becomes also an objection to the Athanasian;
and if it be relaxed to admit the doctrines retained by the English Church, it no longer
excludes certain doctrines of Rome which that Church denies. I cannot at once condemn
St. Thomas and St. Bernard, and defend St. Athanasius and St. Gregory Nazianzen.6
Furthermore, Newman realized that the dictum of Vincent of Lerins had never been applied
everywhere, always, and at all times. Newman cites as one example the ante-Nicene council of
Antioch, convened in the mid-third century, which decided to denounce the usage of the term
‘homoousion”—which was reintroduced at Nicaea.7 In fact, many of the ante-Nicene theologians
and bishops appeared to have adhered to a subordinationist Christology. Referring to many of the
theological writings of the ante-Nicene era, Newman states the following:
…the creeds of that early day make no mention in their letter of the Catholic doctrine at
all. They make mention indeed of a Three; but that there is any mystery in the doctrine,
that the Three are One, that They are coequal, coeternal, all increate, all omnipotent, all
incomprehensible, is not stated, and never could be gathered from them. 8
Having exposed the inadequacy of the Lerins’ dictum, and having rejected the disciplina arcana,
Newman realized new metaphors were needed. The idea of development required looking at the
questions historically. And to do this Newman adopted metaphors of organic growth to do justice
to the reality of change in doctrinal history.
5
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However, before turning to his theory, perhaps we should begin by noting that
Newman’s, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (or, Essay in this study) is an
extended historical piece, whereas his last of the University Sermons, “The Theory of
Developments in Religious Doctrine” emphasizes what we might call, ‘psychological’ notions in
that it focuses on issues of ‘faith and reason’ as well as epistemological concerns.9 Therefore, to
my mind, we should read the former through the lens of the later. The concepts Newman first
mentions in these sermons shed direct light onto the ‘hermeneutic,’ or perhaps, we might say,
‘communal epistemology,’ that lays behind the notion of development in his Essay. Following
this brief excursus, we will turn to Newman’s, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent (or,
Grammar), where we will have occasion to define Newman’s epistemological ideas a bit further
before describing how they fit into his Essay.
Newman first laid out his early ponderings on epistemological topics in relation to the
issue of ‘faith,’ in his eighth sermon, “Implicit and Explicit Reason,” at Oxford University. This
dichotomy between knowing something ‘implicitly,’ and knowing it in an ‘explicit manner,’ will
become key to grasping Newman’s epistemology. The basic thought may be explicated with
numerous examples such as how a child loves his mother or father very deeply and yet lacks the
ability (at a young age) to put this feeling into adequate wording.10 Or another example might be
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how a farmer may know and be able to predict weather changes yet be unable to express the
exact justification for her assertion.11 Newman suggests that a child, or perhaps an adult too busy
to reflect, may have an ‘impression’ of ‘revealed faith,’ as an inward or implicit understanding,
and yet be unable—at least ‘right now’—to express or justify precisely what they do in fact
‘know’ implicitly. As Newman explains:
…as the inward idea of divine truth… passes into explicit form by the activity of our
reflective powers, still such an actual delineation is not essential to its genuineness and
perfection. A peasant may have such a true impression, yet be unable to give any
intelligible account of it… But what is remarkable at first sight is this, that there is good
reason for saying that the impression make upon the mind need not even be recognized
by the parties possessing it. It is no proof that persons are not possessed, because they are
not conscious of an idea.12
When Newman uses the term, ‘idea,’ he does so in a very specific sense.13 Perhaps the
most comprehensible explication of this term comes from Owen Chadwick. Chadwick explains
that “idea does not mean the notion which an individual may form of an object, but the object
itself as it is capable of being apprehended in various notions.”14 Now, ‘notional apprehension,’
for Newman, refers to the way in which the mind may abstract from concrete reality.15 A
notional apprehension, therefore, is what is involved in thinking or speaking in general terms. A
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‘real apprehension,’ on the other hand, refers to the experience of a particular concrete or
individual reality. When a theologian speaks of God, she necessarily does so notionally. But, for
Newman, it is possible to speak of a ‘real assent’ to a proposition such as ‘God exists,’ because it
is based on ‘conscience,’ and conscience is understood as a real apprehension.16 Similarly, ‘faith’
for Newman, is based on a real apprehension whereas theology is necessarily based on the
notional. Thus, doctrines are understood notionally.17 As Jan Walgrave explains these
distinctions of Newman’s:
Faith, then is an assent to dogma, but an assent grounded in a real apprehension of the
heavenly things to which the human forms of dogmatic language point. As such, the
object of assent is the real, apprehended in the notional.18
Now, Newman’s use of the term, ‘idea,’—in addition to the aspects just mentioned—
coincides with Newman’s use of the term, ‘real apprehension.”19 With this terminology and
understanding at hand, it may be stated that the ‘idea’ in the Essay is God’s Revelation to the
Church. This Revelation is infinitely deep, and as a real idea, “there is no one aspect deep
enough to exhaust the contents of a real idea.”20 Additionally for Newman, the reasoning process
15
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is not to be reduced to a mere logical deductive procedure. Newman’s illative sense—a type of
phronesis—involves the whole of the person, involving ‘probabilities in cumulation,’
experience, and many other avenues by which one may arrive at belief.21 In an important
passage, Newman explains something of this reflecting and mulling over of ‘the idea’: “An idea
under one or other of its aspects grows in the mind by remaining there; it becomes familiar and
distinct, and is viewed in its relations; it leads to other aspects, and these again to others.”22
So, for Newman, faith is an assent to the real, but is pondered in its many notional
aspects. And for Newman, the idea must be a living idea. It must not be hardened, or ossified, or
it will be left in the past within a constantly changing world. A Living idea must change in order
to be faithful to its intent. Again, Newman expresses this best:
The highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all
by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as
being received and transmitted by minds not inspired and through media which were
human, have required only the longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation.
This may be called the Theory of Development of Doctrine.23
The idea received by the ‘mind’ of the Church is pondered, considered from different angles,
applied in various ways, compared with other knowledge, entered into dialogue with other
knowledge, and gradually, new implications, understandings, and additional insights emerge.
I think it is important to note that any attempt to compose an historical account—
especially one where there is a dearth of facts such as in the case regarding the first four
centuries of doctrinal history—is a construction in which the author must formulate a ‘pattern’ or
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‘narrative.”24 Thus it is accurate to state that Newman is bringing a Roman Catholic narrative to
his particular account.25 The specific ‘view’ that Newman settled upon relies upon the illative
sense and his trust in ‘informal inferencing.”26 More precisely, Newman utilizes a cluster of
“probabilities in cumulation,”27 to argue in chapter two of the Essay that there is an “antecedent
argument” that doctrine indeed develops and that the Church is an “infallible developing
authority.”28 Newman is convinced God exists, and the fact that God exists and is perfectly
Good, entails that God would provide one revelation. And there is an ‘antecedent probability’
that an ‘infallible authority’ would be provided by God to ensure accurate interpretation of that
revelation. The infinitely rich revelation received in the deposit of faith entails that the Church
continually develop (notionally) doctrines to strive towards more and more adequate
representations of that ‘idea,’ in the mind of the Church. According to Newman, the Catholic
Tradition is the best candidate for providing the historical narrative to account for the doctrinal
development he perceived over the course of his study.29 As Chadwick describes it “To Newman
a combination of probabilities multiplied probability and turned it into a moral certainty. To the
Roman theologians, when they came to criticize his theology, this language seemed perilous, as
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though it removed all certainty from the judgment whether one church was the right church.”30
Newman, however, felt confident that the moral probabilities added up to the sense that the
Roman Catholic Church was the location of legitimate doctrinal development. As Newman put
it: “Did St. Athanasius or St. Ambrose come suddenly to life, it cannot be doubted what
communion he would take to be his own.”31
The second portion of Newman’s text deals with the ‘notes,’ the criteria that he proposes
be utilized when attempting to determine whether a given doctrinal development is ‘authentic,’
or a ‘corruption.’ Again, it was Newman’s contention that it was the Roman Catholic Church
that best explained and embodied the necessary development of doctrine. The first note of a
genuine development is the ‘preservation of type.’32 Newman’s empahsis seems to be on the
notion that the underlying type or essence is continuous: An egg turns into a bird, not an oak
tree. (As a brief aside and continuing the organic metaphor: Is a speciation event ever possible?)
Newman notes that to the ancient Roman authors such as Tacitus, Pliny, and Suetonius,
Christianity was a ‘new’ (and thus suspicious on that ground alone) ‘superstition,’ not unlike the
mystery cults associated with Mithras, Cybele, Isis, or Adonis. To the ‘proper’ Roman mind,
‘superstition’ such as what would be found in any of these ‘mysteries’ seemed weak and
ultimately antithetical to the Roman spirit. In an interesting turn, Newman asserts that
Christianity has always been liable to accusations like these. In short, Catholicism has endured
such accusations throughout the centuries—and so there has been a preservation of type.
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Reminiscent of Tertullian or Irenaeus, Newman continues the claim that there is a preservation
of type in Catholicism that was absent in the Manicheans, Donatists, Nestorianism,
Monophysites, and so on.
I will make only two quick comments regarding this ‘note.’ If this criterion is held ‘too
rigidly,’ by which I mean, if each doctrine must have a demonstrable preservation of its ‘type’—
would this not be close to denying any significant development at all? If it has changed (or
developed in some meaningful sense), how can one firmly assert whether it is the ‘same’ type or
not? If it is the same in a clear and non-controversial way, has it really developed? Without
getting too far ahead in this text—we will look at these type of issues in greater detail—I suggest
that we move away from any hint of any enduring or underlying ‘type,’ or ‘essence,’ that
mitigates against any meaningful sense of the term ‘development.’ Perhaps instead, we might
adopt the language of ‘information flow.’ Information has the almost intangible—almost quasimetaphysical (?)—sense of transformability. ‘Information,’ is not anything, yet it may take on a
multitude of forms—marks on a page, laser pulses, radio waves, electron flow—and as binary
digits, information may be transmitted by multiple physical means. The information is
intangible—almost nothing—yet it is meaningful.
In any case, Newman’s second note is his insistence on a continuity of principles.33 This
note, is an ingenious way to articulate the way in which doctrines develop and change and yet the
underlying principles, such as sacramentalism, faith, theology, and so on are in a sense,
immutable. Caritas, may be a principle of love that guarantees the dignity of every person. This
principle cannot change, even if any individual doctrine regrading social ethics may. The third
note of the assimilative power of living doctrine is crucial in ascertaining what has happened
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historically in doctrinal development.34 Like a plant that absorbs ‘foreign’ nutrients, light, water
and so on in order to grow and develop, so too must a living idea interact and use ‘borrowed
material’ from its environment.35 ‘Logical sequence,’ the fourth note Newman employs is
potentially confusing.36 It is not, for example, ‘logical,’ in the traditional sense of ‘deductive.’
What Newman intends with this phrase is to provide a glimpse of how certain apparent
‘additions’ to a doctrine ‘make sense,’ and have a ‘logical’ reason for their existence. One quick
example: doctrines of purgatory and confession became new branches sprouting from the
doctrine of baptism. The fifth and sixth notes seem designed to ensure an enduring core to any
doctrinal development.37 Later doctrines are implications that were anticipated and then
preserved within the process of development. But is it not the case that there is always some kind
‘connection’ or ‘relation’ with what comes before, and what follows after, any doctrinal
formation? Unless there is some absolute rupture that has virtually nothing to do with the prior
context (and how would this be?) there will always be some type of similar thread or aspect
found in what precedes and what follows any historical occurrence. Finally, the last note, which
Newman refers to as ‘chronic vigor,’ suggests that a living faith survives through time and
opposition.38 I agree, although there is always the possibility that any institution has survived
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through time due to issues of power as well as due to its ‘intrinsic vigor.’ (Although the Church’s
early survival was certainly precarious for a time, and yet it did survive). This is merely a
comment on the strength of the criterion and not meant as a critique of the Church. Furthermore,
the reason many in the Church turn to critical theory or any critical hermeneutic is precisely to
guard against the abuse of power that may arise throughout its long history.
One question that arises time and again when looking over Newman’s theory is the one
posed by virtually every commentary I have read. The question may be framed something like
this: To what extent can one claim that new developments—developments that arise from an
‘unconscious or implicit’ knowledge—are not actually new revelations? By what criteria may
one judge between a developed ‘new’ understanding of what was originally received of the idea,
although not fully perceived in its origin, on the one hand, and an actual new revelation or new
doctrine on the other?39 Newman would likely assert that ‘the idea’ revealed to the Church is
much too large to be fully understood immediately, or from the outset. And therefore, it is
precisely the ‘thinking process’ in the mind of the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, that finally
allows the Magisterium to make authoritative pronouncements. But questions remain. Does
doctrinal development ever end? How can one be sure that new understandings prompted by the
Spirit will not occur in the future regarding a doctrine that seems settled now, in this present
context? Newman suggests that the “doctrine of Original Sin” was in a state of “gradual
progress, not completed until the time of Augustine and Pelagius” at which time it was “fully
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developed.”40 This certainly implies that doctrinal development does come to a definitive end,
for Newman. And approaching the matter from the opposite angle, Maurice Bevenot has
questioned whether the notion of doctrinal development might not legitimately include the
notions of ‘pruning,’ implying the sense of reversing a given development.41 Continuing the
biological metaphors, could a doctrine go extinct? Could there be a speciation event? The fear of
using too many biological metaphors or talk of doctrinal evolution is typically due to concerns of
a religion evolving into something else entirely. These issues will arise again in this work. A
further consideration on Newman’s work leaves one wondering if the ‘notes’ for distinguishing
authentic versus corrupt developments might not be understood to defend Eastern Orthodox as
well as Roman Catholic developments. In fact, as alluded to above, would it not be possible for
anyone, from whatever tradition, to find some thread of continuity between what precedes and
what follows any point in history? And as Maurice Wiles points out, when we attempt to
distinguish between authentic versus corrupt developments of growth in something biological,
we have other examples to look to—something lacking in our view of Christian history. As
Wiles puts it:
…we only know what is latent in the seed because we have a host of specimens which we
have been able to observe. It is on this basis that we are, for example, able to identify
some growths as malformations. But there is only one Christian history. The concept of
development as such does not therefore provide any criteria for distinguishing between
true and false developments.”42
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Newman’s text is a brilliant approach to a serious issue. I am grateful that he had the courage to
write it at a time when the suggestion of a theory of doctrinal development was quite
controversial. Newman’s theory is not a unified theory of development, but no one final say on
development could ever be the final word. Doctrinal development must itself develop.
George Lindbeck
In his text, The Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck outlines a tripartite classification of
doctrinal types.43 The first proposal, the ‘cognitive-propositional’ type, is the view of doctrine
probably held by Neo-Scholasticism (think of the ‘theology of the manuals’ for example), and
was also typical of Protestant Orthodoxy (such as Francis Turretin or Charles Hodge and the
‘Princeton theology”), and is currently adhered to in some forms of conservative Evangelical
theology such as may be found in the texts of Wayne Grudem. A ‘cognitive-propositional’
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approach interprets the main function of doctrine to serve “as informative propositions or truth
claims about objective realities.”44 This approach to doctrine quite naturally coincides with a
correspondence or representational theory of truth. In terms of ecumenical goals, a cognitivepropositional approach cannot according to Lindbeck, avoid “doctrinal reconciliation without
capitulation.”45 In other words, if a doctrinal statement is thought to correctly define some
theological reality, then there seems to be no way to find agreement with another denomination’s
statements, let alone a different religion’s doctrinal assertions. It would not even be likely that
discussion could take place under such a rigid way of conceiving doctrine. Therefore, it comes as
no surprise that many thinkers that accept this approach to doctrine are often uncompromising in
a situation of intrareligious or interreligious dialogue.
The second approach to doctrine Lindbeck calls the ‘experiential-expressive’ type. This
type of doctrine is ‘non-discursive,’ and may be understood as an approach that prefers symbolic
language as the best means to express an inner experience. Or in other words, this perspective
attempts to convey deeper ‘existential orientations.”46 According to Lindbeck, this perspective
on doctrine promotes an unhelpful possibility: An experiential-expressive view allows for the
doctrinal formulation to change, while the inner experience remains the same. In other words, the
same inner experience may be expressed in a different manner. This type of doctrinal
construction, therefore, permits “at least the logical possibility that a Buddhist and a Christian
might have basically the same faith, although expressed very differently.”47 Lindbeck claims that
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Schleiermacher is the prime example of this type of doctrinal expression. This assertion is
(rightly, to my mind) challenged by Alister McGrath, who explains that Schleiermacher
described the Christian experience as an deep inner-awareness of redemption dependent upon the
work of Jesus.48 The ‘pre-reflective’ sense of ‘absolute dependence’ is, for Schleiermacher a
universal phenomenon, but it is always already mediated through the specific cultural-religious
belief system, which ‘shapes’ any religious experience by that system (or tradition).49 When this
doctrinal perspective is considered in this light, it sounds suspiciously similar to Lindbeck’s
preferred model, the ‘cultural-linguistic,’ approach to doctrine.
According to Lindbeck, doctrines neither refer to an objective reality (the cognitivepropositional approach) nor are they mere ‘significations’ of some inner experience (the
experiential-expressive type). Doctrines are hermeneutical rules. Or, in other words, they are
essentially nomological rather than epistemological. So, if one considers the category of
‘doctrine’ as analogous to ‘rules’ of a game or ‘grammatical rules’ of a language, then it would
be a mistake to ask whether such ‘rules’ are true or false.50 Rules are what direct and guide the
legitimate ‘play’ or maneuvers within a game or within a language, and as such, it would be a
categorical mistake to ask if the rules themselves are true. As Lindbeck explains:
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Just as grammar by itself affirms nothing either true or false regarding the world in which
language is used, but only about language, so theology and doctrine, to the extent that
they are second-order activities, assert nothing either true or false about God and his
relation to creatures but only speak religiously, i.e., when seeking to align oneself and
others performatively with what one takes to be most important in the universe by
worshipping, promising, obeying, exhorting, preaching.51
The cultural-linguistic approach to religion that includes this ‘rule theory’ considers
doctrine to serve this ‘regulative function.’ Doctrines—and this is really essential to the postliberal or narrative theological perspective—shape experience and channel thinking by providing
the rules by which theologians may construct theology and the faithful may guide their lives and
actions. As Lindbeck puts it:
Church doctrines are communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs and practices
that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the group in question. They may
be formally staged or informally operative, but in any case, they indicate what constitutes
faithful adherence to a community…A religious body cannot exist as a recognizably
distinctive collectivity unless it has some beliefs and/or practices by which it can be
identified.52
A ‘rule theory,’ Lindbeck suggests, is precisely the way that theologians of the Patristic era
thought about doctrine. When Athanasius argued for the usage of the concept of
‘consubstantiality,’ for example, Lindbeck claims that his intention was to use this metaphysical
term as nothing more than a ‘nomological rule.’ As Lindbeck explains, “the theologian most
responsible for the final triumph of Nicaea thought of it, not as a first-order proposition with
ontological reference, but as a second-order rule of speech.”53 Doctrines conceived as rules,
therefore, allow for different theological constructions. Theologians may formulate these
categories in multiple ways, the only stipulation being that their representations follow the pre-
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established ‘rules.’ Whether formulated as Bonhoeffer’s ‘Man for Others,’ or Barth’s ‘Humanity
of God,’ the “basic rules for its use remain the same.”54
Lindbeck insists that doctrine should not be understood as a monolithic category.
Doctrines, for example, may be considered, ‘unconditionally necessary,’ in which case they
cannot be altered without thereby changing some fundamental aspect of the Christian life.55 An
example of such a permanent doctrine, Lindbeck explains, would be the “law of love.”56 It is,
and has always been, a central feature of the Christian existence that the love of God and
neighbor are absolute and fundamental to the faith.57 Some doctrines, however, may be
considered as “conditionally essential.”58 Lindbeck suggests that the Christian attitude towards
war exemplifies this type of doctrine. Throughout the variegated history of Christian societies,
the attitude towards war has oscillated between ‘Just War,’ to ‘Realist’ approaches, as well as to
adopting positions of ‘Pacifism.’59
‘Conditional doctrines,’ according to Lindbeck, are either permanent or temporary.60 If
considered as permanent, then such a doctrine will be continually applicable. However, doctrines
that are considered conditional and temporary—such as in the changing history of Christian
attitudes towards sexual ethics—can be altered if proper Biblical exegesis determines that the
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context in which the moral claims originated is no longer valid in light of an increase in
contemporary knowledge and experience.61 So, whereas Lindbeck claims that temporary
doctrines may also be “reversable”—such as in his example regarding the issues surrounding
war—other temporary doctrines are simply “irreversible.”62 Finally, Lindbeck discusses one
further category of doctrine which he refers to as “accidentally necessary.”63 This type of
doctrine signifies those which have been adhered to for such a long time that it would be difficult
to attempt to alter it, although there is no pressing reason why it might not be altered. An
example of ‘accidentally necessary’ doctrines, according to Lindbeck, would be “postbiblical
liturgical developments such as Sunday and Christmas celebrations.”64 The idea that Lindbeck
has in mind here, is the possibility of replacing types of ontological dualisms such as one finds in
Greek thought. Doctrinal formulations such as “the immortality of the soul,” on the other hand,
are to be considered “conditional, temporary, and reversible.”65 For Lindbeck it would certainly
be legitimate in the light of current neuroscientific research, to adopt new theories of
consciousness that could be argued to coincide to some extent with ancient Hebrew beliefs in
mind and body.66
Viewed in the light of this ‘rule theory,’ Lindbeck insists that the creedal or definitional
statements from Nicaea or Chalcedon “represent historically conditioned formulations of
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doctrines that are unconditionally and permanently necessary to mainstream Christian
identity.”67 In short, for Lindbeck, doctrines may be “historically conditioned,” and the creeds
retain their “continuing value” only insofar as they are authentic representations of what he
refers to as “regulative principles.”68 These principles are “monotheism, historical specificity,
and Christological maximalism.”69 Furthermore, as Lindbeck asserts:
[The] Nicene and Chalcedonian formulations were among the few, and perhaps only,
possible outcomes of the process of adjusting Christian discourse to the world of late
classical antiquity in a manner conformable to regulative principles that were already at
work in the earliest strata of the tradition. These creeds can be understood by Christian
and non-Christian alike as paradigmatically instantiating doctrinal rules that have been
abidingly important from the beginning in forming mainstream Christian identity.70
But should we consider these ‘regulative principles’ to be truly ‘unconditionally and permanently
necessary?’
To my mind, it seems that no doctrine (or underlying ‘principle’ which seems to me to be
subject to the same critique) could have unconditional necessity.71 There seems little reason to

67

Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 82.

68

Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 82. Lindbeck uses “’principle’ and ‘rule’ interchangeably” in this discussion: see
endnote 8., p.94.
69

Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 82. These ‘principles’ or ‘rules’ are explained as first: the principle of
‘monotheism,’ second, the “principle of historical specificity: the stories of Jesus refer to a genuine human
being”…Third, “Christological maximalism: every possible importance is to be ascribed to Jesus that is not
inconsistent with the first rules,” 80.
70

71

Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 81.

We will return to this issue in Chapter Three. For now, it should be noted that there is the question of whether
Lindbeck’s principle of “Christological Maximalism” was indeed universally held in the earliest communities. There
may well have been a variety of “high” or “low” conceptions of Christology in the early Church. For a good study
covering “adoptionism” within Jewish Christianity and the early differences between the Nazarenes and the
Ebionites see Ray A. Pritz, Nazarene Jewish Christianity (Leiden: Brill, 1988). Studies from the liturgy of the era
show people praying “to Christ” and also “through Christ.” See Rebeca Lyman, “Lex Orandi: Heresy, Orthodoxy,
and Popular Religion” in The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine: Essays in honor of Maurice Wiles
Edited by Sarah Coakley and David Palin (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), 131-142

38
think that Christological formulations utilizing Greek metaphysical concepts such as homoousion
were necessary developments. Regarding this I am inclined to mention a statement Maurice
Wiles made in his work on doctrinal development when he explained that:
…the historical processes of doctrinal development seem as unlikely to lead to infallible
decisions as the oral transmission of gospel material to lead to an infallible record of the
life of Jesus. The element of human fallibility is present in the bishops and theologians of
the early Church as evidently as it is in the persons of the apostles and evangelists. We
have as much reason in the one case as in the other to believe either that that fallibility
was totally suppressed or that it was incapable of reflecting enough of the inspiration of
the divine Spirit to provide us with valuable guidance for the Church’s life.72
Criticisms of Lindbeck’s ‘regulative’ or ‘rule theory’ of doctrine have been levied from the
theological ‘left’ and ‘right.’ Therefore, at this point in the chapter, I will briefly explicate Alister
McGrath’s ‘rightwing’ critique of Lindbeck. This will provide a segue into McGrath’s theory of
doctrinal development and criticism. At this point, we will be in a better position to ponder
Kathryn Tanner’s criticisms that are especially relevant to both Lindbeck and McGrath (and
indeed most so-called Postliberal or ‘Yale school’ theological views of doctrine).
McGrath devotes an entire chapter of his text on doctrine to Lindbeck’s theory of the
same. In short, McGrath appears to be advocating a hybrid of elements from both the ‘cognitivepropositional’ and ‘cultural-linguistic’ typologies for his understanding of doctrine. Other than
the brief defense of Schleiermacher as being incorrectly identified with the ‘experientialexpressive’ model, McGrath’s comments on this type of doctrine is largely negative. McGrath
asserts that Lindbeck’s critique of the ‘experiential-expressive’ model that advocates a
“ubiquitous private prereflective experience underlying all religions appears to be fair and
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accurate.”73 The greatest reservation expressed by McGrath concerns Lindbeck’s treatment of the
“cognitive-propositional” model. McGrath agrees that a “crudely realist approach to theological
statements,” such as that criticized by John Robinson’s target of God as an “elderly man located
at an unspecified point in the stratosphere” is largely on target.74 But who is really making claims
like this? If we reject any ‘cognitive-propositional’ understanding of doctrine, McGrath asks,
how can we distinguish between “the radically different interpretations of the statement ‘This is
my body’ (Matthew 26:26) found in Luther (it is literally true), Zwingli (it is a form of metaphor)
and Calvin (it is metonymical)?”75 A ‘cultural-linguistic’ understanding that advocates
something like Wittgenstein’s meaning arising from usage would, presumably, not be able to
distinguish between these interpretations of the Eucharist. McGrath argues that cognitive and
propositional assertions, such as utilized in the Medieval era were much more sophisticated than
Lindbeck allows. It was taken for granted in this era that propositions have cognitive content, but
this in no way diminished the many subtleties that a given statement may exemplify. Cognitive
theories in the Medieval era (not to mention Patristics such as Origen and Augustine) assumed
allegorical, moral, and spiritual readings of propositions. Tropes such as metaphor, metonymy,
synecdoche, and irony are assumed and are not in any way simple propositions, although they
must correspond to some extramental or “external referent.”76
To my mind, McGrath is confusing the ‘cognitive’ content with the ‘propositional
referent.’ In short, this seems to be a blurring of the complex questions involving ‘meaning and
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reference.’ Yet it is clear that McGrath is primarily concerned with preserving the ‘external
referent” in theological statements. This is in fact the central criticism that McGrath directs to
Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-linguistic’ theory of doctrine. We noted Lindbeck’s assertion that ‘doctrine’
be considered a ‘second-order’ rather than a ‘first-order’ language. For example, doctrines are
analogous to ‘rules’ in a game or ‘grammar’ in a language.77 And in this sense, Lindbeck asserts
that doctrines make “intrasytematic rather than ontological truth claims.”78 This is the crux of
McGrath’s reservation with the model. For McGrath, there needs to be an ‘extra-linguistic
reality’ to which doctrine statements may refer.79 Moreover, McGrath takes issue with the
apparent lack of any description in Lindbeck’s text as to the historical origins or ‘genesis’ of
doctrine.80 As far as McGrath is concerned, doctrine in Lindbeck’s account, is a linguistic-system
that, “like Melchizedek—has no origins. It is just there.”81 Grounding doctrine in an ‘origin’ for
McGrath means looking to the life and event of Jesus of Nazareth. Thus, we will turn to
McGrath’s account before examining Tanner’s critique that may be applied to both Lindbeck and
McGrath.
Alister E. McGrath
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Although we have just examined a good deal of McGrath’s text insofar as he dedicates
the entire second chapter to criticism of Lindbeck, the following explication lays out McGrath’s
‘positive’ theory of doctrinal development. Therefore, we may see that in his text, The Genesis of
Doctrine, Alister E. McGrath provides both an historical and methodological approach to the
origin, development, and criticism of doctrine.82 The method is ‘foundationalist,’ being grounded
in the New Testament witness to the history of Jesus, which McGrath explicitly asserts must
serve as the sole legitimate basis for any ‘genesis,’ or subsequent ‘critique,’ of doctrine. The
narrative history of Jesus is both the source of all doctrine and the hermeneutical lens for judging
or critiquing any doctrine.83 For McGrath, Jesus is the “primary explicandum of Christian
faith.”84 And in a couple of phrases that seem reminiscent of Schleiermacher, McGrath explains
that the narrative history of Jesus of Nazareth is the “fundamental impulse to contemporary
doctrinal reflection,” and the collective Christian memory of him is the “generative event of the
Christian faith.”85
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In any case, doctrine, according to McGrath, should be understood as maneuvers to
imagine, “re-imagine, and recreate” ideas drawn from the narrative history of Jesus.86 Doctrine is
a necessary element of the Christian faith because the Christian community needs to understand
the history and life of Jesus. For McGrath, doctrine serves this community-focused teaching
function for the Christian community. Since any attempt to give ‘full expression’ to the insights
of the Christian narrative will inevitably fall short, it becomes necessary for theologians to “draw
upon the conceptual resources which their day and age recognizes as outstanding” in order to
construct more adequate formulations of the faith.87 As tensions necessarily arise from
differences of interpretation or emphasis, the need to provide better conceptual clarification
emerges. Doctrines are passed on through time as the tradition and possession of the Christian
community. Tradition, according to McGrath, is an essential part of the Christian faith, serving
as an “inherited manner of interpreting scripture” and as a means for “transmitting the kerygma
which it contains, rather than a source of revelation in addition to scripture.”88
McGrath recognizes the irreducible historicity of every theologian and therefore of any
doctrinal formulation. Every age is culturally and linguistically conditioned, an irreducible
contextual situation in which any act of theological imagination, or mode of discourse, is
necessarily limited. For McGrath, every theologian is located within a tradition as,
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[an] inhabitant of the flux of history—an inherited complex of symbols, values and preunderstandings which fixes a world-view and functions as a framework for
communication in which the past obstinately impresses itself upon the present.89
I would suggest that McGrath’s project is an attempt to negotiate a kind of ‘middle way’
between a thoroughgoing historical relativism on the one hand, and any understanding of an
epistemology that would essentially deny the historically conditioned nature of reason, method,
and thinking on the other. The means by which he does this, is through the work of Alasdair
MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer—two thinkers that are mentioned rarely in the text, but are
nevertheless, clearly vital influences of McGrath’s thought.90
Another important theoretical query McGrath considers vital to his methodology involves
the question of how cultural development is possible. McGrath is asking how this development is
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possible, if we concede the main thrust of any historically conditioned construction of social
reality. In other words, McGrath is concerned with the fact that if individuals are in fact shaped
by the culture and time in which they are embedded, how is it that they are able to “escape, at
least in part, from their present cultural situation.”91 McGrath asserts that theories of cultural
relativity that do not allow for real cultural development are seriously flawed. In order to think
through this issue, McGrath suggests an analogy, by utilizing the image of ‘paradigm shifts’
from the philosophy of science.92 Such paradigm shifts happen when a growing number of
anomalies appear within a predominant paradigm that can no longer be tolerated or explained by
that framework. In this situation of crisis, something analogous to a revolution occurs, and a new
conceptual model emerges. This new paradigm is then able to explain the anomalies and
stimulates a new approach for organizing the questions and patterns within the discipline. If our
thinking was totally conditioned by the prevailing paradigm (or cultural situation), then an
“epistemological skepticism would appear to be implied, taking away all possibilities of rational
discrimination and of new departures of thought.”93 Nevertheless, “the very recognition that
there is an ideological component to our thinking,” McGrath explains, “provides a means by
which the total dominance of hidden ideological factors to our ways of thinking may be
reduced.”94 McGrath also acknowledges the notion of a ‘double hermeneutic,’ in which there is
an explicit recognition that any observer (or interpreter) is just as subject to the historical or
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cultural conditioning of his or her era as that which is being observed (for example, a doctrine or
historical period) is conditioned by its culture and time.95 The theologian, just as any sociologist
or historian, needs to be constantly aware of the historically conditioned nature of any doctrine as
well as their own context of interpretation.
This brief tour through McGrath’s methodological background to his perspective of the
historicity of knowledge was important for his understanding of doctrine and its development.
And as stated above, these ideas allow McGrath to accept a kind of sociology of knowledge that
avoids, either extreme relativism, or, a view that denies the importance of historical awareness
on any epistemological or axiological considerations. In particular, McGrath’s inquiry seeks to
identify what criteria are employed in any given historical era for evaluating ‘the past’ and the
value of ‘past authority.’96
McGrath undertakes a large historical survey, moving through the Renaissance,
Magisterial, and Radical Reformation, before examining the perspective of the German
Enlightenment. It was during the Renaissance, according to McGrath, that the first real sense of
historical consciousness arose. Whereas the Medieval age did not tend to think historically—
McGrath recounts one example in which ‘time’ was often measured in terms of ‘Aves,’ (the
amount of time it takes to recite one ‘Hail Mary”)—the Renaissance witnessed a profusion of
mechanical clocks, and of course, the re-discovery in Italy of the ancient classical world.97 The
era’s motto of ‘ad fontes’ exemplifies the move away from the Medieval emphasis upon “glosses
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and commentaries” and towards the sources themselves.98 In this period there is an emerging
sense of truth as something historical, rather than as basically static. The era witnessed new
literary and philological techniques aimed at re-imagining the “immediate experience of the
apostolic period.”99 An emphasis upon the elegance of literature and the formation of the self
were indicative of the era. This all too brief overview of McGrath’s deep research is meant to
illustrate something of his main point: The thinkers of the Renaissance looked to the past as
something to be valued as a source for moral improvement. They did not value the past for its
fixed doctrinal pronouncements. The context-specific criteria of the era affected the attitude of
doctrinal indifference within the Renaissance. Yet the literary emphasis—such as Erasmus’
Greek translation of the New Testament—would directly impact the years of the Reformation.
Within the Magisterial Reformation, different attitudes towards the past emerged between
Luther and Huldrych Zwingli. The later looked to the new Greek translations of the New
Testament as the primary criterion for judging certain moral doctrines of the church. Reflecting
the emphasis of the Renaissance, Zwingli was primarily concerned with issues of orthopraxy
such as “clerical celibacy, communion in one kind, praying for the dead and worshipping
images.”100 Zwingli was “deeply influenced by Quattrocento humanism,” and generally
personified a view similar to the Renaissance preference to read the scriptures for moral
edification, rather than for doctrinal concern.101 Turning to Wittenberg, it is of course well
known how Luther and Karlstadt sought academic reform through an emphasis on Biblical
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languages as well as emphasizing a “personal transformative encounter between the individual
and Jesus Christ.”102 This of course reflects the ad fontes motto as well as the Renaissance
emphasis upon experience and personal transformation. It should be noted that the Swiss
Reformed thinker Zwingli tended to agree with many Renaissance thinkers (and also Erasmus)
that Medieval thought was overly arid and inelegant—an actual “impediment to interpretation”
of Scriptures.103 Yet for Luther, there was real value in maintaining a sustained dialogue with the
Medieval theologians—in particular the scholars of the Via Moderna—and so it was, that from
these debates, Luther’s “theology of the Cross” emerged.104 It should also be noted that McGrath
is quite clearly influenced by this later notion, which for him is basically the hermeneutical key
to Scriptural interpretation and doctrinal formation as described in his text. It is important to
McGrath that it is precisely in this intersection—the intersection between Luther’s debates with
representatives of the Via Moderna (such as with Gabriel Biel), and his “epiphany” of the
“Theology of the Cross”—that the doctrine of justification emerged. McGrath takes issue with
scholars such as Heiko Oberman who argue that the doctrine of justification had “forerunners” in
the late Medieval era.105 For McGrath, the social conditions of the era—the recent emergence of
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movable print, the Renaissance turn to experience, and the urge to “learn the original
languages,”—were the conditions for the possibility of these doctrinal innovations. An example
of an opposite response—one of a rejection of past authority of the Church, although not a
rejection of the past authority of Scriptures--was exemplified by the “radical Reformation.”106
According to McGrath, the goal of these thinkers was for a transformation of society and
therefore a complete break with the past. Somewhat oddly, McGrath appears to dismiss these
individuals, discussing them in a mere two pages. He suggests the movement is based upon
social concerns alone and that issues of doctrine were not particularly essential. McGrath claims
the Radical Reformers valued individual experience of the Holy Spirit and subsequently had
little desire to focus on doctrinal issues which they associated with Church authority and its past
hold over society.107
This brief survey through the contextually shaped attitudes towards the past—with the
exception of the Radical Reformation—was one of basic respect, albeit with differing degrees of
emphasis and interpretation. McGrath contends that each era’s “conceptual framework” was
shaped by the societal, political, and economic changes occurring in the various geographies
across Europe.108 These ‘frameworks’ or ‘ideologies’ cannot be considered universally valid, but

History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 3rd edition (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005),210-217.
McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine, 123-130.
106
107

108

McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine, 131-132.
McGrath, Genesis of Doctrine, 131-132.

As McGrath explains “Without wishing to reduce Christian theology to an ideological epiphenomenon, an
ideational superstructure erected upon a socio-economic base, the history of this discipline suggests that ideological
factors are a major consideration in shaping a theologian’s attitude to the past; questions of ‘truth’ concerning
attitudes to the past may thus ultimately reduce, at least in part, to the question of whether a conservative or
progressive ideology happens to be dominant in a given situation. (I use the terms ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’
as defined in Marx’s German Ideology, accepting the inevitable conceptual limitations which result),” from
McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine, 152. And again, McGrath defines ideology as “purely phenomenological,” and
as “an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs or

49
rather, are irreducibly contextual, with the result that doctrinal construction reflects the concerns
of that era. However, it was during the arrival of the Enlightenment that the very notion of
‘doctrine’ was basically rejected. McGrath focuses almost exclusively on the German
Enlightenment, and orients the values associated with that time as originating from the social
changes occurring during the years, 1780-1790.109 McGrath begins by examining the rising
population and concomitant decline in ‘professional positions’ such as might be found in the
church, government or in academia.110 The growing number of educated persons of the time
were becoming more inclined towards an “overthrow of the ancien regime and its traditionridden outlook.”111 This attitude was paralleled with a desire to reject the doctrinal formulations
of the Christian past as well. This bourgeois movement accelerated with the news of the French
Revolution, and was itself paralleled, by the rise of the Moravian or Pietist strands of theology
that de-emphasized the role of doctrine, albeit out of a perceived sense that doctrines are by their
nature arid and inhibiting of a true spirituality. As a result, McGrath argues that Lutheran
Orthodoxy emerged to give the growing emphasis on “personal experience” a “coherent
intellectual framework.”112 Yet the real legacy of this era, according to McGrath, is the
Enlightenment’s influence in Germany, with its emphasis upon two central points: The first, is
the recognition amongst many of the era, that doctrinal constructions are always historically
located and were formulated in the past. Therefore, although these doctrines may have been
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necessary or useful in their time, they are essentially irrelevant to the modern period if they
cannot stand up to the standards of reason. This is essentially the type of rationalist assumptions
behind Gotthold Lessing’s assertion that the “accidental truths of history can never become the
proof of necessary truths of reason.”113 The second element important to the era, according to
McGrath, states that true rationality is necessarily universal and autonomous. Therefore, justified
knowledge is universally true and must be grounded on reasonable evidence or logical
formulations. Any proposition that may be granted the status of ‘Knowledge,’ is either a
necessarily true a priori judgment of reason, or a contingent and empirically inferred a posteriori
judgment arising from the senses. According to views such as these, most doctrines have very
little credibility.
Yet it is precisely these assertions of a universally applicable method guaranteeing a sure
route to indubitable knowledge that seem oblivious to their own “historically-conditioned” status.
In other words, Enlightenment claims to a public and universally applicable and “traditionindependent” rationality is self-deceptive.114 As McGrath puts it:
The Christian tradition may indeed by evaluated by the standards of another historicallycontingent tradition; the notion, however, that it may be evaluated (presumably to be
found wanting) by some universal rationality, purified of the contingencies of history,
would seem to be a notion which is distinctly located in history, prior to the growth of
historical insight.115
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So, the upshot of all of this, is that for McGrath, the proper sphere for “doctrinal
criticism” can only be within the “community of faith.”116 Here again we may recognize the
influence of MacIntyre and his claim that it is only within traditions that we may locate the
essential context for any form of rationality. And it is only within a tradition, McGrath explains,
that an individual’s identity may be formed by becoming “linked with the history and story of the
community.”117 Furthermore, it is only through being embedded within a “communal tradition”
that any legitimate “religious epistemology” may be found.118
So only in a traditional context may one be in a position to interpret and understand the
meanings inherited from the past. 119 Therefore, it is only within the historical context of
narration and tradition that comprises Christianity that one may understand Christ as the
hermeneutical key to properly evaluating doctrine. Doctrine must necessarily be expressed
within the ‘ideology’ or cultural language of the time in which it is constructed. Yet this does not
mean that the ‘meaning’ of the doctrine is in anyway reduced to the language of that culture. It is
only expressed in the language of the time in which it was formulated. Thus, it is the task of
theologians, working within the tradition, that are able to make critical judgments on doctrinal
assertions. It is from the tensions witnessed by differing historical doctrinal constructions that
doctrinal development occurs and allows no one doctrine to become reduced to a particular era’s
ideology. Only within the tradition may doctrinal formation, interpretation, or criticism take
place. McGrath asserts that the reason that it is difficult to understand a contemporary culture
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such as the “Azande or the Dinka tribes of Africa—who exist in my own day and age—is that
their ideas and values have not been mediated to me as formative or identity-giving.”120 McGrath
seems to be claiming that one may only hope to interpret or critique a doctrine—at least with any
confidence—if one is already embedded within that tradition that gave rise to it. McGrath would
likely reply that someone outside of the tradition may indeed critique the doctrine, but they will
inevitably be utilizing their own standards, and therefore would be guilty of a sort of
‘ethnocentrism.’
Having only previously read works of McGrath on the intersection of science and
religion (and his works on “justification”), I was somewhat surprised to read this type of
incommensurable narrative theology found in this text. There is no place for a ‘public theology’
in a sectarian project such as we observe in McGrath’s understanding of doctrine. Furthermore,
although McGrath refers to the category of ‘doctrinal development’ in multiple locations
throughout the text, I wonder if this is truly a ‘theory of development,’ or rather an attempt to
continually re-translate the same inner core that McGrath tells us we must find in the New
Testament and may only be interpreted within ‘the’ Church community. For example, McGrath
explains that “doctrine must not be seen as an alienating move away from the gospel, being
rather a development of a more advanced level of interpretative consciousness within the
Christian community.”121 At the same time, McGrath affirms in multiple locations the fact that
doctrines do in fact develop and change over time. He briefly suggests the possibility of utilizing
the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget as a model for doctrinal development since “these
four phases are hierarchical in that each stage incorporates its predecessors, building upon and
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modifying them.”122 Although he does not develop this interesting idea, it also does not seem
clear to what extent any actual development of doctrine is allowed in McGrath’s theory.
Furthermore, I think that the idea of the ‘narrative life of Jesus’ as both the generative source of
doctrine as well as its ‘framework’ for interpretation is likewise ambiguous. One would like to
know, for example, which interpretation of Jesus should serve as the ‘hermeneutical key’ for
developing this project. Perhaps McGrath would suggest that different communities tell different
interpretations of the life of Jesus, sharing only the importance of the telling of that story. To my
mind this would only further isolate and fragment theological reflection into multiple traditions,
all of which may well become more sectarian and incommensurable. There is also the matter of,
what seems to me, to be a monolithic conception of tradition, culture, or conceptual frameworks.
Kathryn Tanner describes this kind of terminology as belonging to the ‘modern’ rather than
‘postmodern’ conceptions of culture. Postliberal theology—as an example of utilizing modern
anthropological notions of culture—tends to assume the untroubled assertion of an isolated
system of interpretation, viewing them as exhibiting some internally consistent and stable
identity. But as Tanner points out, and we will soon examine more closely, cultures, are actually
quite fluid, with shifting and porous boundaries. And finally, I wonder if one can draw such a
sharp demarcation between what is historically, culturally, or linguistically conditioned, and that
which is immune to such social constructivism? This is a complex matter, and far outside what
may be addressed in this project, yet to my mind, McGrath has not successfully made a case for
his choices in what appears to be ‘socially constructed,’ and that which can be known, ‘in-itself.’
Perhaps another way of looking at this is to note the difficulty McGrath faces in attempting to
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reconcile a type of correspondence theory of truth (and a defense of Lindbeck’s cognitivepropositional notion of doctrine) with his historicism and advocation for a sociology of
knowledge. McGrath is a brilliant theologian, I have a bookshelf full of his writings, but this
theory of doctrine presented here is precisely the kind of incommensurable and sectarian
theology that this project is attempting to challenge.
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Kathryn Tanner
A perspective that does resonate with much of what I plan to say in this project may be
found in Kathryn Tanner’s, Theories of Culture, a work that we will be returning to throughout
this project.123 For all the differences between Lindbeck and McGrath—particularly Lindbeck’s
‘instrumentalist’ view versus McGrath’s ‘realist’ approach to doctrine—the two theologians have
quite a bit in common. For instance, both appear to interpret culture, tradition, and doctrine as
something inherently ‘stable,’ with well-defined boundaries. And often enough, in considering
such ‘social phenomena’ in this way, is to view them also, as incommensurable. Views of
culture, religion, tradition, or doctrine that assume the existence of ‘well-defined’ boundaries,
however, are also exclusive in nature, in that they divide and decide ‘who is in and who is out.’
So, the question that we need to ask is whether any culture or religion really should be thought of
as stable in this way with such definite and clear-cut boundaries? Are doctrines ever,
‘unconditionally and permanently essential?’ Can they be considered as having such stable
identities with strict clearly defined boundaries? Asking these questions brings us into Tanner’s
book and her extensive knowledge regarding the difference between modern and postmodern
understandings of anthropology. First, Tanner makes a convincing case that static or
homogenous social phenomena are illusory. There never has been any strict boundaries to culture
(or doctrine) that are inherently stable or immutable in the way post-liberals such as Lindbeck
and McGrath are proposing. In her text Tanner guides the reader through the changes in thought
patterns associated with a modern, and then into a postmodern, anthropological sensibility. She
argues that a postmodern understanding of culture, religion, doctrine, or any other social
phenomena, should be viewed as dynamic, interactive, reciprocal, porous, and with shifting
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rather than stable boundaries. The imposition of borders or boundaries, or indeed any assertion of
some stable and unvarying concept that is supposed to remain transcendent and above the
continually changing world of becoming, is not only an illusion, but often enough, such claims
may be a thinly veiled ‘power play.’124
Accordingly, any cultural, religious, or doctrinal formation should be interpreted as
always and already constructed from ‘borrowed materials.’125 Lindbeck and McGrath—and
indeed most post-liberals or narrative theologians generally—would assert that the Biblical
narrative is the ultimate criterion, or framework, for organizing and interpreting the
overwhelming amount of “borrowed materials” comprising Christianity, or Christian doctrine,
into a “distinctively Christian track.”126 The Bible, Tanner explains, when viewed in this way as
a meta-narrative or hermeneutical key, becomes the central lens for how all of the variegated
“borrowed material” may be interpreted. Yet it is precisely this perspective that fails to recognize
that the Bible itself consists “of borrowed materials.”127 And as Tanner explains, by exempting
the Bible—or the concept of doctrine we might add—from this process, “some subset or aspect
of Christian social practices is being privileged in a theologically suspect fashion.”128 Tanner
continues by explaining that:
The process of transforming borrowed material should be as much about self-criticism as
it is about criticism of other ways of life; it should be a self-directed process of
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transformation in keeping with an awareness of its own need for criticism. That would be
the case if, as we have suggested, Christian social practices are never themselves
anything other than the transformation of what is outside; if that is, Christian identity is
established from the beginning through the use of borrowed materials.129
I would suggest that what may be said of Biblical materials may also be said of doctrinal
formation. I will return to this theme of ‘borrowed materials’ throughout this work as it is a key
element in the constructive aspect of this project, as we will see. In many ways, to my mind at
least, Tanner is suggesting a postmodern anthropological perspective that parallels to some
extent my metaphorical language that employs ideas from contemporary information theory.
There is another term that Tanner employs that will be important in later chapters of this
work and that is the reference to “motifs.”130 She rarely refers to ‘doctrine’ as such, but the
concept of the ‘motif,’ or the ‘form,’ seem to parallel the idea of doctrine, perhaps including
other themes, phrases, or ideas that are also prevalent throughout Christian history. For Tanner,
theology is best understood as an ongoing ‘task,’ in the sense that the very search for ‘Christian
identity’ is itself a ‘task’ (or a style) in which any such identity is the task of continuing to
construct and self-critique such identity, especially any claim to a final or ‘stable’ identity.131
There is an irreducible plurality across Christianity—both throughout history and across
‘cultures.’ Yet it is precisely Christian discipleship, Tanner claims, that is what enables talk of a
‘Christian’ way of life.132 As Tanner explains, there are certain “affirmations” that provide a
common thread wherever Christians may be located. What she means by this is that there are
certain “motifs” that arise time and again in Christian discussion or forms of life. It may be the
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case that Christians tend to use expressions such as “love of God and neighbor,” or “the
Messiah,” or they may speak frequently of “dying and rising.”133 It is not agreement on the
precise meaning of these ‘motifs,’ nor the fact that those who identify as Christian use these
terms in exactly the same way that makes them Christian ‘motifs.’ These ‘motifs’ and other
phrases similar to these are indeed important to Christian ways of life. Yet there is no fixed
essence that is agreed upon as to the precise meaning of these motifs. Christians do not agree on
the content of these motifs, but they do typically agree that the motifs are important to their lives
in some way.134 Importantly, for this project, I would like to emphasize the following point from
Tanner. She insists that these motifs may themselves be called into question if they lead to some
form of idolatry or injustice. As she phrases this:
Christians claim that Jesus is God; that does not mean however, that some Christians
might not decide in the process that the central and overriding significance that Jesus
continues to have for human life would be less misleadingly expressed some other way.
In short, while they set the terms for argument, the forms themselves are not immune
from questioning as the argument proceeds.135
If at some point, within the vicissitudes of history, certain ‘motifs’ or doctrines become a
source or contributor to injustice, or in some way become contrary to Caritas—the love of God
and neighbor—then it may be ethically necessary to re-consider the formulation of this ‘motif’ or
doctrine and ponder whether a new construction or development may be in order. This is a point
that we will return to over the course of this project as well. In Tanner’s estimation, motifs may
provide guidelines to Christian thought and theological construction, but we must guard against
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making assertions to stable identities of these doctrines or writings as if they represented the final
truth. It is self-critique and humility that Tanner suggests are needed to live the Christian life and
guard against idolatry—either idolatry of our pride or idolatry in affirming doctrinal
constructions as if they fully represent Divine Truth. Tanner stresses that Christians should
always be open to hearing ‘new voices,’ or perhaps voices from the margins of ‘the borrowed
materials,’ and what they may be saying to us. It may be, that they help us avoid doctrinal
idolatry. As I will reiterate again in later chapters, a particular claim that Tanner iterates reminds
me of H.R. Niebuhr’s ‘permanent revolution’ within a view towards ‘Radical Monotheism,’ or
Tillich’s ‘Protestant Principle.’ In this phrase Tanner is again warning against the ever-present
threat of making our claims into an idolatrous representation of any ‘motif.’ Tanner stresses that
we must
…make God, rather than some human account of God, the center of one’s life. Doing
otherwise, making a Christian identity a matter of allegiance to certain meanings,
threatens to put human ideas about God in the place that only God should fill in Christian
life.136
Wolfhart Pannenberg
We now turn from the postmodern to the postfoundational. One scholar who is certainly
seeking to develop a publicly rational form of theological thought is Wolfhart Pannenberg.
Although we will look much closer at Pannenberg’s theology in the next chapter, it is important
to include him here, in the literature review, since he has provided a unique dialectical
understanding of the doctrinal development process. Asserting that “whatever is true, must
finally be consistent with all other truth,” Pannenberg may be said to be dedicated to a coherence
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theory of truth.137 At the same time, Pannenberg insists that truth be understood as an historical
occurrence so that we do not “narrow-mindedly substitute a particular perspective for the whole
of truth.”138Truth is always provisional, only partly developed, and endlessly revisable. And it is
only in the very process of history that we may say that ‘truth happens.’ Clearly the influence of
Hegel looms large over Pannenberg’s thought. As Pannenberg explains:
Hegel’s Thesis that the truth of the whole will be visible only at the end of history
approximates the biblical understanding of truth in two respects. It does so, firstly, by the
fact that the truth as such is understood not as timelessly unchangeable but as a process
that runs its course and maintains itself through change. Secondly, it does so by asserting
that the unity of the process, which is full of contradictions while it is underway, will
become visible along with the true meaning of every individual moment in it, only from
the standpoint of its end. What a thing is, it first decided by its future, by what becomes
of it.139
Pannenberg differs from Hegel, however, in that it is the resurrection of Christ that stands as a
proleptic event that both informs, and even shapes the past, as well as the present, from the
eschatological future while simultaneously keeping the future open-ended. Of course, the
Incarnation was, for Hegel, a mode of revelation of the unity of infinite and finite, but according
to Pannenberg, for Hegel “the Christ event was certainly something belonging to the closed past,
which might at best still continue to operate in the present in the spirit, in concept, but could by
no means be a still-open future.”140
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Another aspect of Pannenberg’s methodological approach that we must recognize
involves a philosophical hermeneutics such as that which was explicated by Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Pannenberg explains this interpretive movement in the following way:
The horizons of the interpreter and of the text to be interpreted are different at first, but
that is only their initial position, so to speak, in the process of interpretation. The
interpreter’s own horizon is not fixed, but capable of movement and expansion. In the
process of understanding, the interpreter’s horizon is widened in such a way that the
initially strange matter along with its own horizon can be appropriated into the expanded
horizon he attains as he understands. In the interpreter’s encounter with the text, a new
horizon is formed141
In a rather bold claim, Pannenberg describes God as the “all determining reality,” so that the
theologian should expect that all academic disciplines—history, sciences, psychology and so
on—must contain “theologically relevant dimensions.”142 At this point the assertion that God is
the “all determining reality,” may well leave one wondering why history does not appear to be
necessarily “providentially guided,” or “all- determined.” Pannenberg’s answer to this is that if
the coming of the Kingdom of God is understood as the eschatological rule of the “all
determining power” over all reality, then the obvious fact that the Kingdom has not yet arrived,
suggests that God will not be fully God until the Eschaton. Therefore, Pannenberg is able to state
that “in an important sense God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable,
God’s being is still in the process of coming to be.”143 The entire historical process amounts to “a
self-demonstration of God’s existence.”144The dialectical process of history has a structure of
anticipating the future (from the prolepsis of the Christ event), while continually looking back to
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re-configure our understanding of the past. And in keeping with his interdisciplinary
commitments, Pannenberg considers the category of ‘doctrine,’ to be best interpreted as
‘hypotheses’ that are “always to be tested against everything that can provide us with
evidence.”145 As we construct, revise, and test our ‘doctrinal hypotheses’ against reality, and
seek continual ‘coherence’ within this process of doctrinal development, Pannenberg insists that
there can be no immediate confirmation since “dogmatics speak constantly of something that
will fully appear only in a future which is inconceivable for us.”146 Therefore, for Pannenberg,
we may say that doctrines are hypotheses with eschatological verification. In the present, we
must be content with testing our doctrinal hypotheses for internal coherence with all other
knowledge and be prepared to revise and judge how well they shed light upon ‘theologically
relevant dimensions’ of our current existence.
The process of doctrinal development is a function of this dialectical process of history.
And, for Pannenberg, revelation is the whole process of history. The notion of Divine selfdisclosure occurs ‘indirectly’ throughout the full unfolding of this process. God does not reveal
God-self in any one act but rather it is all of the events of history that provide glimpses, and
indirect revelations, of some partial aspect of the Infinity of God. “These acts,” Pannenberg
explains,
cast light back on God himself, communicating something indirectly about God himself.
That does not of course mean that they reveal God or that God reveals himself in them as
their originator, for every individual event which is taken to be God’s activity illuminates
the being of God in a partial way. Thus no one act could be a full revelation of God. The
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isolated conception of a single divine action as the revelation of God most often leads to a
distorted view to an idol.147
The events of history, Pannenberg explains in a very Hegelian manner, are to be taken up and
reflected upon; and as they are formed, and tested for coherence with other knowledge, the
process of doctrinal development unfolds. Furthermore, the events of history are public and
universal in character. (Note how this is a far move away from the sectarian perspective we
witnessed in McGrath and Lindbeck)! Pannenberg explains that the universal events of history
are not only public but that “God has proved his deity in the language of facts.”148 Pannenberg
recognizes the importance of interpreting these ‘facts’—since there can be no uninterpreted
facts—in their “traditio-historical context”149 using any methods, theories, or perspectives that
continually assist in our ever-changing understandings. Nevertheless, Pannenberg insists that
rational reflection on public and universal historical events are open to everyone and is the
proper mode for determining and developing doctrines.150 Interestingly, Pannenberg claims that
to deny this public character to revelation and doctrinal development—that is, to view these
categories as belonging solely to a sectarian ‘Christian community”—would be a form of
Gnosticism. For Pannenberg, it is only a public and universal rational consideration of doctrinal
development throughout the process of ongoing history that may be understood as legitimate
revelation, and “if the problem is not thought of in this way, then the Christian truth for the in
group, and the Church becomes a gnostic community.”151
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Revelation considered as the unfolding of the whole of history entails that the fullness of
God’s revelation will only occur at the end, rather than the beginning of history.152 Thinking
dialectically involves this forming of new ‘doctrinal hypotheses,’ testing how well they
illuminate our knowledge, while we simultaneously look for the ‘theologically relevant
dimensions’ of all domains of knowledge. This back and forth, between the anticipated future, in
view of the proleptic event of resurrection, while continually revising our understanding of the
historical past, is the process of testing ‘doctrinal hypotheses.’ Doctrines, considered in this
light, may allow new meanings to emerge and new syntheses to arise even as old ones may be
considered unhelpful or misleading. Doctrines considered as hypotheses must continually be
tested in light of new interdisciplinary research and questioned for how well they illuminate our
understandings. New meanings are lifted up as we move towards the future even while past
interpretations are brought forward formulating new syntheses, which must be tested or perhaps
re-configured or even discarded. For Pannenberg, doctrinal development is a thoroughly
interdisciplinary dialectical process that considers doctrines as hypotheses with eschatological
verification.
Maurice Wiles
The last theologian I will examine in this literature review is Maurice Wiles. Wiles’
discussion of doctrinal development pushes the concept towards more ‘radical’ directions than
anyone examined in this chapter with the exception of Kathryn Tanner. Wiles begins by noting
the inadequacies of either the logical model or Newman’s model of development that “involved
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the discovery of truths of which the Church had not previously been fully conscious.”153 The
questions that Wiles suggests we should be asking today are of a different sort. For instance,
when one looks at any development of doctrine that has occurred in the history of the Church, we
should ask whether this was a necessary or merely a legitimate development. If the definition
pronounced at Chalcedon was a necessary one, then any further Christological reflection would
need to be first thoroughly grounded in that theology before considering any further development
or ‘translation.’ Furthermore, the assumption behind any judgment that a given doctrinal
formulation is a necessary one would be that it is essentially irreformable or immutable. The only
possible orthodox attitude towards it then would be to consider ‘translating’ the inner meaning or
significance in a different language. If, however, the pronouncement at Chalcedon is to be
considered a legitimate or valuable one, but not a necessary one, then new reflection could
occur, and a new formulation might be possible in order to better articulate it. However, Wiles
explains that we should go a step further in this and express “an unreadiness to accept in advance
that doctrinal development…can be assumed with confidence to have been wholly true in
direction and in conclusion.”154 It is worth pausing to reiterate just how ‘radical’ this assertion is
in the history of reflection on any theory of doctrinal development. Note that this ‘step further’ is
suggesting that one should be prepared to ponder whether a given past doctrinal formulation was
ever even “wholly true in direction and in conclusion.”
Newman, we may recall, claimed that there was an ‘antecedent probability’ that a
Divinely infallible guide would guarantee the true, orthodox, and necessary development of
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doctrine within the Church. But is this justified? Wiles says no. He explains that the same type of
expectation was once assumed in the field of scriptural criticism. For example, it was often
claimed that God would guarantee a verbal inerrancy to at least the autographs of the scriptures.
Aside from not having the originals, the evidence of historical critical analysis demonstrates
quite definitively that one cannot continue to claim that scripture has been infallibly written. And
if there is no legitimate reason for accepting the infallibility of scripture then a fortiori there is
less reason to assert an infallibility to doctrinal development. At any rate, to make such a
judgment would require an historical look at the process of development, which as Wiles
explains, does not support the claim either.155
To my mind, the model of doctrinal development that Wiles unfolds, can be understood
by first considering the idea of a paradigm shift, such as was first discussed briefly in the section
on McGrath. Consider the replacement of the Ptolemaic view of the universe with the
Copernican or heliocentric perspective.156 At least to a point, and for certain purposes, the
Ptolemaic model works just fine. One could add epicycles to explain much apparent planetary
motion, positions of the stars and so on. For centuries, this worked fine as long as one continues
to add epicycle within epicycles in ever more complicated patterns in order to explain
observation. With the paradigm shift to the Heliocentric model, however, the model became
immediately more elegant and much simpler. Wiles suggests that we consider this analogously
with the idea of doctrinal development. The Patristic writers were attempting to “assimilate new
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ideas” as mere “refinement” to existing doctrine.157 According to Wiles, this is similar to ancient
astronomers seeking to fit new epicycles to their understanding of the universe in order to
preserve the geocentric model. According to Wiles, the model that is required to not only
account for past doctrinal developments, but to promote useful developments in the future,
would be to adopt an analogy to the notion of a scientific paradigm shift. Wiles believes that a
careful examination of the history of doctrinal development exhibits a model of change that is
less like attempts to “assimilate new ideas by the addition of new refinements to the old” and
more like “assimilation of new ideas by modification of the old.”158
Wiles further illustrates this way of modeling doctrinal development by examining the
way in which the Patristic theologians debated with one another. For example, Wiles provides
many examples of the complex ‘role of argument’ in his text.159 One example should suffice to
show the pattern of argumentation that Wiles views as undermining the notion of any clear-cut
smooth process of development. Indeed, Wiles advocates something closer to the type of
development that one sees in scientific revolutions, as we just saw.160 So let us briefly turn to one
example Wiles provides of how ‘reason’ was implemented in antiquity.
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Tertullian, in his debates with Praxeas and the Modalist Monarchians, utilized New
Testament passages that seemed to stress the distinction between the Father and the Son.161 So,
for example, Tertullian appealed to accounts where the Son prays to the Father, or where the Son
is said to have ‘been sent’ by the Father and so on. The point Tertullian was trying to make, of
course, was to demonstrate that the Son and the Father are distinct based on Scripture and
therefore any Modalist claim that the Son is merely a modification of the Father entails the
absurdities associated with Patripassianism. And so it was that the late second and third century
debates against the Modalists eventually were successful. Stressing the distinction was usually
presented in subordinationist terms as we may see in the writings of Origen. By the time of the
Arain controversy, however, the Modalist ‘threat’ had all but disappeared and most theological
positions indeed recognized the distinction, or reality of three Divine Persons, or at least a
Binitarianism until the council of 381. They only disagreed regarding the co-equality of the
three. Typically, they accepted a kind of hierarchal movement such as found in Clement or,
especially Origen. So, at this point in the fourth century, theological debate was between those
who asserted the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and those Arians who stated that
the Logos was essentially a creature, albeit the highest of all creatures. Wiles’ point is that the
arguments (both Biblical and theological), that theologians such as Tertullian had appealed to in
his invective against the Modalists were now, ‘embarrassingly,’ being used by Subordinationist
proponents162. So, the very arguments and Scriptural passages utilized by Tertullian could now

161

See Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine, 114-140 for the full argument merely outlined here. For an
expanded explanation of this case see Wiles, “Some Reflections on the Origins of the Doctrine of the Trinity,”
Journal of Theological Studies, No. 8 (April, 1957, 92-106. For a critical reading of Wiles on this see Sarah
Coakley, “Why Three? Some Further Reflections on the Origins of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in The Making and
Remaking of Christian Doctrine, ed. Sarah Coakley and David Pailin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 31-56.
162
Wiles, Making of Christian Doctrine, 126.

69
be used to “support the Son’s inferiority to the Father” in favor of the Arian position.163
Consequently, many theologians were insisting that these scriptural passages “did not refer to the
relation of the first two persons of the Trinity at all but to the relation of the Father and the
Incarnate Christ.”164
At first sight all of this seems to simply confirm that a process of the development of
doctrine ‘happened.’ First, a potential threat to Orthodoxy arises in the form of Modalism, and
then when new thinking pressed the issue further, the concern over Arianism arose, at which
time, new concepts drawn from philosophy were appealed to for dealing with the new concern.
But this is not Wiles’ point. Wiles is explaining how there is a logical inconsistency between
different eras of theological debate if examined within a kind of arc of history. In other words, if
one looks closely at the arguments appealed to in an early point of debate, and then look at a later
period, often enough, the arguments in the first point, are forgotten or repudiated later.165 It is as
if the earlier arguments lift the Church to a new position, and then those same arguments are
dropped—or actually argued against if needed to combat a new ‘threat’ so that there is no logical
consistency over time. (It may remind one somewhat of Wittgenstein’s ‘ladder,’ used to
demonstrate the limits of language only to be thrown away once arrived at that desired position).
Or, to simply let Wiles describe the issue as he sees it:
This discussion of trinitarian doctrine arose out of an attempt to understand the logical
structure of the development of a doctrine through two distinct stages; it was designed to
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show that the reasoning used in those stages, though apparently convincing when each
stage is regarded in isolation, may prove to be self-contradictory when the two are put
together and seen as part of a single process of development. 166
The logical inconsistency is apparent when these two temporal contexts are viewed together. So,
it is not that Wiles is arguing against the idea of applying reason to theological debates. Far from
it. Rather, it is simply that Wiles wishes to question any concept of doctrinal development as a
process that produces necessary or irreformable doctrines.
Wiles contends that throughout the Christian history of doctrinal development, three
sources have been and need to be appeal to. Those three sources are Scripture, worship, and a
sense of salvation. I will look briefly at each of these three. Scripture for the early Church was at
first the Hebrew Scriptures read in light of the Christ event. Wiles maintains that the oral
tradition must not in any way be thought of as separate from the emerging New Testament
Scriptures as it was the former that gave rise to the later. Wiles provides many instances of the
use of Scripture for doctrinal debates. It should suffice to mention a couple of examples he
provides. The central point Wiles insists upon is that often enough Scripture is used to justify a
position that a thinker already holds. The tendency to proof text is quite common at the time. For
instance, Arius appeals to Proverbs 8:22 where “Wisdom” proclaims “The Lord created me at
the beginning of his work.” Athanasius, for his part, was fond of quoting Psalm 110:3, “From the
dew of the morning I begat thee before the morning star,” which he apparently claimed
supported his position of the eternal “generation” (begetting) of the Logos.167 Yet as Wiles
maintains, neither Arius nor Athanasius came to their theological stances on the basis of these
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passages but, “the role of Scripture here was rather confirmatory of a position originally adopted
for quite other reasons.”168
Worship or the role of lex orandi lex credendi in shaping doctrinal outcomes is key in
Wiles’ thought. Again, to provide a single example, Wiles cites the way that Origen taught the
proper form of prayer. For Origen, prayer should always be to God but through Christ, a position
that Wiles has documented as quite common amongst “the official liturgy of the Church.”169 Yet
it is the so-called popular liturgical practices of the time that seemed to have had the most impact
on shaping the contours of doctrinal formation, especially of the ‘high’ Christological kind.170
‘Popular liturgical’ practices also account for the largest impetus, according to Wiles, for the
pressure to understand the Holy Spirit as being consubstantial with the God-head as well.171
Soteriological experience is the third source Wiles explains governs doctrinal
development. Our example from this section looks to two of the main ways in which salvation
was experienced in the early centuries. In Antioch, the so-called Logos-Anthropos school that
considered the Word ‘conjoined’ to a human being emphasized the sense that salvation must be
‘of the human.’ The phrase “what has not been assumed is not healed,” uttered by Gregory
Nazianzen is invariably associated with this “Christological school.”172 On the other hand, Cyril,
and others at Alexandria—the so-called Logos-Sarx Christological school—insisted salvation
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can only be achieved by God which for them meant that if the Logos is merely ‘conjoined’ to a
man, how could humanity be transformed? Only the life-giving Spirit of the Logos would have
the power of restoring the divine likeness to human beings. And, of course, the Logos-Sarx
viewpoint was promoted earlier by Athanasius against the Arians. Now, this all too brief
roughshod ride over this convoluted and important period of Christological development has a
point. I mention what we have seen here—not to pretend to have ‘covered the issues”—but to set
up the main point that Wiles is getting to. As a means of illustrating the possibility of how
doctrinal development could have gone in a different direction, Wiles asks: What ‘soteriological
principles’ may we glean from these two viewpoints that played an enormous role in the
Christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries? Wiles explains:
On the one hand was the conviction that a savior must be fully divine; on the other was
the conviction that what is not assumed is not healed. Or, to put the matter in other words,
the source of salvation must be God; the locus of salvation must be man. It is quite clear
that these two principles often pulled in opposite directions. The Council of Chalcedon
was the Church’s attempt to live resolve, or perhaps rather to agree to live with, that
tension.173
Wiles continues this line of thought by reminding the reader that one further theme that was
common to all the theologians of the era was the belief salvation involved being “made partakers
of the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4).174 In other words, the common soteriological belief was in the
process of divinization or theosis. Furthermore, all of the Patristic writers distinguished between
‘gods by grace,’ and ‘God by nature.’ Christ was ‘God by nature,’ whereas a believer may hope
to be transformed as seen in the phrase, ‘gods by grace.’ These distinctions that were accepted by
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all parties in these disputes suggest that Christological development could have gone in a very
different direction. According to Wiles:
In the light of this understanding of man’s destiny, it does not seem logically absurd to
claim on behalf of Arianism that the Son, the supreme God’s agent in creation, who in the
Arian scheme is the example par excellence of what it is to be a ‘god by grace’ should be
able in the work of redemption to bring us to be what he already is and so make us also
‘gods by grace’ with as full a fellowship with God as is possible for finite beings.175
Now, Wiles is not recommending that we adopt an Arian Christology, he is merely providing an
example of his theory that doctrine may have evolved in very different directions.176 Wiles is
keen on demonstrating that such alternative developments could have been legitimate according
to the accepted beliefs of the time, namely scriptural exegesis, worship, and the experience of
salvation. These three criteria, according to Wiles, are legitimate sources to any past or future
doctrinal developments. Nevertheless, we should be aware that the past interpretations of these
sources could have been expounded different—and importantly, for Wiles, in some cases they
perhaps should have been constructed differently.
For Wiles, there is no legitimate interpretation of doctrinal development that views this
process as one of unchanging dogma or precise continuity.177 It is rather in the “continuity of
aims” that Wiles finds important.178 We must appeal to the three criteria of development but do
so within the time, and context in which we find ourselves. As Wiles puts it:
I believe that we are more likely to prove loyal to the past, in the important sense of the
word ‘loyal’, if we think not so much in terms of the translation of old formulae into new
sets of words as in terms of the continuation of the same task of interpreting the Church’s
Scriptures, her worship and her experience of salvation.179
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Some Concluding Thoughts
For the purposes of this essay, I would like to propose a mapping of doctrinal
developmental ‘types.’ I suggest three ‘ideal’ types: (1) Organic growth model (2)
Pneumological-tradition model (3) Dialectical Doctrinal Development model. I do not think, nor
will I attempt, to place the theologians that I review directly under one single category. All of
them may be interpreted in light of any of these types, although some will be more directly
‘under’ one category than another. The types may be helpful just to delineate certain,
‘tendencies,’ that any model of doctrinal development may exhibit. I maintain that this tripartite
typology can serve as a heuristic device to depict some of the elements that I suggest should be
included into a model of our re-configured development of doctrine. The reason why I am
suggesting the types is simply to illustrate the value that I wish to derive from each.
Allow me to explain. Each type has value and may be thought to contribute to the
reconfigured sense of doctrinal development that I will be unfolding over the course of this
project. From the first model, I find the metaphor of ‘organic growth’ appropriate, although I
suggest that this should be ‘re-configured’ as we will see especially in Chapter Three. The
second model values the importance of tradition and its role in any development of doctrine—
especially such as Wiles’ criteria of Scripture, worship, and experience. Here again, Tanner’s use
of the term ‘motif’ applies nicely, although as she would insist, any notion of ‘tradition’ cannot
be thought of as some incommensurable ‘culture’—such as advocated by Lindbeck and
McGrath. Yet the ‘fragments’ and ‘motifs’ of the fluid traditions we find ourselves in still may
speak to us today. The third model, is suggestive of Pannenberg’s concept of doctrine as a
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thoroughly interdisciplinary dialectical process that considers doctrines as hypotheses with
eschatological verification. So it is that I find the ideas of ‘organic growth’ metaphors, tradition,
and doctrine as interdisciplinary and types of hypotheses that may continually need revision in
light of new information to be the vital elements that I glean from these three ‘ideal types’ of
doctrinal development.
There is a tendency that we may notice most clearly in the writings of Pannenberg and
McGrath to treat doctrine as basically ‘propositional.’ And for these scholars, as well as for
Lindbeck, the essence of Christianity appears to be doctrinal. In other words, there is a clear
emphasis upon orthodoxy but very little view towards an ethical perspective or orthopraxy. For
Pannenberg and McGrath, doctrines are inextricably connected to a correspondence theory of
truth. There are, of course, elements of a coherence theory of truth in both thinkers. Nevertheless,
both are quite insistent that true doctrines must have an ‘external referent. ‘ Now in this regard,
Lindbeck, as we have seen, contends that doctrine is essentially nomological, or perhaps to be
thought of as hermeneutical rules. Yet there too, Lindbeck insists that crucial theological and
Christological doctrines are “unconditional, necessary, and irreversible.”180 To conceive of
doctrine in this way—as something ‘out of play’ and transcendent above the vicissitudes of
history—is an unfounded and arbitrary maneuver as I believe Tanner has demonstrated. And the
very notion of ‘unconditional, necessary or irreversible’ doctrine is explicitly called into question
through the historical analysis of Maurice Wiles.
Two final points. Too often in the history of Christian thought we witness ‘doctrine’
being thought of as unchangeable, to the point of being ossified, and even weaponized. This
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point will occupy much of the following chapters. I will not pursue it further here. Secondly, in
none of these authors—with the possible exception of Tanner—do we see the criterion of Caritas
employed as a source or guideline for doctrinal construction. This is the second element that this
project seeks to develop: an ethical dimension, or ethics of belief, as a key criterion to any future
discussion of doctrinal development. With the mention of Caritas, we may now turn to the
second chapter where we will look at Augustine and his emphasis upon the inextricable
connection between doctrine and caritas.

CHAPTER TWO
AN AUGUSTINIAN RETRIEVAL
Simone Weil once asked the question, “How can Christianity call itself catholic if the
universe itself is left out?”1 Although his overall theology tends to place greater emphasis upon
the inexhaustible and unchanging transcendent, rather than the immanent, in De Doctrina
Christiana (On Christian Doctrine, translated by R.P.H. Green), Augustine reminds his readers
to view the entire universe with reference to God. According to Augustine, the ‘things’ of this
world, if understood properly, should lead one to a proper mode of love in which the ‘signs and
things’ of the universe point to the knowledge of the ultimate double commandment of love. It is
a type of an almost Neoplatonic ascent, an ‘upward’ movement from sign (signa) to thing (res)
on to the Divine. This Augustinian notion of the movement from ‘representation’ to ‘reality,’
will, in the first part of this chapter, provide a type of heuristic and analysis for theological ideas
and doctrines. In this chapter I will suggest a type of doctrinal ‘mapping’ that utilizes the
interpretation theory and praxis laid out by Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana.2
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There are, of course, multiple ways in which we could attempt to “map what doctrines
are about”—how they form, how they function. 3
When attempting to provide models or ‘maps’ for something as diverse as discussions of
doctrine, there is the constant danger of squeezing subtle differences into preconceived
categories.4 Furthermore, many ways of considering doctrine are less about theories of truth and
more about critical theory or hermeneutics. And I am aware that the very notion of applying any
theory of truth in the ways listed is controversial. And again, there are those who would argue
that even the very claim to ‘truth’ is a kind of violence.5 Yet to my mind, given the impossible
task of reviewing in a single book all the literature on issues of doctrine and its development, this
framework is useful as an analytic map as well as a heuristic device for examining the thesis of
this chapter: that virtually all theological discussion on the topic of ‘doctrine’ can be understood
as exhibiting a type of sign to res structure; and this structure—or what I will call an
‘Augustinian paradigm’ or ‘heuristic’—makes clear that, in whatever other ways the ‘theories’ of
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Truth. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 23. These topics are
extremely important but outside the scope of this chapter. My point is to simply recognize this, and to suggest that
my aim in explicating this “Augustinian sign-res paradigm” can serve as a useful heuristic. I would claim that
regardless of one’s notion of doctrine or one’s epistemology (or any rejection of this category whether for
philosophical or neuroscientific reasons) this paradigm can illuminate some interesting features of doctrine.
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doctrine differ, most all discussions of this theological category assume that the sign (or doctrinal
representation) is an imperfect attempt to point to an unchanging res. In other words, I am
claiming that the various ways one can construe ideas about ‘doctrine’ can be placed under the
Augustinian paradigm which is able to show this most general feature of all of them.6
In the first chapter we examined the ideas of some key representative thinkers writing
about doctrinal development in the post-Newman era. The arguments of these theologians
centered around establishing criteria for whether doctrines are ever, ‘irreformable,’ or
establishing criteria for any potential limits to doctrinal development. Nevertheless, I am
suggesting that what the various mappings of doctrine elucidated above share with the scholars
mentioned in the first chapter is an implicit Augustinian assumption of a type of ‘signa/res,’ ‘a
representation to reality’ framework. And so again, and in other words, in whatever way these
various models differ—and of course there is considerable difference—nevertheless they all
assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that the res—that which the doctrines (signs, symbols,
representations) are trying, however imperfectly to express—is an unchanging almost semi-

6

So for example, two brief initial illustrations: (1) Alister E. McGrath asserts that “it is proper to suggest that there
is an ineradicable cognitive element to Christian doctrine, considered as an historical phenomenon. It purports to be
a representation, however inadequate or provisional, of the ways things really are” in The Genesis of Doctrine: A
Study in the Foundation of Doctrinal Criticism (Grand Rapids, Mi: Eerdmans, 1997), 75. This is a relatively
straightforward claim of a sign or representational quality of doctrine that refers to some res. (2) George Lindbeck
would refer to this as a type of “cognitive-propositional” or “first order” truth-claim that relies upon truth theories of
correspondence or representational theories of meaning. As an alternative proposal, Lindbeck argues for a culturallinguistic model of doctrine. Rather than viewing doctrine as propositional or “experientially-expressive,” Lindbeck
argues that doctrine serves as “regulative” or as the “grammar” of a “language-game.” Understood as “rules of
grammar” I would argue that treating doctrine as such “second-order assertions” or “intrasystematic” claims
nevertheless assumes a type of res-like status for doctrine. Just as it makes little sense to question whether rules or
grammar are “objectively true,” doctrines too are supposed to be understood as “out of play,” unquestionable and
quasi-transcendent criteria that govern the intratextual project of theology. Nevertheless, even if Lindbeck considers
doctrine “nomologically” as opposed to “epistemologically,” seems to my mind to make little difference for our
purposes here. Doctrines are still considered the true ‘res’ of Christianity for Lindbeck. See George A. Lindbeck,
The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Pa: Westminster Press, 1984).
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Platonic essence or thing-in-itself behind the signs. The signs which are symbols drawn from the
culture (signum) are attempts to represent this unchanging reality (res) behind the appearances.7
Or to describe this in another way, the emphasis has been essentially epistemological, with some
type of a quasi-metaphysical status attributed to doctrine. Doctrines are elevated to the status of
the true ‘res’ of the Christian faith. Whereas for Augustine, as we shall see, it is Caritas which is
the ‘res’ of the faith. Neither doctrines nor scripture are the central key of Christianity for
Augustine. Just as one should be open to the inexhaustible love of God, one may see an
indefinite number of interpretations that are equally valid insofar as they express Caritas.
Doctrines, at their best, are merely expressions of Caritas and ultimately in service to it.
Therefore, this chapter consists of two parts. In the first part I will examine the structure
of this ‘Augustinian paradigm.’ The second part will consist of an application of this paradigm as
a heuristic device to two theologians in order to analyze what I have referred to as a near

7

Perhaps it would be useful to suggest two possible but opposite ‘type’ analogies: (1) realism/anti-realism debates
or (2) insights and metaphors from evolution and contemporary genetics. First, the categories of realism and antirealism within the philosophy of science. Anti-realist positions such as those espoused by the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum physics suggest that, for example, particles such as an electron that cannot be directly
observed, even with extended powers of observation, may be understood in a purely instrumentalist or ‘consensus’
perspective. Descriptions of “spin,” “wave,” “position,” and the like are merely human concepts derived from
experience at the macrolevel. But at the quantum level, beyond the categories such as space, time, causation that we
have available to us, the impositions of these concepts just do not really apply. Formulas used to describe motion at
the macrolevel break down at the quantum level. This view might lead one to ask: if a particle is not anything but
“probability waves” until measured by some instrumentation, does this mean that reality is in some way dependent
upon our categories of thought? In view of the strangeness of wave-particle duality we can say that the Copenhagen
view is an ontological and not just an epistemological interpretation. Realists, by contrast, insist that reality is in
principle knowable. Quantum physics is thus an incomplete theory. By delving deeper and deeper into existence
scientists can move closer to the reality under the appearances. (This leads to notions of multiple dimensions and
the like). I would like to suggest that the question of an unchanging res behind the sign, or a reality behind the
representations, is at least loosely analogous to the debates of the anti-realist and realists. Is there a res or not? Or
rather, is it that the res exists but itself evolves? Utilizing metaphors from modern genetics and evolution one could
think of not simply a development or change in sign or representation but rather change “all the way down.” On this
later view, all of reality is evolving. In light of such questions, where for example would one place the “death of
God” theologians? Do they deny that there is any res (anti-realism or instrumentalism)? Or would they argue that
there is no distinction between sign and res ? Or would they think of the res as itself evolving? What of certain
process thinkers? There are multiple possibilities here. On the other hand, open theists, for example, I would suggest
end up treating biblical texts themselves as res. At any rate, considering these types of questions in light of these
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universal doctrinal structure where the sign (doctrinal representation) implicitly points to an
unchanging res. Towards this end, the second part will examine aspects of the thought of
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jon Sobrino. These two theologians employ a dialectical approach in
their respective works. Yet while it is true that their projects have roots in the thought of G.W.F
Hegel, their respective interpretations take the well-examined divergence of thought roughly
described as focusing on moving from inadequate symbols to more adequate concepts on the one
hand, or ‘turning this upside down’ in order to stress the material conditions of existence on the
other hand. In other words, Pannenberg is articulating an example of German Absolute Idealism,
whereas Sobrino represents a theology more in line with so-called Historical-Materialism. This is
not to say that Pannenberg is merely following Hegel, nor that Sobrino is simply a Marxist. They
are both theologians first and foremost. Pannenberg, for example, has been quite clear that the
future be viewed as open, allowing for new possibilities and new events in a manner that he
believes Hegel (and some of Hegel’s followers like Ernst Troeltsch) cannot provide within their
interpretations.8 And Sobrino is adamant in asserting that refusal to understand Christianity in
any other way than as total commitment against injustice and poverty would be essentially a
betrayal of the faith. And yet he also insists that “we cannot possibly realize the kingdom in all
its fullness because it is a gift.”9 Nevertheless, there is an inverse relation between these two
dialectical approaches that ‘fit’ the Augustinian sign-Res paradigm albeit in quite different ways.
For Pannenberg, the sign (doctrine) is constructed dialectically in history as a revisable and
analogies might be useful as providing another aspect of the mapping and “Augustinian sign-res paradigm.” This
article will focus on the perspective of doctrines using metaphors inspired from evolution and genetics.
8
Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Hermeneutic and Universal History,” originally translated by Paul J. Achtemeier in Basic
Questions in Theology, Collected Essays: Vol. I, Translated by George H. Kehm. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
2008), pp. 134-135.
9

Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, translated by John Drury (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1978), 135.
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interdisciplinary project as the imperfectly known future (Res) comes as possibility to the
present. Doctrines are hypotheses with an eschatological verification. For Pannenberg doctrines
are the ‘res’ of the faith. Sobrino, by contrast, interprets the sign of the suffering poor as pointing
to the future Res and justice of the Kingdom. For Sobrino, any legitimate discussion of doctrine
is really about action or praxis. It is structural change and justice that is the goal and the driving
force here. It is not elevating representations to the level of Concept that is central, rather, the
point is to “take the crucified people down from the cross.”10 It is this last statement that
probably expresses best what constitutes the ‘res’ of Christianity for Sobrino. And so I think that
both thinkers can be interpreted within the Augustinian sign-Res paradigm.11 And both also
follow Augustine’s understanding that any theological construction requires a praxis, albeit these
interpretations are also in an almost inverse relationship to one another. And both also, either
explicitly or implicitly, assume that there is an unchanging Res behind these constructions, as I
will attempt to demonstrate, after the following elucidation of ‘Augustine’s sign-Res paradigm.’
And yet I am suggesting that Sobrino’s emphasis upon taking ‘the crucified people down from
the cross,’ is in fact much closer to Augustine’s insistence upon Caritas as the ‘res’ of
Christianity than Pannenberg’s notion of the Christian ‘res’ consisting primarily of doctrinal
hypotheses seeking eschatological verification.
An ‘Augustinian Paradigm’

10

Jon Sobrino, Christ the Liberator: A View from the Victims, translated by Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Press, 2001), p.48.
11

It is also interesting to note that Hegel provided the first real new development in any theology of history since the
time of Augustine (who provided the first major theology of history). According to Karl Lowith, after Augustine,
Joachim of Fiore, Bossuet, and Vico built on this basic Augustinian framework. Voltaire formulated the first notion
of a philosophy rather than a theology of history. So Pannenberg and Sobrino as “heirs” of Hegel are in an
interesting historical lineage of “theology of history” as well. See Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949).
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One particular theme that appears time and again in Augustine’s many writings could be
summed up in is his assertion that “My will is my weight.”12 For Augustine, that which one loves
is like a weight pulling or directing one’s being towards it, either towards the Creator or some
aspect of creation.13 It is caritas, the love of God and neighbor, that Augustine views as the true
goal of one’s life and love. If love unites one to that which one loves, then a life of caritas unites
one to God and neighbor. This same theme appears again as the standard of a right-ordered love
throughout the four books that comprise his De Doctrina Christiana.14 Book one deals primarily
with notions of possible contents of faith, that is, the right ‘thing’ to center one’s life upon.15
Books two and three examine issues of signification and interpretation. The final book comprises
Augustine’s advice on what he considers the most legitimate ways to effectively convey the
Christian message to various audiences.
“All teaching,” explains Augustine “is teaching of either things or signs, but things are
learnt through signs” (DDC 1.2.2). Signs (signa) are also things, albeit something that signifies
something else. Things (res) can also signify other things although not all things are necessarily
signs. Furthermore, all signs are things although not all things are signs. Because a sign (signum)

12

Augustine, Confessions, 2nd edition, Translated by F.J. Sheed, Edited by Michael P. Foley (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 13.9.10.
13

Ibid., Also see 1.1.1; 10.27.38. Also in Book 14 of The City of God.
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Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, translated by R.P.H. Green (New York, Oxford University Press, 1999).

15

What I mean by referring to Book I as about “faith” as opposed to “things,” is due to the stress Augustine places
on the issue of rightly or wrongly ordered love. I cannot read this book without thinking about Paul Tillich’s notion
of “Ultimate concern.” For the later, there is an objective and subjective correlate as well. Having an ultimate
concern may be universal, according to Tillich, but the objective correlate of this can differ almost indefinitely. For
this point see Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, (NY:Perennial Classics, 2001), 1-34. Also, Marcus Borg’s differentiation
between “believing that” and “believing in” are helpful distinctions. The former is about “propositions” and their
correct correspondence to reality. Believing in, is about an new orientation, “trust, loyalty, love,” and a way of
living that leads to transformation. It seems to me that these are some contemporary ways of getting at Augustine’s
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serves as a representation of some reality (res), we can understand Augustine’s statement that
“things are learnt through signs.” Augustine is suggesting that humans and human activity are
always already embedded within “systems of representation.”16 Yet according to Rowan
Williams, a “res is, first and foremost, something whose being is not determined by the function
of meaning something else. It is what it is, and does not belong in a system of representation. It
may become part of such a system, and be both res and signum.”17
It is the concept of res, ‘thing,’ that Augustine interprets in terms of his understanding of
caritas, or the double commandment of love that is such a constant theme for him. “There are
some things,” Augustine explains, “which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, and
some whose function is both to enjoy and use” (DDC 1.3.3.) The uti (use) and frui (enjoyment)
distinction is made in order to ‘map’ out the proper subjective attitude that one should take in
relation to the many good things of the world. To enjoy some ‘thing’ in Augustine’s sense of the
word is to make it the center of one’s being. Enjoyment of a thing is to regard it with complete
commitment, the source of importance, and the ground of meaning in one’s life. The thing one
seeks to enjoy is the object of one’s ultimate desire, what they believe will ultimately satisfy
their being.18 It is literally the ‘end’ of all of our seeking. On the other hand, to ‘use’ something
is to appreciate it in relation to that which one seeks to enjoy. Augustine wants us to love things

notion of Enjoyment and properly ordered love. See especially pages 14-26 in his Jesus: Uncovering the Life,
Teachings, and Relevance of a Religious Revolutionary, (NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006).
16
Rowan Williams, “Language, Reality and Desire in Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” in The Journal of
Literature and Theology, Volume 3, No 2 (1989), 139.
17

Williams, “Language, Reality, and Desire,” 139.
Williams “Language, Reality, and Desire,” 148. Also See Oliver O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De
Doctrina Christiana I,” Journal of Theological Studies, No. 32, (1982), 361-397.
18
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that are to be ‘used’ in relation to or for the sake of our ultimate goal of enjoyment of that which
makes us happy.
For Augustine, the subjective side of all this is involves understanding what should be the
proper referent to one’s love in the sense of enjoyment. To love something finite—whether the
self or some other thing—is to confuse the notions of what is to be used and what should be
enjoyed. No finite ‘thing’ could possibly bear the full ‘weight of one’s will.’ This subjective
confusion of properly ordered love with inappropriate objective correlates will simply lead one
to dissatisfaction (DDC 1.4.4.). While it may be the case that the many things of the world are
created as ‘good’ for Augustine, they are not the infinite Good, and so will ultimately disappoint.
The temporal things of the universe are to be ‘used’ to move ‘upward’ to the eternal things that
are to be enjoyed—the Triune God as the ultimate Res.19 It is Caritas, the double command to
love God and neighbor that Augustine asserts as the scriptural justification for his theory of the
true Res. God is the only ‘thing’ that could possibly fulfill human desire.20 And the neighbor, as

19

This notion of loving or using the journey for the sake of arriving at the destination and not loving or enjoying the
journey itself, is also a common theme in Augustine, eg, (DDC 1.4.4.). Augustine’s Neoplatonic metaphors and
ideas of the soul’s ascent from the sensible to the intelligible was probably most influenced by his reading of
Plotinus’ The Enneads (see especially “On Beauty” and “On the Three Primary Hypostases.”) Augustine’s notion of
Caritas was greatly influenced by the idea of eros that extends back to Plato’s Symposium (esp. 199c-212b) and
Phaedrus (esp. 244a-257b). In this Platonist conception, if the soul can move beyond the many beautiful things of
the world towards the source of Beauty Itself, this erotic desire will allow the soul to achieve its true place. For a
critique of this see the large work by Anders Nygren, Eros and Agape. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1982). It is on pages 476-558 in this large work where Nygren argues that Augustine’s understanding of love has too
much of a Platonist conception of Eros about it. See especially chapters 4 and 5 of John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A
Study in the Religion of St. Augustine (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), for a more positive view of
Augustine on love.
20
The idea that God is a “Thing” is, of course, a controversial topic involving discussions of language and the
question of onto-theology. The literature on this topic is enormous. A few examples: See for example, Kevin W.
Hector, Theology Without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition (UK: Cambridge Press,
2011); Religion After Metaphysics. Edited by Mark A. Wrathall (UK: Cambridge, 2003); Merold Westphal
Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith (NY: Fordham Press, 2001); God, The Gift, and
Postmodernism, Edited by John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington,IN: Indiana University Press,
1999); also see Thomas A. Carlson Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God (University of Chicago Press,
1999); Views more “ontotheological”: Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology Edited by
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the fellow being that is capable of ‘using and enjoying,’ is thus able to enjoy God with others,
and so is worthy of human love as well, in reference to the Divine (DDC 1.27.28; 1.29.30). It is
worth quoting Augustine on this point:
The chief purpose of all that we have been saying in our discussion of things is to make it
understood that the fulfilment and end of the law [cf. Rom, 13:10; I Tim. 1:5] and all the
divine scriptures is to love the thing which must be enjoyed and the thing which together
with us can enjoy that thing (DDC 1.35.39).
Also at the end of Book I, Augustine explains that as soon as one understands that the
double command to love is the end of all scripture, one cannot interpret those scriptures
incorrectly, even if one does not understand correctly the original (human) authorial intention
(DDC 1.36.41.). Therefore, “A person strengthened by faith, hope, and love,” Augustine
explains, “has no need of the scriptures, except to instruct others” (DDC 1.39.43). Thus, the
scriptures are to be ‘used’ and not considered an object of ‘enjoyment.’
After his discussion on ‘things,’ Augustine turns his attention to ‘signs.’ Some things are,
in themselves, a terminus of a sign when the thing in question does not signify anything else. Yet
many things will also act as signs. Signification can refer to natural signs (signa naturalia) as
well as ‘conventional signs’ (signa data).21 Natural signs refer to smoke or footprints and thus
point to the fire or animal that gave rise to them (DDC 2.1.1.). Augustine is primarily concerned
with analyzing conventional signs. These can be analyzed into two groupings: signa propria and
signa translata. When a conventional sign refers to some ‘thing,’ such as in Augustine’s
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example of an ox, the verbal sign ‘ox’ refers to the extra-mental animal, namely an ox.22 Such
verbal signs are signa propria, and any confusion over the meaning can, according to Augustine,
be clarified often enough through studying the language or consulting various translations. The
real issue for Augustine involves the category of signa translata, often translated as signa
figurata.23 This involves situations in which a sign refers to a thing which signifies somethings
else. Such figurative speech occurs frequently within scripture. Augustine uses the example of
the scriptural sign ‘ox,’ that signifies an ox, which signifies an apostle [ 1 Cor.9:9 and I Tim.
5:18, quoting Deut. 25:4 (DDC 2.10.15)]. Now, frequent uses of such figurative speech occur
throughout culture. According to Augustine the signs and symbols of language can be
understood in terms of “two kinds of learning” (DDC 2.19.29). The first type refers to those
‘systems of signification’ that were instituted by human beings. The second, refers to those that
were “already in place” or even “divinely instituted.”24 The fact that some ‘things’ are in some
sense ‘signs’ able to point to other ‘things’ is due therefore, to the existence of one or the other of
these two types of ‘learning.’
One ‘kind of learning’ that Augustine sees as instituted (or perhaps we might say socially
constructed) by human beings involves astrology. Astrology or divination both involve a
complex ‘system of signification’ in which certain ‘things’ are invested with meaning and refer
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to other ‘things,’ in order to, for example, provide reasons for human events, significance of
natural events for human destinies and so on (DDC 2.20.30—2.25.39). For Augustine, such
practices form ways of thinking and acting that encourage people to worship creation rather than
the Creator. Such actions are idolatrous because they amount to ‘enjoying’ things in themselves
rather than ‘using’ them as ways of ascending to the Infinite. And although Augustine considers
such practices as actual pacts between humans and demons, many today would at least agree that
such systems of signification are elaborately socially constructed (DDC 2.23.36).
For Augustine there are other humanly instituted ways of signifying that are neutral in
value. Some type of economic exchange, systems of weights and measure and so on are essential
for any society to function (DDC 2.25.38—26.40). Interestingly, Augustine makes the assertion
that although the type of signification used for mathematics and logic are humanly instituted, the
things that they refer to are not. In this respect Augustine seems to be in line once again with
Platonic and Pythagorean interpretations. In this case he seems to hold to at least some type of
Platonic number theory. For these schools of thought, as apparently for Augustine, numbers and
things are discovered, they are not invented (DDC 2.30.58—2.34.52; 2.37.55—2.39.63).
Now the issue that Augustine is raising with all of these categories involves the following
questions: How can one determine whether any given ‘system of signification’ is legitimate or
not ? How can one know whether a given verbal sign (for example in scripture) is to be
understood as figurative or not ? Augustine wants to avoid two potential difficulties. First he
does not wish to confuse any ‘sign’ that was intended to be understood as signa propria in such a
way as to be interpreted as a signa figurata (DDC 3.9.13—3.10.14). This would amount to
merely imposing some external meaning onto something else. Second, he wants to avoid the
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opposite problem where something that should have been understood figuratively ends up
interpreted in a literal sense. For Augustine, this is would be a context where “The letter kills but
the spirit gives life” [(2 Cor. 3:6) (DDC 3.4.8—3.5.9)]. A further danger lies in the possibility
that people interpret these things incorrectly because they decide the two questions above on the
basis of their own cultural values or moral judgments (DDC 3.9.13—3.25.36). For Augustine the
answer to all of these questions comes down to the double commandment of love. Once again it
is caritas that enables Augustine to determine the legitimacy of interpretations. So, in regards to a
‘system of signification’ such as astrology, Augustine argued that the socially constructed values
and meanings attached to ‘things’ within these ‘sign systems,’ does not lead one to caritas but
instead it will lead them towards a deeper cupiditas. According to Augustine, any ‘system of
representation’ that involves one’s mode of love, (as in the sense of ‘enjoyment’), of created
things will encourage both self-love and further love of created entities. Yet any language, sign
system, or interpretation that builds up love of God and neighbor is based on caritas. Caritas has
the ability to encourage social interactions and relationships precisely because it is the only mode
of being in which one lives according to a rightly order love (DDC 3.10.15). And so any
interpretation of the scripture is legitimate as long as it promotes and embodies caritas. One can
know quite readily whether an interpretation of scripture should be taken as literal or figurative
by asking the question: Does this passage, taken literally, build up or tear down caritas? If it
literally exhibits nothing of caritas, then it must be understood figuratively.
Summary of Augustine’s Signa-Res Paradigm
From this brief exploration of Augustine’s sign theory, here are six central points that it
seems, to my mind at least, should be noted at this point:
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First, there is Augustine’s prescription that any rightly-ordered mode of love should only
seek ‘enjoyment’ (‘belief in,’ ‘ultimate concern”), in what is truly Infinite Love, Justice, and
Goodness. The double commandment of Love (Caritas) is really what the ‘Res,’ the ‘Thing,’ that
is to be ‘enjoyed,’ is all about for Augustine.
Second, in Augustine’s thought, the entire world becomes a kind of intersection between
human desire and the open-ended fluidity of signs and things, language, and reality. Any number
of res may have any number of ‘meanings’ and significations. For Augustine, ‘logs, stones, and
sheep’ are indeed ‘res,’ but they also become signs of Moses’ transforming the waters, a pillow
for Jacobs’s head, and a substitution for Isaac (DDC 1.2.2.). As Rowan Williams explains “not
everything is signum in the ordinary course of things; but in the light of Christ, no res is left
alone. It can be used, and so become a sign; it can mean what it is not.”25
Thirdly, the endless and multiple patterns of ‘sign to res’ that humans are embedded
within are ‘systems of signification,’ where all meaning and value exist. The world may be a
variegated patchwork of such systems of representation, but Caritas is a way of accepting and
celebrating diverse patterns of signification. And yet caritas may show that not every sign
system is necessarily ‘loving’ nor equal. Thus there are ways to interpret and even judge between
various sign systems. Which leads to the Fourth point, which is really a corollary of the first
point and is one of Augustine’s main concerns: Caritas is the mode of love that unites human
beings in relation to, and for the sake of God. And cupiditas is self-love, the mode of love that
promotes love of material things of the world in a self-centered manner. In other words, caritas
and cupiditas represent the two opposing ‘loves’ or ‘drives’ that lay behind diverging ‘social
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theories,’ if I may phrase it that way without, I hope, being too anachronistic. Caritas encourages
and unites people whereas cupiditas represents that drive that divides them.
This fifth point provides an example of doctrinal construction in Augustine’s theology.
This is a vivid example of a sign-res doctrine that I would place under the ‘propositional’
category of the ‘doctrine table’ above. When Augustine speaks on the Incarnation, he first
utilizes a distinction between a ‘word’ (verbum or logos), understood as an interior word (logos
endiathetos), and one viewed as an external word (Logos prophorikos).26 The act of
understanding involves hearing the spoken (external) word of another and translating it in one’s
mind back into the interior word that originated in the mind of the speaker. Now, when humans
communicate in this way, there is often misinterpretation, and a failure to accurately ‘translate.’
And no accidental language ‘casing’ can fully convey the inner essence. Yet when God speaks
forth the Word, it becomes a perfect self-expression of God’s Wisdom. Although the prior
interior Word in the mind of God and the external expression are distinct, it is nevertheless the
case that God’s sapientia is fully present in the historical manifestation.27 Augustine would say
this is the one example of where a ‘sign’ perfectly corresponds to the ‘Res.’ So for Augustine,
while the historical Jesus is a ‘res’ that existed at a point in history, he is also a ‘sign’ that refers
beyond himself to another ‘Res.’ Now when humans read about Jesus in scriptures, this ‘sign’
can only point towards the res (the historical Jesus), that is a ‘sign’ of the eternal ‘Res.’ The
doctrine of the Incarnation is understood explicitly in signa-res terminology. For the Sixth point,
I am simply noting that all theology does, either explicitly or implicitly, involve some type of
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praxis. For Augustine, living by Caritas is the hermeneutical key and guide to Christian praxis. It
is the true ‘res’ of the Christian faith. So, not surprisingly, in Book IV Augustine explains that
the purpose of Books I-III was to lead people to the double commandment of love. In Book IV,
and drawing upon Cicero’s advice on rhetoric, Augustine states that a ‘plain style’ is most
appropriate to aid people into grasping and absorbing the ‘res’ of Caritas. The more ‘grand style’
should be used to inspire and transform the listener’s heart. More important than the skills of
eloquence, however, and the best way to inspire the audience, is the principle that the rhetor
should live by Caritas. This constitutes the Christian praxis for Augustine.
What I have referred to as an ‘Augustinian sign-res paradigm’ simply consists of the
following elements: Any doctrine involves a pattern of movement from contingent signs
(symbols, representations drawn from culture(s)) that are necessarily interdisciplinary in nature
and which comprise attempts to point towards some type of res, some ‘thing,’ that is often
assumed to be eternal, unchanging and essential. Any legitimate construction of doctrine would
embody and reflect the double commandment of love. In quasi-Augustinian language, one could
say that of the many varied possible ‘systems of signification’ that have been, or could be
utilized for doctrinal construction, some would build up caritas, while others (intentionally or
not) might promote cupiditas or a type of self-love, or even at times a love of created things. And
finally, any doctrinal construction that does in some sense embody caritas would naturally flow
towards some type of praxis. While all these points invite further examination in later chapters,
the main feature that I want to reiterate in this chapter, is the Augustinian notion of signs
embedded within ‘systems of signification,’ attempting to ‘get at’ some unchanging res behind
any doctrinal signification. Although there are many ways in which doctrines can be ‘mapped,’ it
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is my claim that most, if not all possible ways to talk about doctrine may be understood as such.
The next section of the chapter will look at just two theologies that utilize somewhat opposite
dialectical approaches and can be viewed in light of this ‘Augustinian sign-res paradigm.’
Questions about the ethical implications of assumptions of an unchanging res, its relation to
caritas, and so on will be addressed in later chapters.
After Hegel
Probably the most innovative development in the theology or philosophy of history after
Augustine’s City of God was G.W.F Hegel’s dialectical understanding of history.28 For Hegel,
the Absolute is both ultimate substance as well as living subject.29 All that exists is directed by
the ‘Idea,’ such that the logic of dialectic directs the unfolding of reality itself. Geist, the
subjective aspect of the Absolute, gradually develops towards self-awareness within Hegel’s
logic of dialectic. As Geist progresses through History itself there is a similar but gradual
progression of consciousness towards freedom. Individuals and nations work towards their own
ends yet all the while the ‘cunning of reason’ is operating to achieve the purposes of the
Absolute Idea.30 Similarly, it is within art, religion, and philosophy that the Idea is expressed in
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increasingly more explicit formulations as history progresses. For Hegel, the symbolic
representations of the Christian faith are the highest form of religious expression in history
because of the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is in the incarnation that the emerging awareness of
the unity of the Infinite and the finite begins to reveal the concept of the Infinite Spirit. Yet it is
only through the ‘lifting’ of the symbolic representations of Christian doctrine into the more
developed universal truth of the concept, that truth, reason and freedom can find their most
adequate expression. Hegel’s notion that history unfolds dialectically was appropriated by Karl
Marx, although, with the caveat that it be understood in terms of material conditions. According
to Marx, Hegel’s dialectic is “standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you
would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”31 Instead, for the more material
interpretation of dialectical logic, it is class struggle and economic tensions that drive the
dialectic of history forward, not the Hegelian Idealistic focus on Idea and Concept. So we can see
that the very logic of dialectical thinking can be understood in two quite opposite ways.
Pannenberg and Sobrino utilize dialectical thought in their writings that could be referred to as a
form of Idealism and Historical-Materialism respectively. It is precisely because of this inverse
relationship that I think that the choice of Pannenberg and Sobrino are wonderful examples of
dialectical approaches to theology. In this way, I intend to demonstrate that dialectical models of
doctrinal construction exemplify well the Augustinian paradigm discussed above.

31

Karl Marx, “Capital vol.1,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition. Edited by Robert C Tucker (New York:
Norton Press, 1978), 290-291 (Kindle).

95
Wolfhart Pannenberg32
In his article, The Crisis of the Scripture Principle, Wolfhart Pannenberg describes, how,
what Paul Ricouer elsewhere has referred to as the end of the ‘first naivete,’ has led to the
privatization of faith by many in the world today.33 The basic trust in the authoritative
interpreters, biblical accounts, and the worldview described within them, has eroded in the wake
of the enlightenment, historical-critical studies, comparative religious research and scientific
discovery. For Pannenberg, this explains western Christianity’s turn towards “enthusiasm” and
the eventual “subjectification” of faith.34 Atheism and skepticism are bound to expand unless the
necessarily universal truth claims of Christianity can be established as universal historical truth
rather than as subjective experience. Pannenberg is committed to interdisciplinary research to
achieve this goal of a publicly rational theology.35 Asserting that “whatever is true must finally
be consistent with all other truth,” Pannenberg has declared his adherence to a coherence theory
32
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of truth.36 And yet truth must be considered an historical phenomenon for Pannenberg so that we
do not “narrow-mindedly substitute a particular perspective for the whole of truth.”37 If we hold
theology to the same standards of rationality expected from historical sciences, for example, then
it must be recognized that truth is provisional, only partially developed and so on. In fact, any
truth claim of human knowledge is necessarily incomplete and partial, debatable and revisable,
until the future eschaton, according to Pannenberg. This applies to claims of theology as well of
course. So when Pannenberg asserts that God is the “all determining reality”—a claim that could
only be confirmed at the eschaton—he is able to boldly claim that all aspects of reality—science,
history, psychology and so on—must contain “theologically relevant dimensions.”38 These two
claims—that all knowledge is provisional until the eschaton and that God is the “all determining
reality”—leads the theologian to develop an eschatological ontology of the future of God. For
Pannenberg the entire world historical process amounts to “a self-demonstration of God’s
existence.”39 God does not exist as a “presence” or a “timeless being underlying all objects,” but
rather, God is the “power of the future.”40 Pannenberg asserts that Jesus’ claim of the coming of
the future Kingdom of God is a reference to this power, which he claims should be taken
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seriously in light of the evidence of the resurrection.41 Perhaps even more provocatively, if the
coming of the Kingdom of God is conceived of as the eschatological rule of the “all determining
power” over all reality, then given the obvious fact that the Kingdom has not arrived,
Pannenberg suggests that God will not be fully God until the eschaton.42 As Pannenberg puts it
“Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God’s being is still in the process of coming to
be…we should not be embarrassed that God cannot be ‘found’ somewhere in present reality.”43
At the same time, it is important to note that Pannenberg shares Hegel’s (and Troeltsch’s)
intention to understand the ‘Whole’ of reality.44 Indeed, Pannenberg considers God as the “all
determining reality” in which nothing in reality—and in fact no domain of knowledge—could
ever aspire to completeness without taking into account that fact.45 In Pannenberg’s view of the
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Whole, however, it is the resurrection of Christ that stands as a proleptic or anticipatory event
that both informs and even shapes the past and present from the eschatological future, and yet,
keeps the future open-ended and unfinished. Hegel too, of course, viewed the Incarnation as a
mode of revelation of the unity of infinite and finite, but according to Pannenberg, for Hegel “the
Christ event was certainly something belonging to the closed past, which might at best still
continue to operate in the present in the spirit, in concept, but could by no means be a still-open
future.”46
Using the Augustinian heuristic discussed in the previous section, it is clear that the
notion of God’s ‘res’ is interpreted by Pannenberg as a future reality. And a doctrine such as the
resurrection of Jesus is a proleptic ‘sign” of the eschatological Kingdom.47 Pannenberg insists
that end-time resurrection has already occurred proleptically with Jesus. Regarding the
resurrection, Pannenberg explains that “what happened in Jesus will always retain an openness to
the future. The ultimate divine confirmation of Jesus will take place only in the occurrence of his
return.”48 For Pannenberg, the only and final place where any theological truth can be ultimately
confirmed would be with the eschatological arrival of the Kingdom of God. As he puts it
“Dogmatics speak constantly of something that will fully appear only in a future which is
inconceivable for us.”49 In fact ‘doctrines’ in Pannenberg’s theology are very much like
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“hypotheses” that are “always to be tested against everything that can provide us with
evidence.”50 In keeping with a coherence theory of truth, Pannenberg interprets doctrines as
debatable and provisional expressions, to be judged in terms of how well they ‘illumine” all
human knowledge, cohere with other doctrines, and expand understanding. The fullness of truth,
however, cannot be known until the eschaton. Pannenberg insists that this perspective that
‘Truth’ itself will only be revealed in total at the eschaton is in complete accordance with the
Hebrew and Christian scriptures.51
This understanding of truth and doctrine as historical informs Pannenberg’s theory of
Revelation as History.52 While Barth insisted that revelation is the transcendent self-disclosure of
God entering into time as the Divine Word, and Bultmann understood revelation as a moment of
existential decision, Pannenberg argues that the category of revelation must be understood
historically. Pannenberg asserts that Divine self-disclosure occurs ‘indirectly” as historical
events are reflected upon. God does not reveal God-self in any one act, but rather it is all of the
events of history that are partial and indirect revelations of some aspect of the infinity of God.
“These acts,” Pannenberg explains,
cast light back on God himself, communicating something indirectly about God himself.
That does not of course mean that they reveal God or the God reveals himself in them as
their originator, for every individual event which is taken to be God’s activity illuminates
the being of God in a partial way…Thus no one act could be a full revelation of God. The
isolated conception of a single divine action as the revelation of God most often leads to a
distorted view, to an idol.53
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Revelation considered as the whole of history implies that the fullness of God’s
revelation will only occur at the end, rather than the beginning of history. It also suggests that the
category of revelation is something public and open to rational scrutiny. Reflection on the events
of history require anticipating the future and reconfiguring aspects of the past and its meaning.
Thinking dialectically involves forming new doctrines as ‘hypotheses,’ testing how well they
illuminate our knowledge, while we simultaneously look for the ‘theologically relevant
dimensions’ of all domains of knowledge. This back and forth intellectual movement includes
looking ahead tentatively in light of the proleptic event of the resurrection while interpreting the
past in light of new understandings. As we move ahead new hypotheses emerge and new
syntheses arise while old ones may be discarded as unhelpful or false. New meanings are “lifted
up” as we move towards the future even while past interpretations are brought forward
formulating new syntheses, which must be tested or perhaps re-configured or even discarded.54
This dialectical movement that considers the entirety of history while formulating and
reformulating doctrines as ‘hypotheses,’ fits quite nicely under the categories of our Augustinian
paradigm of doctrines as representational ‘signs’ referring, however imperfectly, to some
unchanging ‘res’ or essence of what the doctrine is attempting to ‘get at.’ All doctrines are
provisional and open to revision. And all such ‘hypotheses’ are imperfect representations
attempting to signify the future res wherein final confirmation or falsification may occur.
As one example, consider Pannenberg’s concept of the Spirit of God as ‘field.’
Pannenberg insists that notions of field, such as one finds in electromagnetic field or
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gravitational field theories, should be understood historically, as having their roots in the pneuma
theories of ancient Stoicism.55 By rejecting the anthropomorphic conceptions of God as a type of
pure disembodied intellect and will, Pannenberg finds a conception of God as field useful in
interpreting God’s action in history or nature. In Pannenberg’s words “Each finite event or being
is to be considered as a special manifestation of that field, and their movements are responsive to
its forces.”56 This perspective does not, Pannenberg insists, encourage thinking about God as
physical in some sense. To the contrary, Pannenberg seems to be suggesting that such thinking
actually spiritualizes physics. Pannenberg also takes seriously ecology as a ‘field’ in which all
life—human and non-human animal alike—‘self-transcends,’ growing and developing within the
broader ecological context.57 This ecological field is the context of creation viewed as a dynamic
process of the Spirit of God.58
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After arguing that the ancient notion of pneuma became the metaphorical and historical
foundation for later nineteenth century thinking about electromagnetic fields, Pannenberg
employs a new metaphorical use of these ‘significations.’ Pannenberg utilizes thinking about
fields as new hypothesis or ‘signs’ to refer metaphorically to his conception of God as Spirit.
And these significations ultimately point towards the future, where Pannenberg perceives an
ontological priority. Furthermore, just as all doctrinal construction (viewed as provisional
hypotheses) are developed dialectically, the ontological priority of the future is at the same time
“releasing event after event” towards the present as a “field of possibility.”59 These unique
‘systems of representations’ constitute a dialectical type of the Augustinian heuristic, where
signs refer in a revisable and provisional way towards the ‘res’ of the future.
Jon Sobrino
Theologian Jon Sobrino’s project emphasizes the often neglected historical and material
dimensions of existence. The form of dialectical thought that he employs stresses the centrality
of embodied human beings in the context of the crippling poverty of Latin American countries.
Many of these countries are essentially ruled by numerically small oligarchies that cooperate
with transnational corporations that own most of the arable land.60 Coupled with the historical
situation of tacit collaboration with powerful first world industrialized nations—especially in
terms of military aid, economic and political privilege as well as through global organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and so on—these few landowners are
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often able to maintain authoritarian control of the indigenous people in their countries.61 The
conditions of these regions are exploitative, oppressive, and create situations of extreme poverty
and death. Resistance is dangerous and difficult given the asymmetrical power relations. It is
within this context that Sobrino’s thought is situated.
Methodologically, Sobrino states that theology—and hence any discussion of doctrine—
must be a “second act” in which “what comes first is the reality of revelation and faith.”62
Sobrino makes clear what the content of this revelation is:
Theology finds its place in a suffering world insofar as such a world is a mediation of the
truth and the absoluteness of God. The determination of the suffering world as the place
of theology is an option prior to theology, an option required of all believers and all
persons. 63
Using the Augustinian paradigm as a heuristic, it is clear that for Sobrino, the experience of the
suffering within the world serves as ‘mediation,’ as signs pointing towards the ‘res’ of God. God
is experienced as present amongst those who are marginalized, oppressed and suffering as well
as when they are struggling for their liberation from those oppressors. It is this experience of the
liberating and transforming empowerment of love that constitutes the ‘res’ of the Christian faith
for Sobrino.
Central to the dialectical approach to Sobrino’s thought is the tension between the
Kingdom of God and the anti-Kingdom. And one important element of Sobrino’s conception of
the anti-Kingdom is the notion of structural sin. The concept of structural injustice (or sin) may
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be perceived in any socially constructed system, structure, or institutions that create disparities of
wealth/poverty, opportunity/disenfranchisement, or prosperity and power/hunger and suffering.
When injustice becomes ‘embedded’ or ‘locked-into’ cultural, military, economic, legal, or
financial systems, these structures continue to produce and re-produce the conditions of
suffering, even apart from the individuals or groups that may have purposefully (or even
inadvertently) set them up in the first place.64 Structural sin manifests within the Latin American
context in a particularly unique way. This is best demonstrated with reference to the concept of
‘Dependency.’
Within the context of Latin America, ‘Dependency’ or ‘Neodependency’ paradigms serve
as the most prominent theories of international relations in the region.65 Although beginning with
the Spanish and Portuguese imperial ventures from the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
Latin American development projects of the twentieth century created an even deeper
dependency within the international economic system. And it was with the U.S. during the post
WWII era when this dependency tightened even further. Within the Latin America continent,
many of the countries, especially within the Central American regions, became exporters of
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perhaps one or two crops such as coffee or bananas.66 Since many of these transnational
corporations and the foreign investors connected with them are headquartered in the U.S., the
local leaders collaborating with these powers are able to express near total control over these
exports and their production. These local leaders also depend on military and economic
protection from the U.S. Therefore, since these leaders (and corporations) are practically the sole
employers of the lands, their control of many aspects of life is near total. Furthermore, the near
complete reliance upon one or two exported crops that depend on the vicissitudes of the
international market prices—coupled with the necessity of importing virtually everything else—
creates the conditions where the nations of these regions are fully dependent on the first world.
The impact of authoritarian leaders supported by powerful nations such as the U.S. adds to the
suffering of many of the peoples, most especially, in the Central American regions.
Structural injustice (or sin), therefore, refers in this Latin American context to the
multiple systems that have been developed over time in the region. International economic,
political, legal, military and financial systems are actually perpetuating injustice and erecting
barriers for the indigenous peoples of the region, condemning them to perpetual poverty. The
responsibility is diffuse, and the injustice is embedded or ‘locked-into’ structures that in a very
real sense, exist independently of any one individual or group, as we saw above. Sin understood
socially in this way “is fundamentally historical and structural, communitarian and objective, at
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once the fruit and the cause of many other personal and collective sins, and its propagation and
consolidation is the ongoing negation of the Reign of God.”67
Sobrino at times refers to this as an “anti-Reign” of God or an “anti-Kingdom” that
consists of these very structures, institutions, and systems of any society that embody such
violence.68 Furthermore there is a dialectical tension between the Kingdom of God (or Reign of
God) and the anti-Kingdom. Whenever there are those people who are actively engaged in
conflict or struggle against the various forms of oppression or “institutionalized violence” that
perpetuates poverty and death, there is a site of tension between the Kingdom and anti-Kingdom.
As Sobrino puts it “the anti-Kingdom is not just the absence of the not-yet of the Kingdom, but
its formal contradiction. Building the Kingdom means destroying the anti-Kingdom,” and
especially within Latin America, “the Kingdom is not being built from a tabula rasa, but in
opposition to the anti-Kingdom, and the present persecution of those who are mediating the
coming of the Kingdom is effective proof of this.”69 It was, for example, Jesus’ teaching and
living a life that embodied the idea of the Kingdom that inevitably led to crucifixion as an
insurrectionist against the Roman Empire. Historical-critical scholarship provides the best
evidence, according to Sobrino, for what it was that led to the crucifixion. It was precisely Jesus’
way of entering into a compassionate solidarity with the suffering and marginalized poor that led
to the cross. “Jesus was killed,” Sobrino explains, “like so many people before and after him—
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because of his kind of life, because of what he said and what he did. In this sense there is nothing
mysterious in Jesus’ death, because it is a frequent occurrence.”70 This solidarity with the
oppressed is the real meaning of the incarnation of God into the world. If this is the case, then
Sobrino argues that we should look to the “crucified people” in the world today, those who
continue to suffer from the anti-Kingdom and its unjust structures, for the revelation of human
salvation in a suffering world. “Those who bring salvation to the world today,” Sobrino explains,
“or at least those who are the principle of salvation, are the crucified peoples.”71
Turning to the Augustinian Heuristic, I would suggest that in Sobrino’s theology, phrases
such as these serve as ‘signs’ or representations pointing towards the ‘res’ of Christianity. When
Sobrino states that the mission of the church should be to “take the crucified people down from
the cross,” I would suggest that this resonates quite closely with Augustine’s prioritization of
Caritas as the ‘res’ or essence of Christianity.72 It is the “crucified people” that “make it possible
for this world to recognize itself for what it is, sinful, but also to know that it is forgiven.”73
Sobrino is therefore able to make the further claim that “the crucified people are Christ’s
crucified body in history. But the opposite is also true: The present-day crucified people allow us
to know the crucified Christ better.”74 In phrases such as these we can see a type of Augustinian
‘signification,’ such as with the ‘symbol’ of the present crucified people who signify the
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crucified Christ, and who in turn, becomes another sign referring to God. Thus, in Sobrino’s
expression it is “in a suffering world” that we find the “mediation of the truth and the
absoluteness of God.”75
Furthermore, I would suggest that it is within the hermeneutical “circle of praxis” that a
liberative theological system of signification can be understood more fully.76 For example,
contrary to critics such as George Lindbeck or Stanley Hauerwas who argue that liberation
theologians are “experiential-expressivists,” it should be clear that the very experience of God as
present within the marginalization, poverty, and extreme suffering of the Latin American
world—as well as within the experience of resistance to these—is interpreted in this manner
precisely because the experience of these peoples are indeed already shaped by the biblical
narratives.77 In other words, it is their experience of God in the midst of their suffering and
God’s solidarity with them that both shapes and is already shaped by their experiences of
growing up hearing the biblical stories as well as from living directly the suffering around them.
So, it is not that they first experience the suffering and then express this in terms of biblical
symbols. Rather, the ‘signs’ and ‘representations’ of the biblical narratives already give a certain
meaning to their experience, which at the same time informs their interpretations of those same
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representations. At the same time, Sobrino insists on the appropriateness of articulating a
doctrine of Christology using a ‘ground-up’ historical approach. For example, a particular
Christological doctrine such as naming Christ as ‘Lord,’ has often times historically been
interpreted by first delineating implications from the title of ‘Lord,’ such as power, authority and
so on in a kind of ‘top-down’ construction. Sobrino, by way of contrast, argues for the necessity
of beginning with the life of the historical Jesus which “will explain the content of the titles, not
the other way around.”78 For Sobrino it is the hearing of the stories of Jesus’ life that shapes how
marginalized peoples interpret the meaning of their experience of injustice. At the same time,
however, their experience of suffering also serves to shape the interpretation of those stories.
Thus, the hermeneutical circle equips others with ‘ears to hear’ with a more historically
grounded interpretation of scriptures. It is only after this, as a ‘second act,’ that theologians may
then formulate such ‘representations’ that also serve as ‘signs’ pointing towards the res of what
God is all about. In summary, each type of signification—the Crucified People, Christ as Lord,
suffering world—function as a “mediation of the truth and the absoluteness of God.”79 The ‘res’
of the Christian faith, is expressed succinctly with Sobrino’s admonishment for the Church to
“take the crucified people down from the cross.” To my mind, this expression is Sobrino’s
statement of Caritas, the ‘res’ that is key to the Christian faith.
Conclusion
The ‘sign-res’ paradigm found in Augustine’s De Doctrina can serve as a heuristic device
for recognizing a types of ‘representational referencing,’ articulated in doctrinal statements.
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Doctrinal constructions tend to represent, however imperfectly, some unchanging essence or
‘res.’ In Augustine’s thought there are innumerable ‘systems of signification’ that may be
employed in any type of doctrinal formation. For Augustine, it is Caritas that enables one to
have a rightly ordered love in which one’s system of representations signify reality correctly. In
short, for Augustine, it is the double commandment of love that is the res of Christianity. Neither
the Bible nor doctrine should be confused for the ‘res’ of the Christian faith. When a person
understands and lives by Caritas that person has no need for either scripture or doctrine. The
Christian praxis, for Augustine, is to live by Caritas, and discover ways to convey the beauty and
transformative power of Caritas to others. Pannenberg’s interpretations of doctrine as
hypotheses, developed historically and dialectically, may be judged on how well they shed light
upon our interdisciplinary and coherent knowledge of the Whole of Reality. The ontological
priority of the future coming towards the present means that our contemporary construction of
‘doctrines as hypotheses’ are always partial, provisional, and fallible. Nevertheless, doctrines are
constructed ‘signs’ or ‘representations’ pointing toward the future ‘res,’ significations that may
be tentatively judged by standards of coherence, fruitfulness in explanation and their ability to
enlighten “theologically relevant dimensions of reality—a reality that, as future ‘res,’ will not be
finally confirmed or falsified until the eschaton. For Pannenberg, the establishment of correct
doctrinal propositions are central to any theological project. And in short, for Pannenberg,
doctrines are hypotheses with eschatological verification. The ‘res’ of the faith is future. Jon
Sobrino explicates a theological praxis in which experience of a suffering world, and most
especially, the crucified people reveal and mediate the truth of God. ‘Significations’ such as
these point toward the truth and ‘res’ of God. However, for Sobrino—and this is crucial to
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liberation theologies in general—doctrinal representations are, theologically, only ‘a second act.’
Doctrines are not ‘dropped’ in Sobrino’s work. Rather, they are viewed in liberating terms. The
poor and suffering marginalized peoples reveal the grace of God by revealing both injustice and
forgiveness.
Each of these theologians utilized a dialectical approach to history, although their
formulations are quite different, as we have seen. Yet a key point of this chapter, and the result
of reading with our Augustinian heuristic, was to demonstrate that even such divergent
approaches to doctrine may be understood as imperfect signs referring to some unchanging
essence or res. And yet, using this Augustinian model, not all ‘res’ should be understood as
equally valid. At least for Augustine, the ‘res’ of the Christian faith is Caritas. To my mind, we
may conclude that the insights we have seen after reading Sobrino are closer to Augustine’s
vision than the approach taken by Pannenberg. Perhaps viewing the category of ‘doctrine’ as
primarily an epistemological concern is a kind of an historical ‘wrong turn.’ Perhaps doctrine
should not be interpreted as attempts to articulate logical propositions representing some quasimetaphysical ‘res.’ I suspect that Augustine did not want his De Doctrina to be interpreted solely
as a ‘theory of semiotics.’ One of the goals of the next chapter will be to ‘update’ the metaphors
of doctrinal development with the hope that we may begin to move discussions of ‘doctrine’
away from this over-emphasis on epistemology and ossified notions of doctrine.

CHAPTER THREE
CONTEMPORARY INFORMATION THEORY AS A MODEL FOR DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENT
One main and over-arching goal of this project is to hopefully move discussions of
“doctrine” or “doctrinal development” away from an over-emphasis on epistemological and
quasi-metaphysical notions of those categories. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to begin the
process of constructing a reconfigured category of doctrinal development. At the conclusion of
this chapter, we will be able to suggest some of the components of such a reconfigured category.
First, however, I will begin by suggesting three concerns that, to my mind, must be considered
with any early twenty-first century discussion of development of doctrine. The three concerns
are: (1) reifying “res-thinking” and “strong thought” in doctrinal reflection; (2) living “after
Darwin”; and (3) the need for an ethical dimension in any future discussion of doctrinal
development.
Although the theological category of “doctrine” is only one dimension of religion, the last
chapter provided a type of “heuristic-model” in order to suggest that doctrinal formulations,
historically, tend to make a rather general and basic assumption. This assumption, it was
suggested, is that doctrinal statements are about some “thing,” some inner res, where some
mysterious intrinsic essence or unchanging truth “resides.” There is, I suggested, a general
tendency towards a type of “reification” of doctrines. In other words, doctrinal expressions are
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attempts to symbolize something absolute, however imperfectly. But is this assumption correct?
Is there any reason to think this is what doctrines are, or should be about? Furthermore, is the
background assumption that there even is a res, an unnecessary problem and source of concern?
Does ‘res thinking’ lead to violence and unnecessary exclusion and division? Whether
interpreted as a type of a hermeneutical rule theory, symbolic disclosure, or correspondence
model, is doctrinal formulation based on ‘res thinking’ inherently problematic in these ways?
What might a “non-res” type of doctrinal development look like?
If theologians typically take care to avoid attributing “Thingness” to God, then should we
not take care to avoid attributing “thingness” to any doctrines whatsoever? If God is not a
“Thing”, then perhaps we should not attribute to doctrines what we do not attribute to God. Quite
probably most theologians would agree with some axiom such as: “one should not confuse the
finger with what it is pointing towards,” or “do not confuse the map with the terrain,” or some
similar refrain. Yet, to my mind, it seems that just as many theologians tend to assume that there
is some res ‘out there’—something that a doctrine is either “closer or farther away” from
representing. Is not the logical entailment of attempting to avoid the problems associated with
onto-theology, to avoid the notion that there is some “being” behind our doctrines as well?1 If we
take seriously the potentiality of a “living God,” then perhaps we need to also consider a notion
of ‘living doctrine.’2
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Whenever doctrine is presented as a representation of some “res,” there is often an
accompanying assumption that this representation is closer to “the way that things really are.” Or
that there is some “thing-in-itself,” some absolute Truth (with a capital T), that really is “out
there,” perhaps inexhaustibly transcendent to mere human understanding—but nevertheless some
representation is closer to it than other significations.
I am concerned that such assumptions are unnecessarily divisive, exclusive, and
ultimately violent. Gianni Vattimo refers to this type of assumption as “strong thought.” This
way of thinking tends towards intolerance by drawing lines of inclusion/exclusion, the
elect/damned, friend/foe, us/them or foreigner. Attempts to produce definitions, names, or
labels, considered in some sense as ‘universally applicable,’ have the tendency to force a very
fluid world of becoming and difference into fixed and determined categories. Now, it is not that
we cannot “make a case”—after all, that is what I am attempting to do right now. But it does
mean that we can think otherwise than “strong thought.” Following Vattimo, I agree that we
should be vigilant in constructing ideas with an awareness of the “weakening of being.” This
notion that Vattimo has promoted, involves a Verwinding, a “twisting” or “holding ironically” or
“softening” of our language. Thus, I am suggesting we adopt this approach in terms of doctrine.
We must be aware of the danger of “hardening” our non-metaphysics into a new type of

Knox Press, 1993) with his reference respectively to a “permanent revolution” in a “radically monotheistic”
theology. Paul Tillich’s “Protestant Principle” is a similar attempt see Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (NY: Harper
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Fortress, 1997); Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in Drucilla Cornell,
Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (editors), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (London:
Routledge Press, 1992), 3-67; Derrida, Specters of Marx (London: Routledge Press, 1994). Also see the writings of
John Caputo. All of these thinkers are concerned to avoid what I have been referring to as “reifying” doctrine. All of
them are concerned to keep things “open,” whether to something like “the Spirit that blows where it will” or to
“hope” or perhaps a “justice to come.”
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universal or absolute truth.3 Therefore, any new language of doctrinal development or doctrinal
construction needs to be held “ironically,” or in a weakened sense such that other “languages”
and metaphors may be used or even preferrable in various contexts. With this in mind, I do think
we would be better off using “languages” that are looking for metaphors that may mitigate
“reification” of doctrines. This involves a constant self-critique, and really a change within us.
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The second concern for our discussion of doctrinal development involves the “organic
metaphors” traditionally employed for this category.4 It is not surprising that discussion of any
type of development naturally tend towards utilizing metaphors and analogies drawn from the
fields of biological, botanical, or organic growth. What is somewhat surprising is that more than
a century after Darwin, language of doctrinal development still utilizes organic metaphors that
are quite teleological and essentialist. This reluctance to recognize all the potential implications
of living “after Darwin” is, of course, probably not really all that surprising given many
theologians’ concerns with the roles of providence and orthodoxy in ecclesiology. Nevertheless,
we are not in the nineteenth century, we are in the twenty-first century, which is a very different
world. As discussed in the Introduction to this work, Christianity is but one of many religions in
the world. Politically, scientifically, theologically there are legitimate reasons for such a
reconfigured category. And this is in large part why I would like to see a re-opening of this
discussion. Doctrinal development, “after Darwin,” allows the use of many (I would argue)
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useful metaphors that will “open up” new possibilities. What can doctrinal development look like
in terms of phylogenetic trees and the clades and lineages leading from these? What might
allopatric or sympatric speciation events, recombination and the like do for the theological
imagination? Could doctrines be thought “otherwise” using categories of “symbiosis”? What
about the concept of “flows” or “patterns” of information, which is the basis for biology? 5 The
possibilities for comparative theology and any type of philosophical/theological construction are
exciting.
The third concern I would like to express, is the need for an ethical dimension in any new
discussion of doctrinal development. It is important to recognize that prior discussions of
doctrinal development have not, insofar as I can tell, truly considered several major cultural
shifts. A few examples should suffice to demonstrate my point. There has been no “postNewman” consideration of the voluminous work (and very broadly speaking) that “takes into
account” the so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion.” There has been no discussion of ‘critical
theories’ or even any recognition of the variegated spectrum of liberation theologies. Similarly, I
do not find any discussion of the multiple perspectives raised by people after the cultural shifts
following the New Left’s shift from (earlier) class-based analyses towards more ethnic, cultural,
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and gender-based concerns (I am generalizing much here to simply raise the point that previous
discussions of doctrinal development have not, to my knowledge, raised or considered any of
these “ethical” aspects).
Therefore, I would like to suggest that these three concerns: (1) reifying “res-thinking”
and “strong thought” in doctrinal reflection; (2) living “after Darwin”; and (3) the need for an
ethical dimension are issues that any new discussion of doctrinal development should seriously
consider.
Proposal for a Reconfigured Model of Doctrinal Development
Keeping these three concerns in mind, I would suggest that the key metaphor we utilize
for a reconfigured understanding of doctrinal development be: information flow. In short, it is
cascades, streams, flows, clusters, translations, transcriptions, and patterns of information that
form the basis of much contemporary understandings of biology. Adopting tropes associated
with ‘information flow’ is preferrable, to my mind, over the ‘res-like’ metaphors of ‘essentialist’
or ‘teleological’ thinking such as “seed growing into a plant,” or “acorn developing into an
oak.”6 Modern genetics and evolutionary biology are certainly not using language of ‘res’ or
intrinsic ‘essences.’ Metaphors of Information flow express the insight of these contemporary
sciences that everything is subject to evolution and there are no unchanging essences. Flows of
information form an important aspect of areas such as systems biology, genetics, and cellular
automata in computation, allowing features such as complexity, emergent properties, downward
6
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causation (and generally top/down, bottom/up interaction and evolution). It is from these notions
(that will feature prominently in the next chapter) that I will argue that an “ethical dimension”
can indeed emerge from quite unforeseeable initial conditions or starting points. In short,
thinking of doctrinal development as flows of information, integrates an “emergent ethical
dimension” directly into the process of development of doctrine. A key point of this Chapter
Three will be that the metaphors of information flow, complexity, and emergence enable, not
only the emergence of ‘rules’ that govern biological processes (or informational processing), but
also the very possibility of ‘state dependent rule evolution.’ In biology (and any type of
computation): rules evolve. They do not necessarily evolve constantly, or even quickly. But they
can evolve. And scientists can use technology and bring about alterations intentionally. Scientists
can, for example, use technology to edit or alter the way in which information flows as in new
CRISPR technology.7 They do this by editing gene sequences and thus altering gene expression.
The last section of this chapter will examine this notion of ‘rules that evolve’ in relation to
doctrinal thinking in George Lindbeck and in conversation with Kathryn Tanner. Analogically
to biological evolution, I would suggest that not only can doctrinal (as well as biological) ‘rules’
evolve, but that sometimes they should evolve. We may use intentional ‘techne’ to alter or ‘edit’
doctrinal rules if ethical ‘complications’ arise, or unexpected ‘features or properties’ emerge that
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are producing ‘downward causal’ effects that may well have been unanticipated when the
doctrinal rules were first formulated but are now seen as producing deleterious effects.
In concluding this section of the chapter, I would like to reflect a bit on the following
thoughts from Stephen Hawking. Noting that although there is approximately a “hundred million
bits of useful information” in “our genes,” while there is likely a “hundred trillion bits” of
information published in the “50,000 new books published” just “in the English language each
year,”8 Hawking recognizes that Homo Sapiens are, therefore, entering a “new phase of
evolution,” one where we are producing voluminous amounts of information and beginning the
process of ‘self-designing evolution.’ By distinguishing an ‘internal’ evolution that involves the
transmission of information encoded in DNA from the ‘external’ phase of evolution that involves
the vast amounts of information discovered and transmitted by human beings, Hawking
recommends extending the concept of evolution.9 As Professor Hawking explains:
Some people would use the term “evolution” only for the internally transmitted genetic
material and would object to it being applied to information handed down externally. But
I think that is too narrow a view. We are more than just our genes. We may be no
stronger or inherently more intelligent than our caveman ancestor. But what distinguishes
us from them is the knowledge that we have accumulated…I think it is legitimate to take
a broader view and include externally transmitted information, as well as DNA, in the
evolution of the human race.”10
To my mind, this idea of extending our understanding of evolution beyond the internal,
and towards the external modes of information exchange, sets a type of precedent for extending
notions of “evolution” into a reconfigured model of doctrinal development.
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Brief Overview of the Structure of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter consists of two main sections: the ‘science’ section
followed by a section discussing George Lindbeck’s ‘rule theory’ of doctrine and Kathryn
Tanner’s cultural anthropological ‘task’ for theology. The first, ‘science’ section, consists of
three parts. The first part is a brief examination of the idea of information flow in biology.
Information patterns are at work in gene expression as seen in both transcription and translation.
Note that although protein synthesis follows a ‘genetic code book’ (assignments of the ‘triplet
code’ of DNA (eventually) to particular amino acids), this ‘book of rules,’ can and does change
in evolutionary history. The informational streams, flows and patterns may be observed both
‘reductively’ as well as from a ‘systems’ approach. Viewed from the later perspective, biological
information flow is analogous in protein production to electronic circuitry following defined
‘logic gates.’ The notion that biological information could be understood as a type of ‘software’
to chemical ‘hardware’ suggests a deeper look at the logical and mathematical roots of
computation. The second part of the ‘science’ section looks particularly at these logical
foundations: especially the concept of self-referential paradoxes seen in Russell, Godel and
Turing’s ‘Decidability problem.’ It is because a system is ‘undecidable’ that open-endedness and
novelty may occur allowing new emergent properties to appear. In the final part of this ‘science’
section, we will examine how this self-referentiality, and its ‘undecidable’ element, allows
emergent higher-order rules to emerge in cellular automata. We will observe how these higherorder rules are ‘state dependent information-processing rules,’ rules that both put certain limits
on evolution, and yet themselves do evolve over time. This will be followed by the final section
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of the chapter with a discussion of Lindbeck and Tanner. From this I will provide a synthesis of
the most salient points for a reconfigured model of doctrinal development.
Patterns of Information Flow as the Basis for the Biological Sciences
Physicist Paul Davies suggests that the notion of an “informed chemistry,” or perhaps the
expression “chemistry plus information,” quite neatly sums up that which “separates life from
non-life.”11 Indeed, metaphors of “information” are prevalent in molecular biology:
“transcription,” “translation,” “code,” “redundancy,” “synonymous,” “messenger,” editing,”
“proofreading,” “library.”12 We may read of “signaling” between cells, or even “communication”
of information on the social level such as that which may be observed when a flock of birds
suddenly and in unison alters course mid-flight.
And examples of the flow of information at the cellular or molecular level abound. A
few brief examples here should suffice to express my point at this stage in the argument.
Information flows occur throughout the processes of transcription (roughly speaking the genetic
informational flow between DNA to RNA), and translation (RNA to protein synthesis), which
are essentially the ways in which genes direct the activities of the cells. 13
Allow me to provide a brief description of the information flow or transfer involved in
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John Maynard Smith, The Concept of Information in Biology,” in Information and the Nature of Reality: From
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identifying common ancestors. These may be reconstructed by analyzing the copied errors of information.
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synthesis.14 Proteins do much of the work inside cells. These three-dimensional structures,
varying to serve different functions, are made up of chains of amino acids. All life consists of
proteins and all proteins are constructed from twenty different amino acid combinations. And a
particular gene on a strand of DNA resides in the nucleus of a cell. The ultimate expression of
this gene, however, occurs outside the nucleus in the cytoplasm of the cell, where a ribosome
molecule resides, ready to act like a little protein synthesis factory. The gene is first transcribed
into mRNA that copies the gene’s nucleotide bases (the well-known A, C, T, G, although the
Thymine becomes a “U,” Uracil in RNA), and transfers the information to the ribosome. Now,
this occurs because a particular “signal,” called a promoter, is sent from a sequence on the DNA
“requesting” to be copied (in order to synthesize some useful protein that is needed). The RNA
polymerase is the molecule that is attracted to the promoter, which arrives at the site to “read off”
from the relevant strand of the DNA molecule. (The RNA polymerase enzyme attaches to the
promoter with the assistance of other proteins known as “transcription factors”). The RNA
polymerase copies, or transcribes, the gene. Then, at the ribosome, the mRNA (with the
transcribed information), waits for the appropriate amino acids to be brought for the synthesizing
of the protein chain. These amino acids are brought to the ribosome “factory” by tRNA. These
“transfer” or tRNA molecules bind to the base pairings of the mRNA and read off code as triple
base pairs (codons). In a sense, there are two “languages” at work here. There is the four letter
“alphabet” of DNA base pairs (written in triplet coding), and the twenty-letter alphabet of the
“language” of amino acids. Certain tRNA molecules, for example, aminoacyl tRNA synthetase
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For this brief description of gene expression I rely on : Harvey Lodish, Arnold Berk, Paul Matsudaira, Chris
Kaiser, Monty Krieger, Matthew P. Scott, Lawrence Zipursky, and James Darnell, Molecular Cell Biology 5th
edition (NY: W.H. Freeman, 2005), see especially chapters 4 and 11.
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molecules are “bilingual” in that they “read off” the triple-code of the language of DNA (now
transcribed in the mRNA) and “translate” by reading the “twenty-letter” code of amino acids.15
These amazing little molecules are then able to bring the appropriate amino acid to the correct
tRNA for synthesizing protein chains in the ribosome.16
Considering the above mentioned examples of informational flow in a manner of
reductivism, we can miss insights to be gained from viewing the same processes from an
emergent, or “systems” biological perspective. For example, chemical circuitry can be viewed
analogously with electronic circuitry. Mapping structures in this more ‘holistic’ way is a first
step towards thinking about ‘information flow’ in biological systems as a kind of “software”
running on the “hardware” of chemistry.17 So considered as “circuitry,” genes may be “’wired’
together via chemical pathways to create features like feedback and feed-forward,” activities
which are common to computing.18
For example, as we saw in the example above, cells regulate protein production through a
complex process of informational input from their environment as well as information gathered
regarding their internal needs. In this process, certain protein molecules known as transcription
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factors, (such as seen with the RNA polymerase enzyme example), can “recognize” a given
sequence of DNA and attach to this appropriate segment (known as a promoter because it first
‘sends out’ a ‘promoting signal to start’ because of a need for some protein). When the
transcription factor attaches to that particular segment, it is then able to begin the process of
increasing or decreasing (depending on the need of the cell) the “rate at which a nearby gene is
expressed.”19 Because this activity is central to understanding the informational processing
aspect of biological systems, it is worth providing this following explanation from Paul Davies:
Transcription factors may combine their activities to create various logic functions
similar to those used in electronics and computing. Consider, for example, the AND
function, where a switch Z is turned on only if a signal is received from switches X and
Y together. To implement this, a chemical signal flips the transcription factor X into its
active shape X*; X is switched on, chemically speaking. Thus activated, X* may then
bind to the promoter of gene Y, causing Y to be produced. If, now, there is a second
(different) signal that switches Y to its active form, Y*, the cell has both X* and Y*
available together. This arrangement can serve as an AND logic gate if there is a third
gene Z, designed (by evolution) to be switched on only if X* and Y* are present together
and bind to its promoter.20
This fascinating view of logical operations within the internal mechanisms of cells can
also be observed operating according to other logic gate configurations as well.21 Logic,
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mathematics, and therefore computation, is a real integral part of the fabric of life.22 And
furthermore, if informational flows can be interpreted as “software” processing within biological
and chemical “hardware,” then it is these computational roots, found in mathematics and logic,
that we must examine next.
Logical and Computational ‘Foundations’ for the Biological Sciences
A key feature in what follows revolves around the recurring themes of “undecidability”
and the paradox of self-reference. The parallels between self-replication in biology and selfreferential paradoxes in mathematical logic are not coincidental. Both are what permit cosmic as
well as biological evolution. And because of this paradox of self-referentiality, open-endedness,
undecidability, and novelty emerge. As Paul Davies puts it “given that undecidability is
enshrined in the very foundations of mathematics, it will also be a fundamental property of a
universe based on mathematical laws. Undecidability guarantees that the mathematical universe
will always be unbounded in its creative potential.”23 Davies continues by explaining that it is
also due to this feature of “undecidability,” that the “logic of life permits biology to explore a
boundless universe of novelty, to create ‘forms most wonderful,’ to use Darwin’s memorable
phrase.”24
Although finding a particular point as the “origin” of the paradoxes of logic is altogether
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arbitrary, we need to start some place.25 And it is with David Hilbert’s “Formalist program” that
we will begin. Hilbert argued that mathematics was a formal system, like a language, that
consisted of a set of symbols, axioms, and agreed upon rules of inferences that allow the
construction of well-formed formulas and theorems. Mathematics, according to Hilbert, is
‘syntactic,’ and not descriptive (such as a Platonist might argue); it is rather like a deductive
system where a mathematical expression is considered true relative to the “rules” of some formal
system.26 Mathematics in this sense does not ‘refer’ to anything, it is simply about the internal
consistency of the axiomatic system. Therefore, the central concern for this type of Formalism is
consistency. So it was that Hilbert posed his questions regarding the prospects for a consistent,
deductive, and formalist systems of mathematics.27 First, Hilbert asked, is mathematics
consistent? In other words, will mathematics form a coherent system of non-contradictory
expressions? Second, is mathematics complete in itself? Here Hilbert is asking, can
mathematicians prove all true propositions? Third is mathematics decidable?28 In other words,
Hilbert is asking whether proofs or algorithms may be produced that can show the truth of every
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mathematical expression in a step-by-step fashion.29 If mathematics is fully consistent in this
manner, Hilbert reasoned, then it must be the case that all mathematical statements could be
determined by a set of algorithms. Mathematics would be consistent and decidable.
The third of Hilbert’s questions—whether mathematics is ‘decidable’—became the focus
of Alan Turing’s “On Computable Numbers with an Application to the
Entscheidungsproblem.”30 Although Turing was discussing the possibility of any form of
‘computation,’ whether performed by one person, many people, or some machine following an
algorithm, the conclusion remains the same. In fact, the very idea of any “machine,” human, or
other form of computation that can read, write, erase, and move across a set of instructions
(Turing originally envisioned a long ‘tape’ with symbols on it with a moveable “reading and
writing head”) may be a Turing machine.31
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Turing’s question was whether it was possible to write a program that could specify
whether any other program would stop (output an answer in a finite number of steps) or if it
would loop forever. This is essentially Hilbert’s question about the decidability of mathematics.
Turing’s answer was no, such a program cannot be coded, and therefore mathematics is
‘undecidable.’ The way in which he answered this was ingenious. One can think of this question
of decidability by asking whether a program or set of algorithms could be written that could
answer whether some particular problem could be solved. For example, if one were to write an
algorithm that could check whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true, how long might it take to
solve?32 If the algorithm “chugged” along checking every consecutive even number greater than
two to see if it could be written exactly as a sum of two primes, the process of computation may
go on forever (or not, it is a conjecture after all). The point is that if one were able to write a
Turing style ‘decidability program’ that could check whether any mathematical problem is
decidable, that is, whether it will come to a stop or if it will loop forever, mathematics would be
a complete and consistent system just as Hilbert suggested.
Turing’s answer is a reductio ad absurdum argument that begins with the assumption that
such a program could be written.33 Let us label this program “T.”34 “T” is able to take as input
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any other algorithm (let us refer to it as a program for ease of discussion) and output “yes” or
“no” as to whether the program will stop or loop.35 Turing then suggested that we take “T” and
‘extend’ the program to include a type of subroutine (let us call this program “O”) that would
take the output from “T” as an input (an input into “O”) which would then output the opposite.
For example, if “T” outputs stop, “O” will loop, and if “T” outputs loop, “O” will stop. So if we
programmed input and program (say, for example, program “A”) into “T” and “T” returns halt as
an output, “O” will loop, but if “T” returns loop as an output, “O” will stop. Turing’s genius
involved asking what would happen if we fed the program “O” as input into “T.” What would
happen? Well, if “T” reads “O” as input and returns output “O” stops, then “O” loops, and if “T”
returns “O” loops, then “O” will stop. So, “O” will stop just in case “O” loops and “O” will loop
just in case “O” stops. It cannot be that program “O” will both stop and run forever at the same
time and same respect. Thus, there can be no algorithm (or program) that can say if any other
algorithm (or program) will stop.
Mathematics will therefore always contain propositions that are undecidable.36 There can
be no algorithm that can solve the ‘decision problem.’ Notice how the contradiction emerges
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from the self-referential nature of the algorithmic expression found in a way that is quite similar
to the self-referential paradoxes observed in the works by Russell and Godel. And it is
undecidability that “guarantees that the mathematical universe will always be unbounded in its
creative potential.”37
The paradox of self-reference is at the heart of any universal computer, (Turing
machines), but it is also a feature inherent to the very concept of ‘self-replication.’ John von
Neumann applied this more biological question of self-replication to his notion of a Universal
Constructor (UC).38 Imagine a machine that is programmed to follow a blueprint for selfreplication. It utilizes physical parts as raw materials by following a blueprint (the program) and
can thus manufacture a physical copy of itself. The program serves as blueprint, but also has to
become a datafile itself, if the UC is to make a fully functioning copy of itself, that is able to
replicate a “daughter” machine that is also able to make fully functioning copies of itself that can
further the process of self-replication. The program is not just a blueprint (software) but must
alter its own status and become an object (hardware) that must itself be copied.39 And this is
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essentially what we may observe when considering DNA. 40The base sequence in any DNA
molecule acts like both blueprint (code) that must be expressed in protein synthesis, and it is to
be copied (replication). In this way, molecules of DNA are like miniature von Neumann selfreplicators. The mathematics in von Neumann’s model of a Universal Replicator is the
inspiration behind the various forms of Cellular Automata coded for research into information
theory, biology, and neuroscience. Perhaps the most famous Cellular Automaton created is John
Conway’s Game of Life. It is to this concept that we turn next. This will help us better
understand phenomena such as complexity, emergence, downward causation, and state
dependent rule evolution.
Cellular Automata as Models of ‘Rule Evolution’
In nature we often find that the level of complexity observed within a system is not
necessarily proportional to the amount of complexity put into it from the beginning. Complex
behaviors or properties do regularly arise from surprisingly simple “rules,” and the unpredictable
states of neighboring cells, molecules, or other external conditions. These two basic aspects—
simple rules and adjacent conditions—can in fact generate unpredictable and unforeseeable
complexity or “higher-order” properties that display surprising features or activities that could
not have been predicted from a thorough analysis of the parts in isolation. The mathematician
John Conway constructed a particular Cellular Automaton, which he named the Game of Life, in
order to isolate in the abstract some of these observable aspects of nature. Cellular Automata are
quite central for understanding how complex patterns emerge within nature. And the notion of
constructing mathematical models for the purpose of analyzing some narrow aspect of the world
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in symbolic form in order to “cast light” on some feature of “the real world” is quite common.41
Such models enable a more specific analysis of a particular feature that could then be
transferable to more general aspects of the “world.” The Game of Life—and other such Cellular
Automata—are able to shed much light on how quite simple interactions produce rather complex
results throughout nature: in galaxy formation, snowflake, or crystal formations, in research on
fluid or aerodynamics as well as research in self-assembling robotics to name a few.42
The Game of Life follows quite simple rules to be displayed on a computer. The program
displays a grid pattern of cells. Each cell is considered ‘live’ or ‘dead’ such that a darkened cell
is ‘alive’ whereas a white or uncolored cell is ‘dead.’ Each cell has exactly eight neighboring
cells that are either alive or dead. The starting pattern for this two-dimensional world is referred
to as ‘generation 0.’ There are only four laws that structure this world:43
(1)

A live cell with fewer than two live neighbors will die as if by underpopulation.

(2)

A live cell with 2 or 3 live neighbors will remain alive into the next iteration (or
generation).

(3)

A live cell with 4 or more live neighbors will die in the next generation (as if by
overpopulation).
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(4)

Any dead cell with exactly 3 live neighbors will become alive (in the next generation),
whereas in any other case a dead cell will remain dead.

Every cell has 8 adjacent neighbors. Now, on each successive ‘generation’ from generation 0,
these same rules are applied. Provided the initial starting conditions, the patterns of live and dead
cells subsequently change in sometimes quite unpredictable patterns.44 The information flow and
complex clusters that emerge can appear to move across the screen, sometimes “colliding and
creating new shapes from the debris.”45 One such configuration that has been shown to evolve
within the game is the “glider.” This pattern of five squares appears to “glide across the screen
without change of internal configuration.”46 The Gosper Glider Gun is another complex
manifestation named after the mathematician Bill Gosper. This configuration is a “glider gun”
where a pattern of “36 live cells…pulsates in and out, like a beating heart, giving birth to a glider
every 30 generations. The gliders scamper away in a diagonal line, one after another, like an
endless stream of bullets shot from a gun.”47
The Gosper glider gun configuration is important because it is a basic first step in
demonstrating how the Game of Life satisfies the conditions of a universal Turing machine.
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Since Claude Shannon’s 1948 articulation of the concept of information theory it has become
clear that a defining property of information is its transformability. As Rolf Landauer
proclaimed, all “information is physical.”48 Now, this means that while information requires a
physical medium for communication—whether in the form of light, magnetic fields, sound, or
electronic pulses is irrelevant—it is also abstract, as it does not matter what type of media is
utilized. And furthermore, information can be represented in terms of binary digits, as Claude
Shannon demonstrated in his formulation of the science of information theory.49 Shannon
showed that any system of solid-state electronic circuits that can switch on and off can
correspond exactly to information expressed in base two mathematics. And so any sort of
information can be represented precisely by binary digits, or bits. This means that any type of
on/off (or in Conway’s game live/dead cells) can convey any type of information. Thus, logic
gates, or really any kind of “switching circuits,” are also able to express logical propositions such
as the kind of logical operations formulated by George Boole and Augustus de Morgan.
What does this have to do with Gosper’s Glider Guns? Well, it is possible to set up
Conway’s game so that a series of these Glider Guns can “fire off” a pulse or sequence of gliders
that traverse the two-dimensional grid. The gliders pulsing across the grid system can represent
exactly the ‘ones’ and ‘zeros’ of binary mathematics.50 In this way it is possible to construct any
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type of logic gate and thus Conway’s game can emulate a computer.51 The Game of Life is a
universal Turing complete program that runs as a computer inside a computer. There are three
basic logic gates: the NOT, AND, and OR gates. All other more complex logic gates may be
established from these basic gates: NAND, XOR, and so on.
The implications of Conway’s game being a Turing machine (any machine capable of
universal computation however slowly) extend further. Turing proved (with the Decision
problem) that undecidability, as a property of any universal computational machine, allows a
certain “open-endedness” or the possibility of emergent order that transcends the discrete
functionality of the individual parts of the system. Just as Turing’s undecidability thesis
demonstrated that there is no way to determine in advance whether a given “program” will run
forever or stop in a finite time, it is likewise impossible to determine what “novel” emergent
behavior will arise from the “computer within a computer” that is the Game of Life. The patterns
that emerge within the game “are not arbitrary but obey higher-level rules of their own.”52 And
one key implication of these discoveries (and a re-acknowledgment of Landauer’s dictum)53 is
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that higher level informational rules may arise independently of whatever type of physical media
employed. Therefore, these insights may be applied to life, consciousness, or any other physical
medium.
One really very interesting implication of this feature of complex Cellular Automata, and
one that is directly relevant to my argument, involves the construction of a “time-dependent
model” where the “update informational rule” is allowed to evolve.54 Alyssa Adams formulated a
Cellular Automaton that utilizes Stephen Wolfram’s study of all possible logically consistent
“update rules” for Cellular Automata. Wolfram found 256 such update rules that “take into
account the nearest-neighbor squares only.”55 Now, what Adams and her team did, was create a
program where a wide array of Wolfram’s “update rules” could apply in different situations. The
model that they constructed uses two Cellular Automata: one that represents the “environment,”
and one that represents the “organism.” The basic idea is that this particular model allows the
two CA to interact and adapt to one another in such a way that the update rules for each actually
evolve. These interactive dynamic systems are allowed to operate autonomously in order to
demonstrate “open-ended evolution,” “innovation,” and “complexity” in such a way that would
exceed the “Poincare recurrence time,”56 or the time at which there is a return to the initial state.
By introducing “non-local rules”—rules that allow interaction with “cells” that are not directly
adjacent to one another—unpredictable patterns will emerge that mutually influence both
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“environment” and “organism.”57 A key point here is that this “arrangement changes the update
rule as a function of both the state of the ‘organism’ itself—making it self-referential—and of the
‘environment’—making it an open system.”58 The point that I wish to emphasize here is that
whether we are discussing virtual organisms interacting with their environment or in the realm of
biology (which we will examine next), rules of information-processing are “state dependent” and
dynamic.59 The rules that govern dynamic systems must themselves be subject to evolution.
It must be reiterated that the important notion that “rule evolution” can and does occur is
due to the peculiar nature of the self-referential paradox that we have already encountered with
Russell, Godel, Turing, in von Neumann’s universal replicator, and of course in Adams’ state
dependent informational -processing rule evolutionary Cellular Automata. The behavior of a
system depends upon its internal states as well as the state of the environment in which it finds
itself. Information, for example that is stored within a genome of a living organism, may be
expressed in “innumerable feedback loops—a process through which the genetic information is
continually re-evaluated by permanent interactions with the physical environment to which it is
exposed.”60 “What a system does,” Paul Davies explains, “depends on how a system is.”61

57

The idea of “unpredictable patterns” mentioned here refers to the fact that the new states of interaction observed
could not have been predicted or have occurred as a result of any of the 256 fixed rules delineated by Wolfram. See
Adams, “Formal Definitions of Unbounded Evolution,” 5-7. Also see Davies, Demon in the Machine, 81-82.
58

Davies, Demon in the Machine, 81.

59

Adams, “Formal Definitions of Unbounded Evolution,” 13-14. Adams and her colleagues explain the far reaching
implications of this insight: “state dependent dynamics…represents a radical departure from more traditional
approaches to dynamics where the ‘laws’ remain fixed….the principles governing open-ended evolution and
innovation in biological and technological systems may require removing the segregation of states and fixed
dynamical laws characteristic of the physical sciences for the 300 years.” (p.14).
60

Bernd-Olaf Kuppers, “Information and Communication in Living Matter,” in Information and the Nature of
Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, 170.

139
Emphasizing this bottom up and top down causal phenomenon within the domain of biology, the
physicist Nigel Goldenfeld states that “self-referential dynamics is an inherent and probably
defining feature of evolutionary dynamics and thus biological systems.”62 Although it is well
known that crystals can self-organize and replicate, such entities are in basic equilibrium with
their environment. Life, on the other hand, is quite out of equilibrium with its environment,
relying as it does on some source of energy as input (for example food or sunlight) while
“outputting” something else as by-product such as “oxygen or carbon dioxide.”63 Recognizing
life as an “emergent phenomenon” that is far from being in equilibrium, Goldenfeld argues that
life must arise from “the laws of non-equilibrium statistical physics.” He continues asking “how
is it that matter self-organizes into hierarchies that are capable of generating feedback loops
which connect multiple levels of organization and are evolvable?”64 Goldenfeld claims that what
is required is to think beyond the standard paradigm of biology’s “modern synthesis.”65 It is
within the emerging yet quite promising area of research involving information theory and
mathematics that Goldenfeld argues scientists will be able to deal with such issues.66 In short,
exploring chemical and biological versions of Wolfram type algorithms, where several cellular
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automata are allowed to affect one another and evolve in relation to one another (such as Adam’s
“state dependent dynamics”) many complex patterns observed in nature may become more clear.
Such a future analysis that seeks to unify biology and physics with information science insights
would be distinguished from current research in standard physical theories such as “condensed
matter physics.” For example, quoting from Goldenfeld’s article, Davies writes:
…in condensed matter theory there is a clear separation between the rules that govern the
time evolution of the system and the state of the system itself. In biology however, the
situation is quite different. The rules that govern the time evolution of the system are
encoded in abstraction, the most obvious of which is the genome itself. As the system
evolves in time, the genome itself can be altered, and so the governing rules are
themselves changed.”67
This is essentially a biological version of the information-processing “rule evolution” discussed
in Adam’s CA model.
It will be helpful at this point to provide a concrete example of this type of “rule
evolution” at work in genetics. Again, I will quote from Paul Davies. Rules in biology “refer to
the informational architecture of organisms. Take the genetic code: the triplet of nucleotides
CGT, for example, codes for the amino acid arginine. Although there are no known exceptions to
that rule, it would be wrong to think of it as a law of nature, like the fixed law of gravity. Almost
certainly the CGT arginine assignment emerged a long time ago, probably from some earlier
and simpler rule…When we consider the great drama of evolutionary history, the game of life
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must be seen as a game of quasi-rules that change over time.”68
At this point it should be clear that even the most “ancient” of “rules” in biology are
subject to evolution. Genetic information, the molecular code, differs from certain interpretations
in science, in that emergent rules are not just epiphenomena, but have real effects. “In biology,”
Davies explains, “there often is coupling between levels, between processes on many scales of
size and complexity: causation can be both bottom-up (from genes to organisms) and top-down
(from organisms to genes).”69 It is this bottom-up and top-down interaction between organism
and genes—or as in Adam’s CA “organism” and her CA “environment”—where we can see how
basic simple rules—whether chemical or electronic versions of a mathematical algorithm—and
the interaction of neighboring states (or cells, entities)—which allow unexpected emergent
‘rules’ (whether genetic code or higher-order algorithms within a computer) to appear. These
rules are examples of patterns of information that emerged from other streams or flows of
information. No ‘essence’ or ‘res’ like entities are involved. Rules emerge, guide behavior, and
are in turn affected by their environment. In this way, we can speak of flows of information and
“state dependent rule evolution” as defining features of contemporary biological sciences.
Summary of ‘Science’ Section
In this section we have examined how streams, flows, patterns and clusters of
information are the basis of contemporary biological sciences. Activities within cells such as
observed in protein production, resemble and follow logical operations analogous to solid-state
electronic circuitry and logic gate configurations. Because biology functions computationally,
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and from a “systems” approach, behaves ‘similar’ to ‘software,’ we turned to an examination of
the logical and mathematical foundations observed in these biological processes. The paradoxes
of self-referentiality were examined, most especially with Turing’s “decidability “problem. Selfreferential paradoxes were noted to show the “incompleteness” of any system (biological or
mechanical). And the paradoxes of undecidability and incompleteness “open up” room for
novelty in the form of emergent properties. (Note the similarities-in-difference with certain
aspects of post-structural thought here. This is not uncommon whenever information is selfreferential). Finally, we examined how these processes—when modeled on cellular automata—
demonstrated how basic rules governing the patterns and flow of information may themselves
evolve due to the ‘bottom-up/top-down’ interaction between ‘organisms’ and ‘environment.’ At
the final section of this chapter, I will suggest that some of these insights drawn from research in
contemporary biological science provide useful and salient ‘components’ for a reconfigured
category of doctrinal development. In the next chapter we will see more of how these
‘components’ operate within such a model. But for now, we will briefly discuss some ideas
presented by George Lindbeck and Kathryn Tanner.
Lindbeck’s ‘Rule Theory’ and Tanner’s Anthropological Alternative
Although George Lindbeck’s major work, The Nature of Doctrine, deals with issues of
ecumenism and theories of religion, it is what he refers to as a “regulative” or “rule theory of
doctrine” that interests us here.70 And although Kathryn Tanner’s Theories of Culture, does not
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explicitly deal with doctrine as such, much of what she wrote is of great interest to the topic of
this chapter.71 There are many issues that could be examined with either of these books, but for
the purposes of this chapter, I will discuss only two topics: (1) the non-foundational, intratextual
hermeneutic of Lindbeck’s “cultural-linguistic” model of religion, with the postmodern cultural
anthropological alternative suggested by Tanner; and (2) the “rule theory of doctrine” suggested
by Lindbeck, and Tanner’s ideas revolving around “motifs,” within the ongoing constructive
‘task’ of Christian identity. This will be followed by some concluding thoughts.
Lindbeck argues that religion is best understood as a kind of culture, especially in the
sense given that term by modern anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz. Considered in this
way, a ‘culture’ is an interpretive framework, a unique “web of meaning.” Religion, for
Lindbeck, is quite literally a culture or “language game” that one is always and already
embedded within.72 This “cultural-linguistic” view interprets religion as a system of symbols that
is comprised of values, texts, symbols, and rituals that shape and channel the experience and
thought of its members. Conversion to Christianity (or any religion, ideology and so on) is
therefore similar to immersing oneself in another language and culture.73 Immersion in a new
language and culture opens up new categories of thought and experience. To think of “religions”
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as a “cultural-linguistic” model, however, is to also view them as incommensurable, with stable
and well-defined boundaries; boundaries that determine, in a sense, ‘who is in and who is out.’74
Therefore, perhaps we should ask, along with Kathryn Tanner, whether any culture or
religion really is a stable and undifferentiated structure or language with distinct boundaries?
Kathryn Tanner has demonstrated that this notion of static homogenous cultural groups with
incommensurable or impermeable boundaries is based on unfounded assumptions.75 There never
have been any cultural boundaries that are stable and unchanging in the way Post-liberals such as
Lindbeck are proposing.76 Any cultural or religious notion is always already constructed from
“borrowed materials.”77 People have multiple commitments, and social roles, belonging to
different associations and connections.78 As Tanner describes, “people do not discard their
identities when they take on a Christian one.”79 If Paul in his letter to the Galatians saw no need
to divide people in God’s Kingdom along ethnic, class, or gendered lines, why should Christian
theologians seek to do so today?80 One further problem with Lindbeck’s notion of religion as a
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stable culture has to do with what we might call the criterion for interpretation. Lindbeck—and it
seems most Post-liberals—would assert that the Biblical narrative, or ‘story,’ is the ultimate
standard for keeping the vast amounts of “borrowed materials” on “a distinctively Christian
track.”81 In other words, the ‘Biblical story’ becomes the overarching narrative or hermeneutical
lens for focusing on how all other “borrowed materials’ be integrated and interpreted. Yet as
Tanner points out, the Bible is itself “made up of borrowed materials.”82 By arbitrarily exempting
the Bible from this process, “some subset or aspect of Christian social practices is being
privileged in a theologically suspect fashion.”83 She continues her explanation:
…[that] the process of transforming borrowed material should be as much about selfcriticism as it is about criticism of other ways of life; it should be a self-directed process
of transformation in keeping with an awareness of its own need for criticism. That would
be the case if, as we have suggested, Christian social practices are never themselves
anything other than the transformation of what is outside; if that is, Christian identity is
established from the beginning through the use of borrowed materials.84
This is what I am trying to express in my claim that we should be vigilant in avoiding “res” or
“reified” thought, especially in doctrinal construction. Although she is using a different,
‘anthropological style’ here than my talk of ‘information flows,’ I believe we are on the same
page. Let us look at Lindbeck’s ‘rule theory’ of doctrine, before, once again, consulting Tanner
on her use of the term, ‘motifs.’
According to Lindbeck, doctrines neither refer to an objective reality nor are they mere
‘significations’ of some inner experience. Doctrines are hermeneutical rules. Thus, Lindbeck
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avoids viewing doctrine in terms of epistemology (such as some correspondence theory of truth,
for example). Doctrines are nomological rather than epistemological. So if one considers the
category of ‘doctrine’ as analogous to ‘rules’ of a game or ‘grammatical rules’ of a language,
then it would be a mistake to ask whether such “rules” are true or false.85 Rules are what direct
and guide the legitimate ‘play’ or maneuvers within a game or within a language, and as such, it
would be a categorical mistake to ask if the rules themselves are true.
Understanding doctrine according to this notion of “rule theory,” Lindbeck explains, is
the most appropriate metaphor for describing how theologians of the Patristic era thought about
doctrine. When Athanasius insisted that the Church adopt the concept of ‘consubstantiality,’ his
intention was to use this metaphysical term as nothing more than a ‘hermeneutical rule.’ As
Lindbeck explains, “the theologian most responsible for the final triumph of Nicaea thought of it,
not as a first-order proposition with ontological reference, but as a second-order rule of
speech.”86 Doctrines conceived as rules, therefore, allow for different theological constructions.
Theologians may formulate these categories in multiple ways, the only stipulation being that
their representations follow the pre-established ‘rules.’ Whether formulated as Bonhoeffer’s
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“Man for Others,” or Barth’s “Humanity of God,” the “basic rules for its use remain the same.”87
Viewed in the light of this “rule theory,” Lindbeck insists that the creedal or definitional
statements from Nicaea or Chalcedon, “represent historically conditioned formulations of
doctrines that are unconditionally and permanently necessary to mainstream Christian
identity.”88 In short, for Lindbeck, doctrines may be “historically conditioned,” and the creeds
retain their “continuing value” only insofar as they are authentic representations of what he
refers to as “regulative principles.”89 These principles are “monotheism, historical specificity,
and Christological maximalism.”90 Furthermore, as Lindbeck explains:
[The] Nicene and Chalcedonian formulations were among the few, and perhaps only,
possible outcomes of the process of adjusting Christian discourse to the world of late
classical antiquity in a manner conformable to regulative principles that were already at
work in the earliest strata of the tradition. These creeds can be understood by Christian
and non-Christian alike as paradigmatically instantiating doctrinal rules that have been
abidingly important from the beginning in forming mainstream Christian identity.91
But should we consider these “regulative principles” to be truly “unconditionally and
permanently necessary?”
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First, to my mind, it seems that no doctrine (or underlying “principle” which seems to me to be
subject to the same critique) could have unconditional necessity.92 There seems little reason to
think that Christological formulations utilizing Greek metaphysical concepts such as homoousion
were necessary developments. Regarding this I am inclined to mention a statement Maurice
Wiles made in his work on doctrinal development:
…the historical processes of doctrinal development seem as unlikely to lead to infallible
decisions as the oral transmission of gospel material to lead to an infallible record of the
life of Jesus. The element of human fallibility is present in the bishops and theologians of
the early Church as evidently as it is in the persons of the apostles and evangelists. We
have as much reason in the one case as in the other to believe either that that fallibility
was totally suppressed or that it was incapable of reflecting enough of the inspiration of
the divine Spirit to provide us with valuable guidance for the Church’s life.93
Once again, I would like to highlight some ideas from Tanner’s book. Although she rarely uses
the term, ‘doctrine,’ in this book, she refers to ‘motifs.’94 For Tanner, theology is an ongoing
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constructive task, where the search for a ‘Christian identity’ is a “task,” or a ‘style,’ where any
such identity is the task of continuing to construct and self-critique such identity, especially
claims to any ‘fixed’ identity.95 And so in recognizing the plurality within Christianity, Tanner
suggests that a unifying thread is the concern for ‘discipleship.’96 Tanner explains that there are
certain affirmations that may identify a Christian way of life. For example, Christians tend to
find importance in certain ‘motifs or forms’ such as “dying and rising, Jesus as ‘the Christ,’ love
of God and neighbor, or God as make of heaven and earth.”97 It is not that there is agreement
over the content of these motifs, but it is the fact that these themes are of importance to Christian
ways of life that matters. Christians do not agree on the content of these motifs, but they do
typically agree that the motifs are important to their lives in some way.98 For Tanner, these
motifs or ‘forms’ may be called into question if they lead to some form of idolatry or injustice:
Christians claim that Jesus is God; that does not mean, however, that some Christians
might not decide in the process that the central and overriding significance that Jesus
continues to have for human life would be less misleadingly expressed some other way.
In short, while they set the terms for argument, the forms themselves are not immune
from questioning as the argument proceeds.99
Motifs, or forms, may be ‘guidelines’ and of central importance to Christian thought and
theological construction, but we must guard against making assertions to stable identities (or I
would say “reifying” or res-thinking) of these doctrines or writings as if they represented the
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Absolute Truth. Tanner stresses the need for self-critique and humility in guarding against this
type of idolatry. We should be always open to hearing what new voices, or “borrowed materials”
may tell us. We may find that listening may help us avoid ‘doctrinal idolatry.’ In a passage that
reminds me of H.R. Niebuhr’s “permanent revolution” or Tillilch’s “Protestant Principle,”
Tanner argues that we must always guard against making our claims into an idolatrous
representation of any ‘motif.’ As she explains we must “make God, rather than some human
account of God, the center of one’s life. Doing otherwise, making Christian identity a matter of
allegiance to certain meanings, threatens to put human ideas about God in the place that only
God should fill in Christian life.”100
I would like to suggest that this idea of always keeping open to “where the Spirit may
blow,” by listening to the voices from the margins, from other cultures and religions, and from
all other academic disciplines, are ways of avoiding “reification” or “res-ification” of doctrines
(or motifs). And I hope that by extending the metaphors from an ‘updated’ understanding of
‘organic growth,’ we may also be able to apply the “after Darwin” concept of “state dependent
‘rule’ evolution” to any future discussion of doctrinal development. It is vital, to my mind, that
we begin to consider that doctrines can and should evolve, not simply be translated into another
‘language’ while simultaneously insisting that the inner “res, or essence, or meaning” remains
untouched. If there is no res to a doctrine, but only flows or streams of ‘information,’ then by
listening to those “other voices” we may be open to a radical revisioning and “Darwinian type
evolution” of any doctrine whatsoever. When any doctrine leads to division, exclusion or
violence, it is time to consider whether we might—analogously to “editing or altering” some
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genetic expression—think of editing the doctrine. Considering doctrines, like Lindbeck as
‘rules’—but very much differently than him as evolving rules—we may ponder the implications
of doctrines, not only evolving naturally through the “bottom/up and top/down” mutual
interaction between the environment (in the broadest sense) and the doctrines or ‘motifs’
themselves, but also our intentional alteration of them if the ethical situation requires.
Concluding Thoughts
Perhaps one of the deepest concerns that many theologians or philosophers have with the
very idea of ‘resurrecting’ any form of doctrinal development arises from a legitimate resistance
to any notion of ‘totalizing thought,’ or the ‘strong thought,’ referred to earlier in this chapter.101
This concern manifests itself anytime there is discussion of some “one true” culture, tradition,
history, or metanarrative. And it is certainly true that some forms of doctrinal development have
expressed implicitly or explicitly just such an assumption.102There has been a tendency to
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construe this category as a ‘teleological’ process, one in which either the “content,” or the at least
the “process of transmission,” are inevitable and continuous.103

Tanner critiques these types of

projects from her postmodern cultural anthropological position. In contrast to any simple idea of
a continuity of history, Tanner suggests that any “cultural continuity is always only the
temporary outcome of historical struggle,” and any attempt to portray the ambiguous flow of
history as a “continuity of traditional materials” is able to do so only by ignoring the
“vicissitudes of history.”104 Secondly, any belief that the variegated spectrum of “borrowed
materials” has any real stable or fixed identity is illusory. There is always only re-interpreting,
absorbing, shifting interpretations of any ideas or materials. It is only in between all of these
differing relations of ideas, fragments of material, and bricolage that a kind of “identity” is
constructed. But because of this, it is necessary to be ever vigilant because any “claim of
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consensus may, for example, simply be a power play.”105 This is quite similar to what I am
trying to say about the need to adopt a non-res approach to doctrine. It is my hope that a
reconfigured way of thinking about doctrinal development may avoid as much of this as
possible.
This chapter began with a suggestion that three elements should be part of any
reconfigured model of doctrinal development: I think we can see how re-thinking the notion of
doctrine as patterns, flows, stream or clusters of information can be useful in the constant need to
avoid ‘reifying’ doctrinal claims. Information quite literally flows, it does not have a ‘res,’ nor
can it become stable for long. It is the nature of information to be flowing just as it is nature’s
way to be continually evolving. Updating the metaphors and analogies associated with doctrinal
development seems long over-due. We live in a time ‘after Darwin,’ and since we have inherited
the quite natural language of ‘organic, biological or botanical growth’ as it applies to doctrinal
change, it also seems natural that we update the metaphors associated with these ideas. For
example, what if we considered the metaphor of symbiosis? The notion of symbiosis I am
thinking of is the example provided by Lynn Margulis’ endosymbiotic theory of the origin of
eukaryotes: Somehow an “amoeba-like prokaryote” entered into some other “energy-producing
prokaryotes, and the two species evolved to live together in a mutually beneficial way”—and in
this way, the “guest” became “the mitochondria of modern eukaryote cells.”106 With this
metaphor of symbiosis in mind—understood as mutually beneficial—could we find a caring and
peaceful application?
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To consider an example of “symbiosis,” we may begin with this question from Kathryn
Tanner, “When African Christians identify the spirits in control of everyday life with demons
and Jesus Christ as the only antidote to their pernicious influence, which is absorbing which—
African religious practices or Christian ones?”107 Now, Tanner’s concern is quite similar to mine.
She is pointing out that Christianity is entirely “borrowed material” in that one cannot reach a
point where there is, in any simplistic sense, an origin or some “pure” source. She is utilizing
notions from postmodern cultural anthropology, while I am suggesting (in the context of
doctrinal development), ideas from evolutionary biology and the information flows that underlie
the biological sciences.
Yet with my caveat of “weak thought” in mind, (or might we refer to it as
alternative/mutual strengthening?), on at least this issue, are we not going about things in similar
ways? One possible difference may be that with the metaphor of “symbiosis,” in the sense of
“mutually beneficial,” any potential doctrinal discussion would be able to accept this, not as a
power play or threat to ecclesiastical authorities, but a natural evolutionary development. And by
being vigilant in trying to use “information” language rather than “res” language, perhaps
“strong” assertions might be avoided. And so is this question regarding some African Christian
communities perhaps a situation is which a type of symbiotic interaction is occurring such that it
does not really matter “who is absorbing whom?”
There are many possibilities opened by the incorporation of new metaphors. The usage of
the concepts of complexity, emergence, downward causation (top/down and bottom/up
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interaction), and the idea of “state dependent ‘rule’ evolution” will be the subject of the next
chapter. We have already seen something of how complexity and emergent “higher-order”
properties or “rules” arise within biology and cellular automata. In the next chapter I will discuss
how an ‘ethical dimension’ emerges over time from what may seem quite innocuous initial
conditions. Thus, we can see how doctrine presents at least two ways in which ethical concerns
may arise: (1) when doctrine is used as an “ossified weapon” (2) through a doctrinal
“emergence.” In this way I hope to demonstrate how ethics is inextricably integrated into any
process of development including doctrinal development.

CHAPTER FOUR
EVOLUTION, DOCTRINE, AND EMERGENT ETHICAL DILEMMAS
The aim of Chapter Three was to provide an outline for a contemporary concept of
“doctrinal development,” with the express purpose of moving away from an over-emphasis on
epistemological and quasi-metaphysical notions of that category. “Ethical considerations” should
also be a necessary criterion of any “critically based” development of doctrine, and not simply
the mostly epistemological criteria usually associated with that category. I would argue that the
contemporary approach to doctrinal development that we discussed in the last chapter allows
Newmans’ “organic development model” to be expanded to include this “ethical” aspect. This
‘expanded model’ of doctrinal development is one that can be said to recognize, and include, the
way in which doctrines—or any ideas—not only have no “enduring or unchanging essential
core,” but also necessarily evolve and interact with their environment in unpredictable ways,
often producing emergent ‘moral situations.’ We have already noted how this contemporary
approach to development seeks to avoid viewing doctrines in an “ossified” way that may become
“weaponized” or used to claim access to exclusive ‘Truth.’ We will see another example below
in the “Doctrine of Creation” section. With these considerations in mind, we can now look
closely in this chapter, at two doctrines, and how they developed over time: the notion of
“’Sovereignty’ in monotheism” and the “doctrine of creation.” I am claiming that from
innocuous beginnings, unpredictable and complex developments may arise, producing quite
unexpected “emergent features” that then produce top/down effects that are often manifested as
156
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unexpected moral situations. Moral situations or dilemmas that were unforeseeable from the
outset, but that in current circumstances may demand a re-consideration, and thus become
altered, or reconstructed, so as to be an expression of Caritas. In precisely this way, a kind of
‘ethics of belief’ may emerge from doctrinal developments.
First, we will look at how aspects of the theological notion of “sovereignty,” originally
associated with God, and “God’s Kingdom,” evolved over time, became associated with the
Corpus Mysticum of Medieval Christendom, and then transitioned into the idea of the “King’s
two bodies,” eventually morphing into forms of “popular sovereignty.” This concept of a
Sovereign representation of a ‘unified people’ is a powerful and ambiguous symbol. This is true
in regard to both the theological and political sense of the term. In any case, Sovereignty, at least
in its most belligerent forms, receded in the wake of the Second World War. Towards the end of
the Cold War, hopes for a “post national” cooperation suggested something of the potential for
the fulfilment of peaceful dreams in the global context. In more recent years, however, with
global financial disasters, mass migration of peoples, and dramatic shifts in demographics, a
dangerous and growing number of people are beginning to call for a new, Nationalist form of
Sovereignty.1 This Sovereignty is often racial, religious, cultural, and nationalist in content. This
‘return of national sovereignty’—however illusory, misguided, and even incoherent—is
nevertheless extremely dangerous. The theological connotations are apparent in the political
language of this type of National Sovereignty. For example, we see such signs in current political
‘hopes’ for some power and authority standing above the fray—almost transcendent--closing and
patrolling borders, deciding who is “in” or who is “out,” demanding obedience, faith, and

1

Saul Newman, Political Theology: A Critical Introduction (MA: Polity Press, 2019), 1-3.

158
sacrifice, while pretending to be a representation of “The People.” This language reflects the
theological idea of sovereignty and the transcendent God declaring who is “saved” or
“damned”—a theological unity that has often had representation on earth, in the form of Pope or
King. But this contemporary populism of the fringe rightwing sees itself as “reclaiming
sovereignty” from the global elites, or secularists, or whatever, as well as the perceived “threat’
to the culture, coming from multiculturalism, immigration, and other cultural shifts.
By tracing this doctrine and its unforeseen and unpredictable evolution, we can see the
“bottom up” emergence of a new “top down” threat in the form of potentially violent, racist, calls
for Sovereignty. (It does not matter whether this is essentially “theatrical” if the very real threat
exists amongst the growing number who “believe in it”). This example of an evolution of
doctrine, admittedly, moves towards the limits of what traditionally constitutes theology,
challenges those borders, and provides an example of how a doctrine can evolve in totally
unexpected and dangerous ways. The moral implications should be clear. Furthermore, the
connotations associated with the concept, “sovereignty,” are both a theological as well as a
political philosophical problem. I am not convinced by claims that this a question solely for
political philosophy, and not for theology. I would claim that it is difficult to keep language of
“religion” and ‘secular” separate. First, the “history of effects” from the Judeo-Christian heritage
has certainly left its mark upon all aspects of culture in “the West.” All ideas blur, and the
influence of religion on politics, economics, and culture generally, is quite pervasive. Yes, we
may abstract and discuss ideas ‘as distinct,’ but I do think that the two notions “autodeconstruct” the closer we scrutinize them. By taking seriously our commitments to an
integration of ethics and theology it seems, to my mind at least, theologians should indeed

159
examine both the origins and this concept of “sovereignty,” its sources, and the ways in which it
has received theological justification. Sovereignty is a theological idea in its origins after all.
Therefore, I would suggest that the theological and political concepts of sovereignty are topics
that should be of great concern for theologians and ethicists.
Next, we turn toward the doctrine of creation and its evolution over time. A Medieval
doctrine of creation, such as we find in Aquinas, is an articulation of a truly Cosmic-Sacramental
universe. His doctrine of creation is one in which every created being—non-human as well as
human animals, nature, and everything within it—has intrinsic goodness, and together provides a
glimpse of the goodness and grandeur of God. Aquinas asserts that every being expresses some
aspect—however imperfectly—of the goodness and purposes of God. (This is the ground for the
analogia entis after all). While Aquinas, of course, did not explicitly describe an eco-theology,
he certainly did articulate a perspective of nature and all in it that would be conducive to such an
interpretation. Furthermore, we will note that in the Medieval worldview, Christian theology
provided the over-arching framework for all other disciplines (trivium, quadrivium, law, and so
on). Reading Jose Casanova and Charles Taylor, we will examine some of the shifts that
occurred that led to the “differentiation” of various domains of knowledge—for example, where
science, politics, and economics all began to develop their own methodologies autonomously and
free from the ‘oversight’ of Christian theology. At the same time, and as a result of these
changes, theology receded into its own rather narrowed focus on spiritual or moral (intra-human
ethical) matters. In response to the Enlightenment shifts towards epistemology and
“propositional” knowledge, the robust and rich medieval doctrine of creation also receded into
apologetics and epistemological questions about how we may know that God created the world,
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whether God “fine-tuned” the initial conditions of the universe, when it was created and so on.
Here is an example of how “doctrine” has been understood as the true “res” of the faith. This is a
position where “doctrinal ossified propositions” are weaponized for apologetic arguments,
providing any easy slide into certain forms of conservative Christian thought. Such maneuvers
encourage some forms of conservative Christianity to enter alliances with rightwing movements
and Big Oil, Corporations, and such. As a result, the focus of much theology became
anthropological and thus Christianity was “caught off guard” as ecological degradation emerged
in the wake of the rise of industrial capitalism. Fortunately, today we are seeing a new
development and re-construction of the Doctrine of Creation that is environmentally concerned.
Therefore, this chapter attempts to stress the importance of continually keeping ethical
implications of doctrine in mind as we trace the evolution of two doctrinal examples, in light of
the expanded model of doctrinal development outlined in the last chapter. There is neither space,
nor is it the purpose of this chapter to provide any hubristic attempt to “solve” these ethical
dilemmas. Instead, I will briefly map some of the proposed solutions that others have suggested.
The point of the chapter is to hopefully demonstrate how the discussion of doctrinal development
outlined in the last chapter allows for a recognition of “emergent ethical situations.” This more
contemporary and critically based model tries to keep ethical thought as a central criterion to
development. This chapter may be viewed as looking at doctrine with a kind of “negative or
warning,” aspect of our critical or ethical lens. The following chapter will briefly outline a more
“positive” constructive appeal to an ethical aspect of doctrinal development. This chapter
illustrates how doctrines evolve unpredictably, and across boundaries. And we may also see how
doctrines can be of ethical concern as (1) ossified propositional ‘weapons’ [declaring who is
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truly “Christian” or not; by focusing on ‘doctrine’ rather than ethical engagement in the world,
and so on] (2) how unforeseen ethical contexts emerge unexpectedly from the “bottom-up” with
“top-down” moral implications that need to be addressed in any ethically responsible model of
doctrinal development. I am not proposing here any one model of critical analysis or ethical
model, rather, I would simply say that any kind of ethical tools should be kept at hand when
examining or constructing doctrine.
The Evolving Doctrine of Sovereignty
In what follows, I will provide an all too brief overview to illustrate a basic point: The
theological doctrines referring to the Sovereignty of God evolved over time and eventually began
developing outside of the theological/ecclesial realm and into the secular. However, through the
inevitable “history of effects” the concept of Sovereignty retains much of the original theological
connotations. This unpredictable process of development enabled the emergence of a whole host
of “moral” issues.
We begin with observing that from Jesus’ original announcing of the coming of God’s
Sovereign Kingdom, he soon became “the announced Sovereign,” as the King. Afterwards, the
doctrinal connotations associated with the concept of “Kingship,” or “Sovereignty,” became ever
more elevated, and having merged with Greek metaphysical categories, eventually became the
basis for a theory of the Medieval Church. This idea of a corpus mysticum was transformed into
a late sixteenth century legal construction of the “King’s two bodies.” From this legal fiction, the
notion of a corporate ‘body politic’ takes hold, and as theological power and influence is pushed
from the public political arena, the associated concept of “sovereignty” nevertheless survived in
the form of the new modern political theories. One might say—continuing our Darwinian
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analogies—that vestiges of the theological notion of sovereignty remain (or emerge) in various
new forms. These new forms of “sovereign ‘theological’ power” continue, having found their
way into the “absent presence” left by the vacating of religion from the public sphere (in
particular, the 18th century).2 Into this structural space, new incarnations of sovereignty,
transcendence and authority find their place.3 It is within this ‘winding tradition’ and
‘developmental process,’ that I hope to demonstrate one way in which totally unpredictable
consequences gradually emerge from the complex interactions of a basic theological title—
Christ as King. It is my claim that the repercussions felt from heightened assertions of national
sovereignty in the current context of crises in the global neoliberal order have their roots in this
initial doctrinal claim; that throughout the complex process and interaction with the broader
environment of culture and politics, the connotations evolved quite unexpectedly, and yet the
current global situation has ‘forced upon us’ a ‘space’ where an ethics of belief and doctrinal
reconsideration is called for. Because there is no ‘res’ to any doctrinal formulation, there are no
easy answers to how to deal with the issue. Doctrines as ‘rules’ that evolve from both bottom-up
interactions with the broader environment as well as top-down applications have no unchanging
or permanent core. However, we will look to some ways of ‘editing’ this particular ‘thread’ that
we are following by re-thinking ways about “Christ as King.”
Within current historical-critical research there is something of an historically agreed
upon minimal understanding of the historical Jesus. A consensus would include that Jesus was
Jewish, and that his followers, originally at least, were all Jewish. Most scholars would probably
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agree that Jesus was baptized by an “apocalyptic prophet,” John the Baptist, and that he taught in
Galilee; that he traveled to Jerusalem to teach, where he was eventually arrested and crucified by
Rome at the direction of the Procurator Pilate.4 Another key consensus element is that Jesus
apparently began his ministry announcing the coming of the Kingdom of God (Mark 1:15). For
the purposes of this project, I wish to point out that what began as this pronouncement of the
coming kingdom evolved into the assertion that Jesus is King.
In looking all too briefly at some basic trajectories within historical-Jesus scholarship, we
must first recognize that the New Testament Gospel accounts are post-Easter interpretations,
constructed from decades of oral traditions. Furthermore, it should be clear that each Gospel
interpretation was designed to deal with precise issues relevant to the distinct contextual
challenges, concerns, and questions of particular communities. With these caveats in mind,
historical-Jesus scholarship does tend to provide two, broadly construed images of the historical
Jesus: a Jewish apocalyptic prophet or a Spirit-filled Jewish social reformer and teacher. The
point relevant for this project is to recognize that Jesus seems to have either been announcing the
future coming of God’s rule or claimed a kind of commission to begin a Kingdom of God on
earth where the poor and social outcasts are welcome.5 This latter notion of a Kingdom without
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mediators, hierarchy, or oppression would likely have been very attractive to the many Jewish
people suffering under what Marcus Borg refers to as the “Imperial domination system.”6 Now,
the key feature of both visions is that Jesus is announcing the Kingdom of God—a rule in which
the justice called for by the prophets becomes actual; where the poor, widow, orphan, and
sojourner are cared for—a kingdom in which God and God’s justice rule rather than Caesar or
Herod. Jesus does not—according to the majority view of historical-critical scholarship—appear
to have claimed himself to be King in any explicit sense.7
Scholars arguing for an ‘apocalyptic Jesus’ remind us that the predominant worldview of
Judaism in the two centuries prior to Jesus, as well as within the first century itself, was saturated
with an apocalyptic imagination.8 Apocalyptic literature was common in the pseudepigrapha and
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the Dead Sea community. An apocalyptic sense of the dualism of history, in which ‘this present
evil age’ will be finally set right by God in the “age to come,” is a central message and belief
amongst many first century prophets such as John the Baptist. This dualist message is also to be
found in the letters of Paul of Tarsus during his itinerant journeys around the Mediterranean and
Levant. Journeys that took place during the time just after the crucifixion. In other words, Jesus’
message is not only quite similar to other apocalyptic thought of the time, but his life span is
situated directly within the time frame best understood as comprising an apocalyptic worldview.
Given the centrality of the ‘coming of the Kingdom’ in Jesus’ message, according to these
scholars, one is best able to understand him in this broader apocalyptic context. Doing so, these
scholars argue, provides the best hermeneutical key for interpreting the authentic sayings of
Jesus of Nazareth.9
The other tendency in historical-critical scholarship presents Jesus as either one who is
creating a non-eschatological kingdom of inclusion and social reform on the one hand or as a
“Spirit-filled” person, capable of healing, teaching, and performing wonders on the other. (Such
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perspectives are not necessarily exclusive of one another. But again, it is not my intention to
delve into these interesting debates. I am simply providing a thumbnail sketch of the positions
merely to illustrate how the nascent notion of ‘kingship or sovereignty’ in the first century
referred to either “God, or ‘God’s kingdom,’” in order to set the stage for the later evolution of
this concept). A well-rounded integration of these ideas come from Marcus Borg who describes
Jesus of Nazareth as a person filled with the “Spirit of God.”10 Espousing a panentheistic
interpretation of God, Borg provides an image of a “Spirit person” as one who may both
experience as well as reflect a sense of the numinous. When Jesus appeared in Galilee, he
apparently embodied something of the presence of God, a kind of authentic centering of the
Spirit. He reflected the love of God which provided an authenticity to his actions, aphorisms, and
parables. Furthermore, these teachings and symbolic prophetic actions contrasted with the
conventional wisdom of the day.11 The image of Jesus as a teacher who spoke wisdom and lived
his message through prophetic symbolic actions is shared by John Domininc Crossan. There are
many similarities between Borg and Crossan, including their shared assertion that Jesus sought to
bring about a type of ethical community on earth12. In contrast to a future “consistent or
imminent eschatology,” these scholars argue that Jesus was calling for an ideal and egalitarian
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community on earth, beginning right there in Palestine. The connotations associated with calling
for a ‘Kingdom of God’ would have been understood as extremely dangerous politically, even
treasonous, in the world of the Roman Empire where there was no ‘King’ but Caesar.13 Jesus’
use of parables, according to Crossan, were therefore deliberately provocative. The imagery
invoked by Jesus’ analogy between a mustard seed and the Kingdom of God provides one clear
example.14 The mustard plant, Crossan tells us, was actually a wild shrub, one that would quite
easily grow out of control and pose a danger for the health of the garden or a field of grain. And
the notion of the birds nesting in its branches would invoke a sense of dread in anyone who
feared for the healthy growth of the seed and grains. The mustard seed grows where it is not
wanted, and does so at rapid rates. It is a wild bush that others try to control, having found it an
invasive threat, a threat with dangerous connotations.15
According to Crossan, to speak of the Kingdom in this way demonstrates the way in
which this notion of an alternative ethical community—albeit a community that is explicitly
described ‘politically’ as a Kingdom—presented a political threat and challenge to what Borg
has called the “Imperial pre-modern domination system.”16 This refers to the system of structural
injustice in which approximately one or two percent of the elite urban rulers extract wealth from
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the ninety-eight or nine percent of the agrarian peasant population. A system enforced by the
Roman military legions (and Herodian or other ‘client’ King’s armed forces) and ‘legitimated’
by Roman Imperial theology.17 Within this context, Borg and Crossan describe a Jesus’
movement that was trying to build an alternative “kingdom” through non-violent resistance to
the reigning Kingdom of Rome.18 The “Kingdom,” for these scholars, is precisely this growing
ethical community on earth that is willing to engage in non-violent resistance to the Roman
system of oppression.
From this very brief overview of the historical Jesus, the scholarship seems to suggest
two, broadly construed visions, of Jesus’s relationship to the concept of “King.” In neither
typology does Jesus appear to refer to himself as King.19 In the apocalyptic Jesus model, Jesus is
announcing the future arrival of God’s Kingdom—a Kingdom ruled by God rather than Rome or
Herod. In the “social reform” model of Jesus, the scholarship suggests that Jesus, and the Jesus
movement itself, was about constructing an alternative ethical community based on a
“participatory eschatology” in which members live out ethical obligations and participate in
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God’s work of bringing a Kingdom of Love, justice, and fairness on the earth. Again, whether
Jesus announced a coming Kingdom of God’s justice—one in which we are expected to
participate by bringing about justice in the here and now—or if he announced a future event that
God would bring about with a restored Israel and Kingdom of Justice is not directly relevant to
our project.20 In either case, the notion of ‘king’ or ‘kingdom’ is quite different from that which
will develop in the post-East interpretations. The Christological evolution that occurs, after the
Easter event, continues past the councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon where Christ becomes the
Pantocrator, and is understood as homoousion with God. The metaphysical Christ as King is
then the condition for the possibility of new developments such as the corpus mysticum. From
the likely historical beginnings of Jesus as the one who announced the coming of a Kingdom of
justice, the prophet from Nazareth becomes the announced: the King and Sovereign Pantocrator
consubstantial with the Godhead.
This evolution from Jesus who announces the Kingdom, to becoming consubstantial with
the monotheistic God of Israel, happened gradually and overtime. Already within the New
Testament there are some well-known elements that hint at just such an evolution. Since the time
of William Wrede scholars have noted, for example, how Jesus responded to Peter’s assertion
that “Jesus is the Messiah” with the strange command to not to tell anyone (MK 8:30). The likely
explanation is that Jesus did not claim to be a Messiah during his lifetime but only after the
crucifixion did the early “Jesus movement” community began to make this messianic
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proclamation. In other words, the gospel of Mark is already an interpretation, probably
attempting to deal with issues in the “Markan” community where people began to ask why it was
that the claim (of being the Messiah) did not appear to have been made during the lifetime of
Jesus. Similar questions that seem best answered as a result of ‘Christological evolution,’ may
also be seen in the development of the gospel of John, which was probably written towards the
end of the first century. This gospel presents Jesus as making high Christological claims such as
the famous “I am” sayings.21 In this case we have the reverse issue of what was observed by
Wrede in Mark. Why, one may ask, if Mark was written some forty years before John’s gospel,
do we not see such high Christological statements in the gospel attributed to Mark? Such
assertions were unlikely to be forgotten. Why would the author of Mark leave such statements
out?22 The point of course, is that such dilemmas, and many others like these, can only be
satisfactorily accounted for given the idea of a Christological evolution that begins within the
New Testament itself.23
The evolutionary process continued beyond the first century, with thought worlds and
cultures merging and interacting in various ways. 24 The impact of Greco-Roman philosophy,
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particularly Stoicism and of course, Platonism, Middle Platonism, and Neo-Platonism can hardly
be overstated, but are unfortunately outside the scope of this project.25 The interaction, most
especially with Greek philosophical concepts, allowed the application of discussion of
“substance,” or ousia, to be applied to the emerging doctrinal constructions of God and the
Logos. With the decision surrounding the creed proclaimed at Nicaea, the evolutionary process
that we are interested in here has reached its climax. And by 381 C.E., the revised version of the
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed refers to God as the “all governing [pantokratora]” as well as
the “Lord Jesus Christ…of the same essence as the Father [homoousion to patri]…through
whom all things came into being…and will come again with glory to judge the living and the
dead. His Kingdom shall have no end [telos].”26 The transition from the Jesus who announced
the coming Kingdom into the Christ who is now the sovereign King has, therefore, evolved
through the complex interactions and merging of several cultural concepts.27 The impact of the
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doctrinal formulation was enormous. Elizabeth Johnson describes well how this emergent
doctrine was interpreted in the world of Roman antiquity.
The image of Christ consequently assumed contours of the male head of household or the
imperial ruler, a move correlated with similar development in the idea of church office.
Christ was then viewed as the principle of headship and cosmic order, the ruling king of
glory, the Pantocrator par excellence, whose heavenly reign sets up and sustains the
earthly rule of the head of the family, empire, and church. Obedience to these authorities
was obedience to Christ; disobedience to them called into question one’s allegiance to
Christ himself. Thus co-opted, the powerful symbol of the liberating Christ lost its
subversive, redemptive significance.28
This is indeed a large evolutionary shift from the Jesus who was calling for a Kingdom of justice
and love to replace or reconfigure the ‘religion’ of power that was indicative of Rome and its
Imperial domination system. Furthermore, these emergent doctrinal formulations of high
Christological sovereignty became a foundation for their novel use in the Medieval world. If the
category of consubstantiality articulated at Nicaea enshrined the notion of sovereignty in all
subsequent Christological doctrines, then the construction of the “two nature” Christology
articulated by Cyril of Alexandria and defined at Chalcedon became the condition of the
possibility that allowed morphing these ideas into the concept of the corpus mysticum.29 For
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example, by 1200 C.E. Simon of Tournai articulated a concept of two bodies of Christ.30 The
idea of “two bodies,” Simon explained, described the “individual” as well as the “collective”
bodies of Christ—the Church and Christendom. This new “sociological” description of the
Church, using the established Christological categories defined at Chalcedon, simply became an
elaboration or development that occurred from the shifting political context of Europe at the
time. The way in which this complex development of the Medieval Church into the Corpus
Ecclesiae Mysticum occurred has been brilliantly charted by Ernst Kantorowicz. Kantorowicz
explained that although the notion of “Christian society” as corpus Christi has its roots in the
letters of Paul, the concept of corpus mysticum first gained prominence during the Carolingian
era.31 It was the monk Ratramnus of the monastery Corbie that first used the term corpus
mysticum to distinguish the Eucharist from the “proper and true body” (proprium et verum
corpus)—the “individual” body of Christ.32 It was only in the mid- twelfth century that these
terms switched meaning, likely as a result of the debates over the nature of the Eucharist.33
Therefore, by 1150 the phrase Corpus Ecclesiae Mysticum was applied to the “organized body of
Christian society united in the Sacrament of the Altar.”34 And so it was that by 1302, Pope
Boniface VIII issued Unam Sanctum stating that the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic Church
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“represents one mystical body, the head of which is Christ, and the head of Christ is God.”35 And
most importantly for our purposes here, this vision of the whole Church headed by Christ—and
visibly headed by Christ’s representative Roman Pontiff on earth—was understood to include all
the various nascent political entities as subordinate to and within this Corpus Mysticum.36 The
very notion of Sovereignty was now understood not only as the mystical body of Christ but as
the embodiment of legal and economic direction on earth—Corpus Christi Juridicum.37 As
Kantorowicz explained, the visible Church was now a “body politic, or a political and legal
organism, on a level with the secular bodies politic which were then beginning to assert
themselves as self-sufficient entities.”38
The next stage of this fascinating evolution takes place in the wake of the Reformation.
Although this process of development first occurred in England, it soon emerged throughout
European courts. Queen Elizabeth’s lawyers in the later quarter of the sixteenth century
borrowed heavily from the symbol of corpus mysticum and transferred it to the nascent state in
England.39 The background and immediate issue for these jurists lay in the potential instability of
the interregnum—the period between the death of a monarch and the instillation of a new crown.
The lawyers found a solution in the concept of the “King’s two bodies.” The Christological
connotations are once again employed in this legal abstraction. Basically, the argument stated
that the monarch has two bodies: a natural mortal body as well as a corporate body politic that
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exists eternally. Hence the phrase, “the king is dead, long live the king.” The concept of the
“Royal We,” in which the monarch speaks as the eternal representative of the people is also
thought to be justified through this legal construction.40 In this way, the jurists laid a legal
construction that allowed for the enduring monarchy, and the unbroken continuation of the state
while attempting to cut off challenges to the monarchical succession. Clearly the later failed as
the seventeenth century conflicts would prove, although the legal fiction of the “Two Bodies”
did allow for the sempiternity of the state itself. In any case, the concept was described by Justice
Harper, a jurist of the time, in the following account:
The king… has two bodies, the one whereof is a body natural, consisting of natural
members as every other Man (sic) has… the other is a Body politic, and the Members
thereof are his Subjects, and he and his Subjects together compose the Corporation…and
he is incorporated with them, and they with him, and he is the Head, and they are the
Members, and he has the sole Government of them. 41
The Body Politic delineated the boundaries of the commonwealth, establishing power and
transcendent authority over the subjects. The monarch was the sovereign representative of the
people, the Head of the state and its members. And just as with the earlier representations of
Christ or the Pope, the Monarch’s sovereignty over the state and its members could demand
sacrifice, complete faith and trust, and perfect obedience. As the Head and Representative over
the sovereign boundaries of the state, the monarch could also define who was “within” or
“outside” the body politic. Notice here the theological connotations of sovereignty that have
migrated to the secular: obedience, faith, sacrifice, the transcendent authority and power over
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everyone within the Body, the ability to define who is “inside or outside” similar to God’s ability
to define the “elect over the reprobate.”42 Sovereigns have the power to tax, demand military
service, and to arrest those who do not follow the law. The sovereign, however, is above the law,
being its source. Furthermore, the members of the body were “fully” unified and represented
under the Sovereign Head of the body. So, when the monarch’s natural body died, the “soul” of
the Corporate Body Politic continued, becoming “incarnate” in the next monarch.43
This evolution of the theological idea of Sovereignty thus transitions and disperses within
the secular. Nevertheless, political sovereignty continues to bear the traces of the theological
concept. Although the first modern liberal nation state emerged in the Netherlands in 1568 after
their successful revolt from the Habsburg empire, it is in England, with Thomas Hobbes, that we
see an analytic account of a state that seems to me to be a midway place between Monarchy and
the emerging notion of national sovereignty.44 Importantly, Hobbes insists on a conception of the
state that is grounded on a “covenant” or consent rather than Divine authorization. By contrast,
the medieval notion of the Corpus Mysticum perceived all “nascent political entities” to be
subordinated to and within the universal Church. There were, of course, the previous conflicts
over investiture during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but there was never any serious
question over where ultimate authority lay during that period. In Hobbes’ construction, however,
the sovereign determines the law as well as stands above the church (in his case, the Anglican
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Church). Hobbes envisions the state of nature as a brutal and selfish condition. The moral theory
he employs is one of relativism:
But whatsoever is the object of any man’s (sic) Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for
his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; And of his
Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible,
are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and
absolutely so;45
It is for entirely rational, albeit self-interested reasons, that all persons will understand
that if they might be able to leave this condition of nature, they ought to. No individual safety or
possibility of developing culture could be possible under such brutal conditions. Therefore,
Hobbes argues that human beings, being rational as well as selfish, can understand that the
natural right (jus), suggests that one is free to seek self-preservation.46 Furthermore, the natural
law (lex), shows that one is obligated to do whatsoever is necessary to secure one’s safety.47 As
rational creatures, therefore, Hobbes suggests one can derive a “fundamental law of nature” that
one ought to seek peace if at all possible, otherwise be prepared to defend oneself from all other
“selfish” persons.48 Since no one could possibly defend oneself against all others, Hobbes
derives the “rational principle” that one should therefore be “willing to lay down this right to all
things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men
against himself.”49 In other words, one should see the futility in trying to defend oneself against
all others and thus agree to stop the “war of all against all” as long as all others are willing to do
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so as well. The central point to this thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature is the way in
which the social covenant is arrived at out of rational, self-interest, and the consent of human
beings. The power of the sovereign is derived directly from the fact that self-interested citizens
gave up their right “to all things.” It is irrelevant, for Hobbes, whether the sovereign arose out of
conquest or by actual election. Sovereignty is never bound by the law because it is the source and
legitimation of that law. Any new implementation of law is, often enough, a violent rupture from
what preceded it. Nevertheless, for Hobbes, the Leviathan, is a “mortal god,” and all citizens
become a part of this organism of the state.50 Whether the sovereign is an aristocracy or
parliament, monarchy or other form of government, citizens are “personated” by the Leviathan
as they become part of the Whole, the Sovereign that rules for them.51
The concept of sovereignty has thoroughly transitioned into the state with Hobbes’
theory. The Leviathan, the sovereign secular state is no longer grounded on a Divine will but a
secular power over the church itself. In the Leviathan we see Max Weber’s well-known
formulation of sovereignty wherein the Sovereign has “a monopoly of legitimate coercion over a
given territory.”52 Furthermore, the Sovereign is said to be the mysterious force that unites the
multitude of individual citizens into a Unity. As Hobbes famously phrased this:
The Multitude so united in one person, is called a Common-Wealth, in Latin CIVITAS.
This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently),
of that mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense…
the Common-wealth is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual
covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he
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may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace
and Common Defense.53
Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that Hobbes was simply projecting the sickness of modern
civilization onto a hypothetical state of nature. In the actual world, Rousseau would claim, it is
precisely within the state of nature that humanity may best flourish.54 Only the artificial desires
and hierarchies of “civilization” are what create the conditions of competition, violence, and
poverty that Hobbes incorrectly identified with “primitive” living. Rousseau was a populist who
advocated for a theory of direct democracy. Unlike Hobbes who asserted that one must surrender
all rights to the government, or Locke who claimed one should give up only some rights,
Rousseau argues that each person should give up all rights to a community of equals. For
Rousseau, it is precisely because giving up all rights to all others in the community means that no
one is giving up rights to any particular group or individual.55 In this peculiar way, Rousseau is
able to claim that society is founded on self-interest (albeit without asserting a pessimistic view
of human nature) and yet everyone is able to retain their freedom since they have not surrendered
anything except to the community of equal members to which they belong.56 Here we see a
direct democracy in which popular sovereignty is expressed in a pure or absolute form. Despite
this appeal to democratic populism, however, there remains a specter of authoritarianism in
Rousseau’s thought. The goal of this particular form of popular sovereignty is to form a virtuous
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society. When society is virtuous a communal self or “general will” emerges. This notion is not
simply an appeal to the will of a democratic majority. This would imply that persons are voting
in terms of their perceived best interests. Rather, the general will is an expression of a whole that
is greater than the sum of the parts. Therefore, the general will is the expression of what is in the
best interest of the whole. The citizens are sovereign in actively making laws, at least that is,
when expressed as the virtuous general will. The laws are then implemented by the elected
government (probably a parliament) which also means that the citizens are the subjects of the
state. Along with a powerful legislator, censor of the arts, and a deistic civic religion which
provides for the sanctity of the state, the system nevertheless is a powerful expression of popular
sovereignty. In Book I, chapter 7 of The Social Contract, Rousseau infamously asserts that those
who do not act or obey the general will should be “forced to be free.”57 Rousseau seems to be
suggesting a concept of freedom that Isaiah Berlin would refer to as “freedom to” as opposed to
a “freedom from” coercion.58 The former notion implies that freedom is more than a mere
absence of restraint. One is truly free when they have discovered the higher virtue or higher
purpose that constitutes living according to some true ‘good.’ Freedom, for Rousseau, is not the
freedom to do anything whatsoever one wishes. True freedom is found in belonging to the
general will, the “republic or Body Politic.”59
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We have seen how the term “sovereignty” has evolved and transitioned in totally
unforeseeable and surprising ways. I would suggest that this emerging concept of a Nation-State,
or a Sovereign State, has, as seen in the examples presented here, began to exhibit elements of
the “sacred” that was once the province of ecclesial institutions and religion.60 Similarly, we see
this in the Westphalian system articulated in 1648—the first international recognition of the
sovereignty of nation-states. Then after the American and French Revolutions, the notion of
popular sovereignty, expressed as the “will of the people” moved from theory to reality. Indeed,
after observing the civic republicanism of the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that
American popular sovereignty appeared to him as if “the people reign in the American political
world like God over the universe. It is the cause and aim of all things, everything comes from
them, and everything is absorbed in them.”61
Again, it is worth looking once more at this concept of sovereignty, both in its theological
as well as in its transitioned place in the secular state. My point is not to advocate for any
positive position, but rather, to describe something of the evolution and ‘traces’ of sovereignty
through its many metamorphoses, especially from the theological into the secular. And, in
particular, I hope to point out how the notions associated with (theological) sovereignty “filled”
the space left by the absence of explicit ecclesial or public religion. So let us look again at some
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of the aspects traditionally associated with the idea of the Sovereignty of God. God understood
as a transcendent sovereign authority was traditionally conceived as having the power to create
the eternal and natural law as well as having the power to revoke this law temporarily, as in a
miracle. The Sovereign God expresses a unified will, and thus establishes power over all things.
The establishment of sovereign “borders” over the entirety of the world creates the sense of those
who are saved and those who are amongst the reprobate. Sovereignty justifies and demands trust,
loyalty, obedience and sacrifice. Therefore, as these connotations of sovereignty transition and
disperse within the secular state, the secular sovereign may also exhibit these aspects.
Sovereignty is expressed in the “will” that formulates the law. In the American and French
revolutions, for example, it is true that sovereignty grounds the law through violent force that
breaks away from the previous context. Is it that Sovereignty flows from the law rather than the
other way around? In modern nation states, “we the people” are the legitimating and mysterious
power behind the right to demand sacrifice (for example by collecting taxes, sending people to
war), or the demand for obedience to the law and so on. Sovereignty, so the argument goes, must
be a monopoly of power—individual people cannot take the law into their own hands—and the
sovereign is representative, a sovereign power and transcendent authority expressing the unitary
“will of the people.” Besides the fact that “all people” (women, non-whites, and for a while nonproperty holding white males) were never originally part of any concept of “the people,” many
forces today, within the neoliberal system of global commerce certainly obscure the
understanding and the will of the people. For example, the current neoliberal worldview—which
we will briefly turn to next—involves multiple and diffuse biopolitical forces that shape
subjectivities through mediatization (including social media), indebtedness, ‘politics of fear’ and
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securitization, and through representation (this later idea is seen especially through the revolving
doors of wall street, corporations, and Washington)—all of which problematize any simple
notion of the “will of the people.”62
However, in order to remain focused on our main point of this section—the evolving
transitioning of the theological connotations of sovereignty and unforeseen emergent ethical
situations—we must skip rather roughshod over history and look ahead at the emerging situation
and tendencies that began to appear towards the end of the cold war.63 Towards the close of this
era, we see the emerging neoliberal proclivity to absorb everything within the global market.
Consumerism, medical care, prisons, education, pension funds, even aspects of the military are
privatized and absorbed within the market. Even the individual is perceived as a commodity and
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investment—an investment in education, healthcare, skills and virtually all other aspects of one’s
life.64 Under the tutelage of advocates of neoliberalism, governments began removing or easing
up on capital restrictions, environmental codes or agreements, exchange rate controls, and other
regulations. The power of the sovereign state was waning as the neoliberal notion of the deregulation of “market forces” became the almost magically preferred way to improve the overall
lot of people around the globe. Transnational corporations, financial institutions and insurance
companies orchestrated the flow of global capital, while nation states were left with managing
local public services on the one hand and becoming mere technocratic facilitators of global
commerce on the other.65 In short, the power of nation states and national sovereignty was
receding.66 Global neoliberalism, however, set the stage for financial disaster. The promise or
hope of post-nationalism began to fade. Not only are poorer nations exploited for their resources,
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and left out of much of global decision making, but in recent years both Europe and the United
States are witnessing the much darker and disastrous calls for Nationalism or a heightened
“Sovereignty.” A growing number of people seem to be drawn to a re-politicalization of the
world in which national borders and walls are built and an imaginary sense of “us versus them”
is on the increase. The very best ethical hopes for internationalism, and the apparently emerging
ideas of a “post-national” or a “one world” outlook that globalization was beginning to open up,
became under a neo-liberal threat. If notions of national sovereignty were giving way to an
increasing optimism of a global community, there is now a growing threat from those on the
extreme “right-wing” who are calling for “National Sovereignty” based on racial, national,
cultural, or religious identity—even though such notions are porous at best and in some ways,
simply imaginary. The dangerous right-wing fantasy of patrolled walls and borders and some
return to an imaginary earlier time feeds the delusion of establishing some sovereign (and almost
transcendent) point of authority that provides meaning and guards against the insecurities of
those who feel “left behind” in a rapidly changing world. The concept of sovereignty continues
to emerge and re-emerge in new ways—especially in times of crisis. The Reformation and Age
of Revolutions were two such previous periods (as we have briefly seen) when crises in the
social order emerged and the notion of Sovereignty evolved, transitioned, and left its “history of
effects” within the secular realms. Threats (as well as perceived threats) to the global order today
may be creating fragmentation, disorder and confusion that is opening a dangerous ‘conceptual
space’ for a new distorted form of Sovereignty.67 But first, let us turn briefly to this context
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before returning to our examination of this mysterious and puzzling theological/secular notion of
Sovereignty and what this unexpected “emergence” of the original doctrine implies about the
way in which we should consider the process of doctrinal development.
Brief Interlude:
Global Context for the Emergence of Recent Calls for Heightened National Sovereignty
The global context that we turn to involves the 2008 global financial recession.68 This
complex situation had many causes. Pressure to repeal regulations of credit derivative markets
and capital requirements in late 1990’s led to dangerous financial activities. Predatory lending by
the mortgage lenders, proprietary trading priorities for the investment banks, and the reckless
combing of risky subprime mortgages into complex derivatives that were given higher credit
ratings than they deserved set the stage.69 Mortgage lenders were not concerned about the
possibility of borrowers defaulting on their debts because they would sell the right to collect on
law and knowledge”(161). There is an “empty place”—symbolically—left by the monarchy with the entailment that
society is no longer a represented unity of “the people” (159). So, religiously infused symbols as well as
representations or concepts of nation, ethnicity, race and so on, may, in times of social crisis or threats of disorder
and change—‘slip’ into the vacuum, the empty place left by the notion of the transcendent sovereign authority. This
idea is also explicated clearly in Saul Newman, Political Theology, see especially pages 16-20. For example,
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which new forms of power emerge and proliferate. The space left by the disappearance of religion from the public
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transcendence” (19). It is the concept of “sovereignty” that we have been discussing that transitions, or merges, into
ideas of the state or nation. Today, the new “emergence” of some on the fringe of the political rightwing calling for
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these debts to large investment banks such as Goldman Sachs or Lehman Brothers. Such
investment giants would bundle these debts into tranches. These tranches were then packaged
into complex derivatives known as collateralized debt obligations (CDO).70 Unfortunately, the
investments in the CDO’s looked safer than they actually were, because they received higher
credit ratings than they actually warranted. Securities insurance firms such as AIG would insure
these CDO’s by selling credit default swaps (CDS) on them.71 CDS’s were basically insurance
on the CDO’s. Because of the CDS’s, credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s or
Moody’s evaluated these bundles of high-risk tranches (CDO’s) and often gave them—
incorrectly it turns out—AAA ratings, which in turn, gave Hedge Fund investors, and other
investors a false sense of security. But because of having dropped the requirements for the
securities insurance firms to have capital set in reserve, when investment banks like Bear Stearns
began to default, AIG and other insurance firms were unable to pay for the CDS (insurance on
the CDO’s) they had sold.72 They simply did not have enough money in reserve. Panic ensued.
Soon AIG and other firms that sold insurance began to collapse.73 As the bubble collapsed, the
impact reverberated throughout the global financial system.74 This complex and volatile situation
led to the global ‘great recession’ of 2008 and the financial insecurity and ruin that followed.75
Movements such as Occupy Wall Street, as well as a general feeling of financial insecurity, grew
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exponentially. The sense that nobody really understands the complex global financial system has
led to (understandably) profound distrust of transnational corporations—but more ominously, it
has also led to increasingly vocal calls for a “return to” heightened forms of ‘national
sovereignty.’ As a result of the changes and insecurities in recent years we have seen a global
resurgence of this “Nationalist” sentiment.
There should also be a frank acknowledgment of other global shifts as well. In 2003 the
US engaged in a “preventative war” in Iraq.76 The mismanagement, lack of careful planning, and
shameless lack of consideration for the cultural and religious complexities of the region were a
recipe for disaster. To make the unfortunate situation worse, US officials decided to forbid any
Iraqi citizen affiliated with the Baath party a chance to have input or a career in the new
regime.77 This led to understandable frustration, but it also, unfortunately, became one factor that
led to the emergence of ISIL-Daesh in the region. The rise of this violent and puzzling group
caused countless deaths and suffering in the region. After the bombing of the ancient Al
Askariya Mosque open violence between Shia and Sunni erupted.78 Mass emigration followed.
The destabilization of the region has also allowed Iran to extend its influence into Iraq and
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beyond to support the violent Assad regime of Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon.79 Since the 1979
revolutionary blowback from the 1953 coup, Iran has espoused anti-Saudi sentiments. In turn,
the Saudis feel threatened by Iran. As the U.S. provides military aid for the Saudis, the regional
geopolitical /sectarian conflict extends into Yemen. The violence, suffering, and mass migration
that follows from these events is staggering. And yet this small paragraph barely touches the
surface of the conflict in the region. But the mass emigration, changing demographics, and
xenophobia that results from these global shifts is enormous.80 The mass emigration following
this suffering in the middle east has led to an “immigration crises” and added to the rise of antiimmigrant prejudices and calls for a “’heightened’ national sovereignty” throughout the western
world.81 And too often politicians and other commentators appeal to various types of ‘politics of
fear’ in order to exacerbate this.
The Return of a Darker Form of Sovereignty
Along with—and because of—the tensions emerging from global demographic changes,
mass immigration, and the 2008 financial disaster, a dangerous “resurgence of authoritarian,
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nationalist and anti-immigrant populism in Europe, the United States and elsewhere represents a
major challenge to liberal values of openness, toleration and human rights…the specter of
national sovereignty has returned in our midst.”82 From Brexit to the democratic threat Derrida
refers to as “autoimmunity,” and with the types of blustery rhetoric from figures such as Viktor
Orban and his Fidesz party in Hungry, Law and Justice in Poland, Duterte in the Philippines,
Putin in Russia, Erdogan in Turkey, or Trump and his most vocal allies in the United States,
there is an increasing call for “building walls, nationalism, anti-immigration, and appeals to
‘politics of fear’ and policies of racism—all of which falls under this distorted category of
‘national sovereignty.’83
I would suggest that this rising issue of “national sovereignty” and its accompanying antiimmigrant outlook (coupled with the global ecological crisis that we will examine in the next
section) sets the stage for serious ethical concerns that should occupy the minds of ethicists,
theologians, and philosophers. The connotations associated with the concept, “sovereignty,” are
both a theological as well as a political philosophical problem. I am not convinced by claims that
this a question or concern solely for political philosophy, and not for theology. In fact, it is
difficult to keep language of ‘religion’ and ‘secular’ separate. First, the ‘history of effects’ from
the Judeo-Christian heritage has certainly left its mark upon all aspects of culture in “the West.”
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Ideas blur, and the influence of religion on politics, economics, and culture generally, is quite
pervasive. To be sure, we are able to abstract and discuss these ideas in distinction to a degree,
but I do think that the two notions “auto-deconstruct” the closer we scrutinize them.
Furthermore, I would argue that the sense of doctrinal development, that we discussed in Chapter
Three, is an expanded model—one that can be extended in such a way, as to recognize and
include, the way in which doctrines, or any ideas, not only have no “enduring essential core,” but
also evolve and interact with their environment in unpredictable ways. And if we take seriously
our commitments to an integration of ethics and theology it seems, to my mind at least,
theologians should indeed examine both the origins of this concept of ‘sovereignty,’ its sources,
and the ways in which it has received theological justifications. Sovereignty is a theological idea
in its origins after all. Therefore, I would suggest that the theological and political concepts of
sovereignty are topics that should be of great concern for theologians and ethicists. The point of
this section is to provide one example of an evolution of a doctrine—one that moves towards the
limits of what traditionally constitutes theology, challenges those borders, and provides an
extreme example of how a doctrine can evolve in totally unexpected and unforeseeable ways. By
tracing the development and transitioning of this doctrine we can see the ‘bottom up’ emergence
of a new ‘top down’ threat in the form of potentially violent, racist, calls for Sovereignty. (It does
not matter whether this is essentially “theatrical” if the very real threat exists amongst the
growing number who ‘believe in it’).84 To my mind, theologians should look at doctrines as
“flows of information” and not as having an essential “res.” And when we do so, we can see how
doctrines do interact with the environment and change in unpredictable ways. Perhaps in this
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expanded sense of development, this is roughly analogous to J.H. Newmans’ ‘type of logical
sequence’ development. For Newman, additional doctrines such as ‘purgatory’ or
‘reconciliation’ develop as a ‘logical’ development from the doctrine of ‘baptism.’ Although this
probably could be used to ‘justify’ any development when viewed in hindsight historically,
perhaps an expanded non-res information flow sense of doctrinal development could accept the
‘blurring’ of boundaries I am thinking of here. At any rate, any discussion of doctrinal
development today should indeed also include a recognition of how the doctrine of sovereignty
has multiple ethical implications. If we continue with my suggestion of considering doctrinal
development along the metaphors of “information flows” rather than res-like ossified essences,
then it is not a surprise that such a doctrine could evolve in such unexpected ways. And at the
same time, we may be able to discuss the need to edit and revise such a doctrine as well as
consider the ethical implications as they have emerged in the ‘secular’ spheres. Furthermore, it is
vital that we see the importance of choosing between a retreat into nationalism, isolationism, and
anti-immigration stances (associated with the concept of “Sovereignty”) on the one hand, and
striving towards a ‘one world solution,’85 or perhaps moving towards one day a ‘federation of the
world’86 on the other hand. Global problems require a global approach to solutions.
Theologically, we should be willing to think ‘otherwise’ in terms of religion and doctrinal
formulations in the early twenty-first century. Doctrines that contribute to such problems need to
be addressed.
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Because of space, all we may do here is look briefly at some of the ways that thinkers
have proposed dealing with a rethinking of sovereignty. It must be brief because it is not the
point of the chapter. Entire volumes are dedicated to proposing solutions to issues of political
theology. The point of the chapter was to trace out the unexpected development of doctrine and
show how the model outlined in Chapter Three may be able to accommodate both the radical
evolution of this particular doctrine of ‘sovereignty’ and the emergent ethical implications
manifest from its development. What follows is merely a brief sketch of some possible avenues
that one could pursue in any attempt to re-construct any doctrine, associated with ‘sovereignty.’
The idea is to do so with the express purpose of having an ‘ethical lens’ (this is intentionally a
broad term here) in mind when doing so.
At risk of oversimplification, I think it fair to suggest that attempts to deal with this issue
may be said to either appeal to the Sovereignty of God to critique injustice87, or they seek to
reimagine the idea of God as immanent, and without “Sovereignty” as such. A third approach
argues that no political theology whatsoever is possible without the some smuggling in of
Sovereignty and the problems associated with that concept.88 Due to space, other than the brief
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footnote references, I will speak on the second option. These approaches often appeal to
Pantheism,89 or Process Thought,90 or a combination of the two. This is a natural maneuver given
that the turn towards immanence is conducive to countering the transcendence associated with
ideas of sovereignty. Spinoza’s thought follows a precise logical deductive method: Numbered
definitions and axioms are followed by numbered propositions that are logically derived from
those definitions and axioms. Starting with the idea of substance, Spinoza defines his concept of
God. Spinoza explains that “By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through
itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it
must be formed.”91 Substance, for Spinoza, is sui generis, infinite, and unconditional. God is
absolutely infinite, consisting of an infinite number of Divine attributes that are expressions of
the eternal essence of God.92 Our human minds, being limited in understanding, are only capable
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of cognitively grasping two of these attributes: thought93 and extension.94 Importantly, for
Spinoza, everything that we see is a modification of God, which again, is the sole existing
substance.95 In other words, there is One Substance, while everything else is a mere mode of the
being of that Infinite Substance.96 Furthermore, as Spinoza explains “Whatever is, is in God, and
nothing can be or be conceived without God.”97 All people and events are modifications of this
One, Infinite substance. Just as steam, ice, and liquid water are “phase transitions,” or “modes of
the being of H2O,” all things whatever, may be thought of as “modes” of God’s infinite being.
If the transcendence and unity of God are inextricably connected with the concept of
‘sovereignty,’ than the scholar Clayton Crockett intentionally draws upon the legacy of Spinoza
in order to counter this tendency.98 Crockett states that for Hobbes, “sovereignty is constructed
by opposing the unity of the sovereignty to the multiplicity of the multitude.”99 Crockett seeks to
utilize the theology of Spinoza to produce a “counter-theology of the Multitude.” In fact, for
Crockett, Spinoza is the “paradigmatic representative of popular sovereignty.”100 By
deconstructing ‘sovereignty’—both theologically and politically—Crockett turns Hobbes or
Schmitt upside down in order to urge forth a radical political theology.
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Theological suggestions for re-thinking the idea of sovereignty associated with
Christological doctrines are also voluminous. Such maneuvers may or may not require the
immanentization that Crockett argues for.101 A “low” historical Christology could certainly
accompany an insistence on a “permanent Revolution” towards doctrine that we saw in H.
Niebuhr, K. Tanner, or Tillich for example. Space precludes the attention that this re-thinking
deserves, but I think that the Christological constructions of liberation theologians and feminist
scholars suggest something of several possible approaches here. In short, perhaps a
reconsideration of “kingship” and the kind of “sovereignty” associated with Biblical images of
Jesus that suggest a King “that comes to serve, not to be served”102 provide the type of thinking
that may stave off and help avoid the negative aspects of sovereignty traced in its evolution
above. We may read this imagery in Elizabeth Johnson’s Trinitarian study and suggestion of
“Jesus-Sophia.”103 When James Cone explains that “to know Jesus is to know him as revealed in
the struggle of the oppressed for freedom,” we read the kind of Christological emphasis that
would certainly help in any re-thinking of the Christological aspects of ‘the doctrine of
sovereignty.’104
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Evolving Doctrine of Creation
In this section we will begin with a brief overview of Aquinas’ deep and Sacramental
Universe-encompassing Doctrine of Creation in which “the whole universe together participates
in the divine goodness” and in which “every grade of being” adds to the “perfection of the
universe.”105 Next we will look at Jose Casanova’s argument that as the Medieval overarching
framework of Christian thought over all other disciplines and domains of knowledge declined—
through a complex process of the “differentiation” of those disciplines into their own “spheres of
influence” and individual methodologies—the robust Medieval Doctrine of Creation also
receded in influence.106 After the Enlightenment, much of theology became devoted to more
epistemological concerns and the Doctrine of Creation devolved into apologetics. These changes
encouraged “Creation” to be viewed as a “stage” in which Divine-human encounter and
Salvation history is to take place. Charles Taylor describes these processes as “nature shorn of
the sacred.”107 With the rise of industrial capitalism and increased pollution much of Christian
theology had an emaciated Doctrine of Creation inadequate to meet the challenge of ecological
degradation. With the synergistic moves of some conservative Christian belief and Big Oil and
corporations, a dangerous trend emerged. Fortunately, in more recent times, we are seeing a
resurgence of ecologically responsible notions of the Doctrine of Creation. The point of this
section is not to provide “solutions” so much as to, once again, trace the evolution, de-evolution,
and development of this doctrine. The model of doctrinal development outlined in Chapter Three
provides, to my mind, a more adequate account of these evolutions then models that discount (1)
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that doctrine understood as “rules” or “principles” can and do evolve since there is no enduring
or unchanging essence somehow immune to development within them; (2) the importance of the
irreducible intertwining of any doctrine with everything else within the “environment” involving
a bottom-up and top-down evolution between any doctrine and all else within “culture”; and (3)
the importance of always keeping a critical eye or ethical turn in mind when analyzing, judging,
or constructing any doctrine.
The medieval theological worldview contained a much more robust and encompassing
vision of the Doctrine of Creation then one tends to find espoused today. It should suffice to look
at Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of ‘creation’ in order to illustrate something of this point. As
a student, Aquinas absorbed the lectures of his Dominican teacher Albert of Lauingen whose
lectures probably first exposed him to the Neo-Platonic ideas of pseudo-Dionysius , Augustine,
and Proclus.108 The Platonic or neo-Platonic idea of “emanation,” provided a useful metaphysical
metaphor for expressing the idea that (1) God created all things; (2) that coming from God they
are good; (3) that all things in some sense must “participate” in this emanating power of God.
And Aquinas would also have heard Albert lecture on Aristotle, Avicenna and Peter Lombard’s
Sentences.109 This helps us understand the way in which Aquinas’s massive Summa Theologica
expresses elements of Neo-Platonic “Emanationism” and “Participationism” as well as the more
Aristotelian emphasis on the immanent and embodied material reality. It also illustrates how
Aquinas’ theological system exemplifies the all-encompassing value of the entirety of
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creation.110 The whole universe comes from God as Creator, and it returns to God as
Redeemer.111 All things ‘participate’ in the Divine source of grace and receive their being and
ground in God. And by drawing upon Augustine’s work on the Trinity, Aquinas stressed the way
in which all creation bears something of a “trace” of the triune God within their being.112 One
can see how each created being has goodness in and for itself, “or for other creatures, or for the
whole universe, or for the glory of God.”113 For Aquinas, every creature, and indeed the entire
Cosmos, has an intrinsic goodness and purpose. Everything receives its being by participating in
the very life of the living God. Aquinas expresses the fullness of the Medieval concept of the
doctrine of Creation by explaining that
…the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would
not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine
providence to produce every grade of being (ST, 1a. Q 22.art 4).
Aquinas articulates the notion that the doctrine of creation reflects something important
about the reality of God. If God is unsurpassably Good and is the ipsum esse subsistens that
sustains all else, how could any one entity ever reflect this Divine Perfection? There needs to be
a multitude of varying beings in order to express something of the Goodness of the Whole. All
beings reflect something of the perfection of the Creator which allows us to speak analogically of
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God (the analogia entis). Aquinas explains how the condition of the possibility of expressing
God’s goodness adequately requires a multiplicity of variation in the order of being:
For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
creatures and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately
represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what
was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by
another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and
divided; and hence the whole universe together participates in the divine goodness more
perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever (ST, 1a. Q 47 art. 1).
So, for Aquinas, every creature, every entity, and indeed the whole of the Cosmos has an
intrinsic goodness and a place and purpose within the Divine plan. This is a sacramental and
cosmological outlook that views the interrelatedness of all creatures and the entire universe as
part of the divine plan moving from creation to the final redemption of the whole of reality. Here
we glimpse the making of a robust Doctrine of Creation that might have prevented or mitigated
the ecological degradation that would occur centuries later, first on the European, and then,
American continent. So, what happened? The causes for how this rich and all-encompassing
doctrine of Creation receded over time is complex.114 I will discuss only some of the events and
conceptual changes that led to this diminishing of the doctrine.
Jose Casanova and Charles Taylor provide an analysis of the intricate processes involved
in the deeply interconnected areas of secularization and modernization.115 The world of Medieval
and Renaissance Europe was a world infused with Christianity. Christendom constituted the
culture and intellectual climate of the era. In the universities, theology was understood to provide
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the over-arching framework for all other areas of inquiry and all other disciplines. The trivium
and quadrivium of a liberal education as well as disciplines of law or medicine were interpreted,
studied, and pondered within the larger encompassing zeitgeist of Christian thought. Similar to
the medieval sacramental cosmology just examined, the medieval academic worldview
understood every topic as related and ultimately to be understood in reference to God. When the
Reformation erupted on the continent, and the universal authority of the Church became
questioned as well as weakened, we may interpret these complex occurrences as the beginning of
certain changes to the intellectual and cultural climate that would soon affect theology and all
academic disciplines. For example, the call for individual liberty (for example, in religious
conscience), the emerging autonomy of the Monarchy, and the nascent stirrings of nation-states,
all can be traced, in part, to this era. And with the many intellectual currents such as
nominalism116 and voluntarism already in the background, the observation of contingent nature
and empirical a posteriori knowledge rose in acceptance.117 With the religiously motivated reemphasis on all aspects of nature within the arts118, many shifts were occuring, shifts that would
lead to the age of reason.119
It was the age of Enlightenment that first witnessed what Casanova refers to as the
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“differentiation and secularization of society.”120 In short, Casanova asserts that the various
disciplines began their gradual “differentiation” from under the all-encompassing framework of
Christian theology and oversight. Science, economics, politics were the first to separate and
begin to develop their own “internal and lawful autonomy.”121 The various arts, medicine and
other disciplines soon followed suite. Each area of thought began to develop its own
methodology and legitimate procedures. This of course led to the rapid advancements of
modernity as well as the fragmentation of disciplines and various domains of knowledge into
their own autonomous spheres. And unfortunately, along with many advancements, the rapid
changes led to ecological degradation and multiple social problems brought about by the
industrial revolution and rapid urbanization. The natural sciences became autonomous and
largely detached from theological concerns. And for our purposes here, I wish to note how the
scope and influence of Christianity receded into the realm of the private. Both the study of nature
and the way in which it was typically interpreted—the cosmos and the world of nature on earth—
became increasingly autonomous of any theological consideration.122
Taylor may be interpreted as providing a deeper look into the conditions of the possibility
of the processes of differentiation described by Casanova. For Taylor, the way of understanding
the complex and multiple changes arising between, for example, 1500 C.E. and the
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contemporary worldview,123 requires that we must avoid simple “subtraction stories.”124 For
example, when charting the underlying changes leading to the receding of a sacramental
cosmological outlook, it is not sufficient to assert that “superstitious” beliefs or practices where
merely “subtracted” as empirical knowledge accumulated. In direct contrast to this view, Taylor
asserts that new “social imaginaries” needed to be constructed in order to begin to see the world
in secular terms, rather than a mere “sloughing off” of religious ideas.125 As a series of intricate
perspectives on the nature of “self,”126 “time,”127 “society,”128 and the “cosmos”129 became
newly constructed, a new social imaginary began to replace the older, previous “medieval
imaginary,” with its sense of an “enchanted” and sacramental universe.130 These newly
constructed concepts were the condition of the possibility of perceiving the cosmos within
“immanent frameworks”131 such as “exclusive humanism.” Only with these significant
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alterations allowing the new “social imaginary” to emerge, was the possibility of conceiving the
universe and nature itself as a mere “stage” for human action—or perhaps for Divine-human
interaction—and as the theologically significant arena for salvation. In other words, the
emergence of the new “social imaginary” allowed the development of a viewpoint of Nature as
an autonomous sphere where human action and any Divine-human interaction may occur. It is at
this juncture that Casanova’s key concept of the “differentiation process” really accelerates. And
as a consequence, Christianity and Christian theology in particular may be seen as turning to
more anthropological concerns.132 Many complex processes were at work in the gradual
construction of the new social imaginaries besides the changes to the underlying assumptions
behind ideas of self, society, nature, and time cited above. The differentiation of various
disciplines and the possibility of viewing the world in terms of an “immanent framework”
emerge through this convoluted process, but it is important to note, that much of these changes
were instigated by Christian thinkers. Many of the shifts in assumption and perspective of the
changing imaginaries were prompted by Christian thinkers pursuing Christian concerns. For
example, for purely theological reasons, a sacramental disenchantment developed during the
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Reformation in which notions of Church rites, sacraments, and ecclesial art, come to be seen as
“black magic” by figures like Jean Calvin.133 By emphasizing the transcendence of God while
simultaneously seeking the elimination of any sacred presence within nature, it became possible
to re-conceive the world of nature as “shorn of the sacred, and the limits it set for us, to re-order
things as seem best.”134 As Taylor explains, from this shift in emphasis, humanity felt a new
freedom to “rationalize the world, expel the mystery from it,” thus allowing “a great energy to
re-order affairs in secular time.”135
This gradual emergence of a sense of nature “shorn of the sacred” is the way in which the
scope and influence of Christianity receded into the realm of the private. Both the study of nature
and the way in which it was typically interpreted—the cosmos and the world of nature on
earth—became increasingly autonomous of any theological consideration. The process of
differentiation described by Casanova leads to the condition of the possibility of both scientific
advancement and the industrial revolution. These processes, however, are ethically ambiguous.
Along with the amelioration of some suffering, other forms of suffering arose from those same
advancements. Furthermore, the effects stemming from these changes allowed the expanding
pillaging of natural resources and the subsequent profusion of pollution back into the
environment. For the purposes of this project, we must stay focused on the way in which these
complex changes described above are relate to this later concern. The main point here, is that as
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Christianity receded into the private realm, so too did the robust Medieval Doctrine of Creation
recede, becoming shaped and influenced by the Enlightenment epistemological concerns that we
have mentioned throughout this work. Nature, “shorn of the sacred,” led to profound changes in
the way that the Doctrine of Creation became articulated. The Age of Reason valued the idea of
correct methodology, discovering the sources of reliable knowledge (whether empirical and
inductive or a priori axioms and deductive), individual self-determination, and in general, the
rational defense of any claim to having justified, true beliefs. As early as the seventeenth century,
we find theologians such as Francis Turretin developing a systematic theology that is purported
to be “scientific” and “propositional” in structure.136 Turretin was the inspiration for the later
“Princeton School” of theology whose nineteenth century exponent was Charles Hodge. Hodge
also sought a “scientific theology,”—one that would counter the influence of Hume, Kant, and
Hegel so prevalent in most other American and especially European schools. In order to achieve
this, Hodge looked to the “direct realism” of the Scottish Philosopher, Thomas Reid. The
Princeton theologian described his “scientific” and “propositional” approach to theology in the
following terms:
The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the man of science. It is his (sic) storehouse of facts; and his method of ascertaining what the Bible teaches, is the same as that
which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches.137
Although there are multiple avenues that we could pursue, the direction that I will follow here
will examine the intellectual heirs of Hodge and his general approach to theological doctrine. To
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my mind, much of theology from the Enlightenment through the nineteenth century (at least in
America) and well into the twentieth century has adopted this epistemological and propositional
emphasis and approach to doctrine.138 With the shrinking of the organic, rich, and full Medieval
doctrinal approach to Creation, most ecclesial denominations have shifted to a more
anthropocentric or personalist theology. Creation is reduced to a mere “stage” where the drama
of Salvation History takes place. And in particular, many Evangelical theologies focus on a
conception of the Doctrine of Creation that reflects these changes most clearly—and I believe
with dire consequences. In many Evangelical circles, for example, pondering the mystery of
“Creation,” is more about defending the notion that God is the cause of the Cosmos, rather than
the much richer organic sense of God as interrelated with the universe as Creator, Sustainer,
Transformer, and Redeemer. This later notion values the plenitude of created beings—their value
in and of themselves, the value in relation to one another, and the value to the rest of the
Cosmos—and finally the value of everything in reference and relation to God that one finds in
Medieval doctrines of Creation. For example, when discussion of Doctrines of Creation are
reduced to arguments such as the Kalam cosmological defense, or current “Intelligent Design”
assertions, certain tendencies will almost surely follow as we will see. Much contemporary
thought regarding the doctrine of creation tends to focus on the epistemological questions
surrounding God’s causing or fine-tuning the universe, the laws of nature or initial conditions
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immediately after the inflation of the universe, the origin of life, or evidence of design in life
itself.139
When the function of doctrine is considered as primarily propositional and
epistemological, the theological imagination becomes almost exclusively focused on the
universe, the human and non-human animals, and nature as if they are isolated created ‘things.’
Things that we are trying to assure ourselves and others, really are “caused, designed, and
sustained” by God. This takes our attention away from the value of nature itself. The doctrine
becomes reduced to an intellectual activity of analyzing propositions about parts of nature—
alleged irreducible complexity, probabilities of information patterns—and arguing about the
conditions under which they may be verified or falsified. The consequence, however, is nature
interpreted as being basically “other” or apart from the transcendent God, and the immanence of
God is diminished or interpreted as God’s ability to act in the world. This later admission is all
that prevents the Doctrine of God—considered in light of this notion of ‘Creation,’—from being
essentially Deistic. At any rate, the result of these shifts in the perception of this doctrine is that
nature becomes “shorn of the sacred.” And the point that I wish to emphasize is the way in
which this rather large shift in the Doctrine of Creation has contributed to the neglect of
ecological concerns on the part of Christian theology—until relatively recently. As this Doctrine
of Creation has transitioned into these thinner forms—in the wake of the differentiation process
that shifted ‘religion’ into the private role of ‘spirituality’—the sense of an embodied
sacramental and cosmological understanding of the interrelatedness of both human and non-
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human life existing interdependently within the broader ecosystems of the world, has been
severely diminished. In short, this emaciated Doctrine of Creation takes attention away from the
intrinsic value of nature. The world is reduced to a mere “stage” where salvation history occurs
between God and humans. Furthermore, thinking of the doctrine of creation as referring to
propositions about “intelligent design,” or “irreducible complexity” within cellular structures, or
seeking to identify some version of Big Bang cosmology with a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, are
often merely slippery rhetorical moves that are only exposing theology to the problems
associated with any “God of the gaps” maneuvering.140
Moreover, this type of “essentializing” of doctrine—the turning of doctrines into ossified
propositions that end up “weaponized” against other denominations, or religions—runs the very
real risk of becoming another tool of exclusion and provides ideological cover for certain types
of political and business interests. It is no coincidence that big oil companies, certain large

Nevertheless, this chapter is mostly focused on the problems and approaches to ‘creation’ as primarily an
“apologetic” problem.
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corporations, several well-funded think tanks, and some conservative Christian churches have
found common purpose.141
This is important for our discussion because the ecological crisis facing all of us will
require a serious collective response if we hope to stem the dangerous tide away from further
devastation and towards sustainability and health for the whole world. The claim that there exists
human induced ecological degradation hardly needs any further empirical support, nor is it the
purpose of this chapter to attempt to do so. Yet it needs to be recognized that the 2015 Paris
Climate agreement expressed the need for the world to actively work to reduce atmospheric
warming to at least 2 degrees Celsius with the express goal and urgency of encouraging a (more
hopeful) 1.5 degree Celsius temperature limit above preindustrial measurements.142 Yet when the
United States, under the Trump administration, decided to leave this agreement, the impetus and
moral urgency for other industrialized nations to remain in the agreement lost much of its force.
Following this development in which the U.S. abrogated its responsibilities, a U.N. report noted
that “even if countries meet their pledges to cut emissions…warming would be more than twice
the 1.5 degree target.”143 As of the time of this writing, the U.N. once again has had to warn that
atmospheric warming is “on track to warm by more than 2.7 degrees Celsius” by the end of the
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century if the “action plans” most recently articulated by the 191 nations is all that is
implemented.144 It remains to be seen what comes of the United Nations Climate Change
Conference of the Parties (COP26), as well as what action it will produce. A new administration
in the U.S., and global talk of pledges to end deforestation, as well as cutting methane emissions
by 30 percent by 2030, for example, will be tested as time proceeds.145
In keeping with our narrow focus on the developing forms of the Doctrine of Creation,
however, it is an interesting and positive development that within a numerically significant area
of academic theology there has been a resurrection of sorts of a deeper form of the doctrine that
emphasizes the value of nature and the interconnectedness of all things. To my mind, any new
formulation or discussion of a Doctrine of Creation should involve this perspective of an explicit
ecologically focused notion of Creation. It may well be the case that any retrieved or
reconfigured Doctrine of Creation will require the formation of new, creative metaphors in order
to assist both our imaginations as well as our motivation to take the declining health of our planet
seriously. In order to do this, Sallie McFague’s theology may be viewed as an attempt to
encourage Christians to conceive of God in Panentheistic terms for the sake of our planetary
survival. Christians can contribute to environmental sustainability, McFague contends, by first
changing their notion of the Divine. It is through the changing of potentially dangerous and
“time-hardened” metaphors in our theological imagination that will allow Christianity to
positively contribute to our current environmental crisis. By recognizing the metaphorical
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character of all language, we may begin the development of new theological metaphors and
models.146”The essence of metaphorical theology,” writes McFague, “is precisely the refusal to
identify human constructions with divine reality.”147Metaphors utilize a concept from one
context and apply it onto another. This is why metaphor “always has the character of ’is’ and ‘is
not’: an asserrtion is made but as a likely account rather than a definition.”148 McFague claims
that religious language understood in terms of metaphor is both theologically appropriate and
conducive to ecological sensibilities. Because notions of God, self and the world have been
constructed in various ways in different times, they are amenable to being re-constructed anew.
As McFague puts it “Language that supports hierarchical, dualistic, external, unchanging,
atomistic, anthropocentric, and deterministic ways of understanding these relationships is not
appropriate for our time.”149 Outmoded models and metaphors that construe God as monarchical
and patriarchal while conceiving of nature as existing solely for human purposes are
theologically wrongheaded and dangerous in our current era. Such models are no longer viable in
this age of environmental degradation. In light of an increasing recognition of an ecological,
relational, organic, and evolving universe, McFague claims that it is most appropriate to
reconceive God in terms of divine immanence. This theology of creation involves considering
God as Divine indwelling with a new model: the Universe as God’s body. New metaphors
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McFague proposes are the rather ‘personal’ concepts of God as Mother, Lover, and Friend.150 A
less ‘personal’ or anthropomorphic metaphor McFague utilizes is the notion of Spirit. McFague
especially suggest the idea of Spirit since it “undercuts anthropocentrism and promotes
Cosmocentrism.”151 The metaphor of the Universe as “the body of God” is meant to suggest the
divine guiding of the evolutionary process and concern for all of nature. By way of contrast to
the image of God as a distant King ruling over a world empty of the Sacred, the universe
conceived of as God’s “body,” is a metaphor that turns towards a sacramental-incarnational
theology. It is important to note that McFague is not reducing God to a mere identification with
the universe. She prefers to speak of an “Immanental Transcendence.”152 This new model
encourages a way of thinking about our relationship to nature and other non-human animals. If
we meditate on the idea of the divine indwelling in all things, we might begin to grasp the
profoundly “interdependent” aspect of all life and accept the “responsibility for other forms of
life and the ecosystem, as guardians and partners of the planet.”153 We are seeing a re-imagining
of our theological resources in various ways in order to develop just such an ecologically
relevant Doctrine of Creation.154 Again, unfortunately there is no space for further discussion of
possibilities, nor is it the point of this chapter to attempt to provide solutions to a reconstruction
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of an ecologically relevant doctrine of creation. The aim of this section was to chart something of
the evolution of this doctrine over time—how it evolved and what unforeseeable ethical
consequences would emerge from it.
Summary of Previous Section: Examination and Evolution of Two Doctrines
Turning to our first historical example where the meanings and connotations associated
with Christ announcing the “Kingdom” or “Sovereignty” of God transitioned over the centuries
until the most recent manifestations of “Sovereignty” morphed into strident calls for National
Sovereignty, we can see how ethical concerns emerged that really could not have been predicted
from the earliest points. We are perhaps at a point where talk of Sovereignty (either theological
or political) has become dangerously apparent, and to my mind, demands ethical reconsideration,
and thus provides reasons to ‘edit’ this doctrine. When a doctrine such as this becomes used as a
justification for dividing people into us/them categories, when it becomes exclusive, and when it
becomes solely focused on power—whether in the theological or political realms—then we
should be sensitive to the ways in which the idea of ‘Sovereignty’ has become contrary to
Caritas. Whatever critical analysis or ethical lens we bring to this doctrinal examination matters
little to the thesis of this chapter. The point of the chapter is to attempt to demonstrate the
evolution and emergence of doctrines that manifest in ways that demand moral decision making.
Nevertheless, we must find ways to re-construct our ideas of sovereignty when discussing God,
Jesus, as well as in the broader political arena.
Similarly, in our examination of the history of the Doctrine of Creation, we saw how
doctrines may devolve as well as evolve. With no essential or enduring core, doctrines may both
influence and be influenced by the changing cultural environment. And at certain points of
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complexity, unexpected aspects emerge that have moral dimensions and demand moral decision
making. Here I would claim that theology needs to continue the hopeful emphasis on intentional
reconstruction, and imaginative new metaphors that are conducive to promoting a sacred sense of
the Universe, and all the life and ecosystems intertwined within it. We saw the moral
implications when the Universe-spanning sacramental Doctrine of Creation receded, and new
doctrines of creation become more about apologetics and epistemology then a sense of the sacred
interconnectedness of all. This ‘reduced’ sense of the doctrine is very much with us still today.
There is still a tendency for certain conservative Christian groups to be closely aligned with Big
Oil interests, and politicians that ignore the disastrous ecological impacts that certain policies
will have on the health of the planet. If this Doctrine of Creation focuses only on defending the
existence of God, and if some strands of Christianity continue to encourage only human concern
for salvation, and if Nature itself, is continually viewed as a “mere stage” for the human-Divine
encounter, then we are facing potentially disastrous consequences. Furthermore, if the doctrine
of creation is understood only in terms of ossified propositions where Christians use all their
energy arguing with each other about whether evolution occurred, or when Adam appeared in the
process, or if there even was an Adam, then doctrines have hardened, devolved, and have
become the ‘real’ “res” of the faith. As we saw with Augustine, ‘doctrines’ should not be the
focal point of Christianity—rather, love of God and neighbor is the summation of the Law and
the Prophets, as Jesus explained, and Augustine reiterated. Focusing on organizing doctrinal
propositions into the historical chronology of the Bible takes one’s attention into a dangerous,
exclusive, and wrong direction.
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Some Concluding Thoughts
In this chapter we have looked at the unpredictable, evolving histories of two doctrines,
and the unexpected moral dilemmas, effects, and concerns that emerged from them. At certain
unpredictable points in doctrinal evolution, situations of moral decision making are forced upon
us. It is my assertion that any critically based contemporary approach to doctrinal development
needs to continually keep an ethical lens focused on doctrine, its unexpected developments and
evolution, and be prepared to ‘intervene’ and reconstruct any doctrine that is contrary to the
formal principle of Caritas. As we saw in the first chapter, Professor Wiles argued for doctrinal
development to be
loyal to the past, in the important sense of ‘loyal,’ if we think not so much in terms of the
translation of old formulae into new sets of words, as in terms of the continuation of the
same task of interpreting the Church’s Scriptures, her worship and her experience of
salvation.155
Here I think we should add “ethical considerations,” as a further criterion to Wile’s
necessary conditions of “exegesis, worship, and experience of salvation” for any “loyal”
constructions and development of doctrine for the contemporary context.156 With the nonenduring, non-essentialist view of doctrinal development that I have suggested, development is
unpredictable, and has no predetermined teleological end. We must ensure that doctrine reflects
the “double commandment” to love God and neighbor. This is in line with the ideas of Kathryn
Tanner that we examined in the last chapter. She stated that ‘motifs’ such as “Jesus as ‘the
Christ,’ ‘dying and rising,’ ‘God as maker of heaven and earth,’” and the like, are the kinds of
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themes that are important to Christian ways of life and ways of speaking.157 There does not need
to be agreement amongst Christians over the precise interpretation of these ‘motifs’ (or I would
say doctrine), rather, there is general agreement that the motifs themselves are important to the
Christian way of life.158 Remember, Tanner asserted that these ‘motifs’ or ‘forms’ may
themselves be called into question if they lead to some form of idolatry or injustice. It is worth
quoting here again on this:
Christians claim that Jesus is God; that does not mean however, that some Christians
might not decide in the process that the central and overriding significance that Jesus
continues to have for human life would be less misleadingly expressed some other way.
In short, while they set the terms for argument, the forms themselves are not immune
from questioning as the argument proceeds.159
Doctrines (or motifs) may be guidelines to Christian thinking, but we must guard against
making assertions into “stable identities” or allowing them to become “reified”. Again, like
Tanner who suggests that we need continual self-critique in guarding against doctrinal idolatry,
we need to be open to new voices and the “borrowed materials” from the culture and others
around us. As I stated in the last chapter this is, to my mind at least, similar to what H.R.
Niebuhr’s “Permanent revolution within Radical Monotheism,” or Tillich’s “Protestant
Principle,” were getting at. In Tanner’s words:
…we must make God, rather than some human account of God the center of one’s life.
Doing otherwise, making a Christian identity a matter of allegiance to certain meanings,
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threatens to put human ideas about God in the place that only God should fill in Christian
life.160
By keeping our attention open “to where the Spirit may blow,” as these thinkers suggest,
we will be aided in our attempt to avoid “ossifying” doctrine. And with a purposeful intention to
keep an “ethical lens” focused on every doctrine, its evolution, and its unpredictable emergence
that presses on us a situation of moral decision making, we may be encouraged to reconstruct or
edit any doctrine that is contrary to Caritas.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ASTROBIOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
In the Introduction to this project, I stated that any new discussion of the theological
category of doctrinal development should recognize certain trends that have emerged in recent
decades. As noted in the Introduction to this work, it should not be surprising that the category of
doctrinal development would find itself in need of development. What is curious is the fact that
previous discussions of this category have basically faded from any sustained or serious
discussion. To be sure, there have been historical works that deal with the historical fact of
changing doctrine, but there has been little focus on the ‘process,’ or ‘theory’ of any
development of doctrine. Nor has much attention been given to the question of what doctrinal
development is, or how it works, in the last few decades. The reasons for this are multiple and
we examined several in the first chapter.
Before looking to the summary of this project, I would like to take a moment to consider
three elements that have been lurking in the background of this project: (1) First, the awareness
of the changes in global social patterns. This trend involves at least two elements. One, the
rapidly changing religious sensibilities and religious demographics in the world. Two, the move
towards greater interconnectedness and a sense of being citizens of one world. (Here too we
might include the rising of the opposite trend, in the form of the emerging threats—or reaction—
to any post-national or other such developments of moving towards a cooperating global
community, as we pondered in Chapter Four). (2) Second, the ubiquity of evolution. We are
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becoming ever more aware of the fact that everything evolves. The entire universe is constantly
evolving. And scientists are even exploring possibilities that our universe is but one of an infinite
ensemble of evolving universes. (3) The special role of information theory, and in particular, the
key property of transformability.
To begin with, let us briefly look at the first element—also mentioned in the
Introduction—and that is of the changing social demographics. As the world becomes more
interconnected Christianity must acknowledge that it is only one of many religions in our rapidly
changing world. We looked at some of these statistics in the Introduction. While the number of
people who self-describe as “Christian” decrease, the number of people who identify with no
religion whatsoever increases. Christians comprise only a little more than thirty-one percent of
the global population. And the number of people who identify as having “no religious affiliation”
is about “one in six” or 1.1 billion (16%) of the worldwide population.1
The second element I wish to briefly mention has emerged time and again throughout this
project. Namely that we live in an age after the time of Darwin. Newman’s theory of doctrinal
development was written more than a decade before the publication of Darwin’s theory of
evolution by natural selection. Nevertheless, most contemporary discussions of this concept still
largely ignore biological evolution even while continuing to utilize organic growth metaphors. I
suspect that previous discussion of doctrinal development has intentionally shied away from any
explicit language of ‘evolution’ precisely because of the concern that such talk leads to the
possibility of a religion evolving to such an extent that it may morph into something else
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entirely. We will turn to this concern later in this chapter.2 And finally, the third trend I wish to
re-emphasize is the emerging role of information theory across disciplines. Information has an
almost quasi-metaphysical aspect to it. Although I do not wish to push this idea too far, I will
elaborate on what seems to be the ambiguity of information. On the one hand, information is
always physical. Any communication or exchange of information requires some physical
medium. Whether in the form of electrical pulses, light or radio waves, magnetic pulses, or
written marks on a page, some physical medium is a required condition of information
movement. At the same time, however, the ‘information itself’—the inherent meaning or
message—is not entirely reducible to any physical medium. A key element of information is its
transformability. In this sense, information is quasi-metaphysical, intangible, almost ‘nothing,’
yet it conveys meaning and significance. It is this aspect that I suggest may assist us in any move
away from rigid, ‘res-like,’ or ossified notions of doctrine as we have seen, especially in Chapter
Three. And the way in which information movement, flow and clustering may reach certain
points of complexity, allowing unexpected emergent properties to produce initially unforeseeable
top-down effects, was elaborated in Chapter Four. In that chapter, we saw how instances of
‘ethical emergence’ is an inextricable aspect of any complex movement of information,
including doctrinal development. But before moving on, let us note how information theory is
transforming many different domains of knowledge. The notions of mass/ energy + information
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is increasingly viewed as the key to understanding the evolution of nature. Likewise, claims of
informed chemistry or, in other words—chemistry + information = life—are hinting towards an
emerging paradigm that may potentially reach across many disciplines.3 Certainly, cosmic,
chemical, technological, and biological evolution are all being revolutionized by insights from
contemporary information theories.
These three elements of changing social realities, the ubiquity of evolution, and the
emerging awareness of the role played by the almost intangible and transformable information
movement and flow underlying cosmic, chemical, biological, technological, and even cultural
evolution, are key to the ideas laid out in this work. These three elements and their implications
and possibilities are in the background of this project.
Brief Summary of the Chapters
Previous discussions of doctrinal development often operated with a pre-Darwinian set of
categories including those of teleology and an assumption of some internal “essence’ underlying
all significations or representations. And as we have seen, the idea that there is some ‘res’—
some ‘thing’—some unchanging enduring substance or stable Truth underlying our doctrinal
representations may be part of the problem. Many of the theologians that we examined in the
first chapter—as scholars writing in the wake of the Enlightenment—wrote with an emphasis
upon issues of epistemology, semiotics, and doctrine conceived of as “referencing” a quasimetaphysical “res.” This focus on doctrine as “res,” may be understood in at least two ways.
First, there is the notion that doctrine itself is the “Res” of the Christian faith. Secondly, doctrine
may be understood to have a res. Although there are many ways in which theologians may differ
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on the process of development—organic growth, pneumological, tradition and reflection, logical
explication, dialectical, paradigm shifts, post-structural and so on—many of the authors we
examined work within frameworks that consider doctrine as essentially propositional. The
exceptions, of course, are Wiles and Tanner. Wiles views doctrine as something like an
interesting hybrid of an instrumentalist perspective and a coherence theory of truth. Tanner, as
we have seen throughout the project, may perhaps be tentatively described as working with a
“radical hermeneutics,” although she describes her project simply as utilizing postmodern
anthropological perspectives. Finally, in that chapter, I suggested three ‘ideal types,’ not to place
any one thinker in some rigid category, but rather to enable certain salient aspects to be
abstracted. Any future discussion of doctrinal development should therefore have respect for (A)
tradition, (including at least Wiles’ criteria of scriptural exegesis, experience of worship, and
experience of transformation, liberation, salvation for example), (B) organic metaphors,
(although I suggested in Chapter Three these should be ‘updated’ or reconfigured), and thirdly,
(C), the possibility of considering doctrines as hypotheses. (I tentatively suggest that thinking of
doctrines as “hypotheses,” may be fruitful for a few reasons. First, the connotation of hypothesis
suggests the provisional aspect and continual openness to revision. Second, the possibility of
testing for coherence and seeking “theologically relevant dimensions” in an interdisciplinary
sense is implied with the term, hypothesis. Suggesting that these particular and potential aspects
of “doctrines as hypotheses” are potentially useful does not however, entail a complete and
uncritical acceptance of other dimensions of Pannenberg’s thought). The fourth criteria (D) that
we looked at especially in Chapter Four, is an ethical consideration. Any serious new discussion
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of doctrinal development should include a criterion of an ethical awareness or dimension. We
will review a bit of this notion of an “emergent ethics of belief” shortly.
In the second chapter we noted that although discussions of doctrine are dealing with
only one dimension of religious phenomena, it is nevertheless an important one. Doctrines are
about beliefs, and beliefs have consequences. For Augustine, doctrine is not the “res” of the
faith. The language of Scripture or indeed any ‘systems of signification’ that we encounter in the
world suggest a certain open-endedness to reference and meaning. It is Caritas that for Augustine
is the hermeneutical key serving as a type of guardrail limiting an otherwise indefinite number of
interpretations that may appear. Furthermore, using Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana as a
type of heuristic device we were able to see how many previous formulations and discussions of
doctrinal development tended toward an overly epistemological/quasi-metaphysical, and “reslike” focus. Related to this awareness is the insight that although doctrine may be considered in
various ways, most articulations assumed that doctrines do ‘have’ a “true res,” however distant
this infinite truth may be from our limited and finite minds. In the second portion of this chapter,
this heuristic model was used to ponder two theologians whose thought are, in a sense,
“inversely related” to one another. Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jon Sobrino both develop a
dialectical approach to history, although the former may be said to represent the German and
Hegelian idealist tradition, while the later writes from a perspective shaped by the social sciences
and especially from experience drawn from the deep poverty and “neo-dependent” context of
Central and South America. In this chapter, we considered Pannenberg’s notion of doctrine as
revisable hypotheses with an eschatological verification. I argued that the “res” is something
‘future’ for Pannenberg, a perspective that allows him to construct a deeply interdisciplinary
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approach to doctrinal construction. Sobrino, to my mind, may be interpreted as viewing the “res”
of religion as being one of attending to the marginalized poor—to “Take the crucified people
down from the cross”—and I suggested that although very different notions of the ‘res’ are
present in these thinkers, Sobrino’s vision is much closer to Augustine’s conception of Caritas as
the “res” of the Christian faith.
In the third chapter I attempted to “update” the guiding metaphors of doctrinal
development with the hope that we may begin to move discussions of “doctrine” away from an
over-emphasis on epistemology and ossified notions. It is the unique—almost quasimetaphysical, yet almost ‘nothingness’—properties of information that makes the concept
appealing for our goal of moving discussions of doctrine away from the over-emphasis on
epistemology or ‘res-like’ aspects. The central property of transformability associated with
information theory provides the key to its ‘intangibility.’ As we saw, information requires any
physical medium—marks on a page, electrical impulses, light, sound, or magnetic waves—but at
the same time, information is not reduced to any physical medium. For example, any information
may be encoded in binary form, but any physical media may relay this information.
Since most all discussions of doctrinal development after Newman accept his tropes of
organic botanical, or biological growth, it seems natural to appeal to more contemporary ideas of
biological evolution. And as we saw, because biology functions computationally—and from a
“systems” approach, behaves similar to software,—we turned to an examination of the logical
and mathematical ‘foundations’ observed in these biological processes. Here is where the ideas
from information theory help to develop our reconfigured model. First, the paradoxes of selfreferentiality were examined, most especially with Turing’s “decidability” problem. Self-
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referential paradoxes of undecidability and incompleteness “open up” room for novelty in the
form of emergent properties. One example, we may recall came from the research being done
with Cellular Automata. We saw how the use of basic and simple rules—regardless of whether
referring to chemical or an electronic version of a mathematical algorithm—and the interaction
of neighboring states (or cells, entities)—allow unexpected emergent “rules” (whether genetic
code in organisms, or higher-order algorithms within a computer) to appear. These rules are
examples of patterns of information that emerged from other streams or flows of information. No
‘essence’ or ‘res-like- entities are involved. Rules emerge, guide behavior, and are in turn
affected by their environment. In this way, we can speak of flows of information and “state
dependent rule evolution” as defining features of contemporary biological sciences.
Finally, in this third chapter we turned to Kathryn Tanner and George Lindbeck. I argued
that Tanner’s critique of post-liberalism is quite close to what I am suggesting as a reconfigured
doctrinal development. She is using what she refers to as postmodern anthropological categories,
and I am appealing to contemporary information theory and the underlying metaphors of
information flow, transformability, incompleteness, undecidability, and open-endedness.
Nevertheless I suggested that the projects are quite similar. In either case, I argued that there are
serious implications for Lindbeck’s “rule theory of doctrine.” If one appeals to this rule theory of
doctrine, we may claim that the research on “state dependent rule evolution” that we examined,
may be utilized as a “corrective” to Lindbeck’s model. In other words, if doctrines are
considered analogous to rules in a game (or grammar to a language), we should carry the analogy
through to its logical conclusion and accept that “rules evolve.” Rules may not change rapidly,
but in complex interaction with “environmental factors,” they can and do evolve. (This applies
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to the concept of grammar as well.) And to carry through a further analogy with biotechnology,
we may step in and “edit” a genome if needed. Therefore, I concluded that, just as Sobrino is
closer than Pannenberg to Augustine’s vision, Tanner is closer than Lindbeck.
In the Chapter Four, we looked to continue drawing further implications for a
reconfigured model of doctrinal development that takes seriously the current information theory
contributions to evolutionary thought. In this fourth chapter we especially turned to the key ideas
of “information flow,” complexity, emergence, and top-down causation. Just as we may view the
phenomena of ‘complexity’ and ‘emergence’ everywhere, from flocks of birds to traffic jams, we
looked specifically to how complexity leads to unpredictable occurrences that emerge quite
unexpectedly from a process of development. It was suggested that in this process, we may find
ourselves in a situation of an “emergent crisis point,” one that “opens up” the space for a serious
consideration of an “ethics of belief.” We looked at two examples, or traditions, in which
unexpected emergent ethical developments occurred—first in the evolution of a concept of
‘sovereignty,’ and second, with the doctrine of ‘creation.’ Following through these strange and
convoluted developments, we witnessed how from innocuous beginnings, unpredictable and
complex developments arose, producing unexpected emergent features that then produced
top/down effects. These were effects that were unforeseeable from the outset, but in current
circumstances, may well demand a re-consideration. In precisely this way, a kind of ‘ethics of
belief’ emerged from these doctrinal developments. Therefore, we saw in this chapter that
doctrines do emerge, evolve, and may be intentionally edited.
As promised above, I would like to take a brief moment to look at what seems to me to be
the chief concern that many theologians express when discussion of doctrinal development
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utilizes explicit language or metaphors of evolution or Darwinism. Most contemporary
discussions of doctrinal development largely ignore terminology drawn from biological
evolution even while they continue to utilize organic growth metaphors. I suspect that previous
discussions of doctrinal development have intentionally shied away from any explicit language
of ‘evolution’ precisely because of the concern that such talk leads to the possibility of a religion
evolving to such an extent that it may morph into something else entirely. I suggest that we may
be able to deal with this concern not by ignoring contemporary science, but rather, but drawing
another concept from evolutionary biology. In evolutionary biology, scientists such as Douglas
Futuyma and Ernst Mayr have expressed that evolution happens in a teleonomic rather than a
teleological manner. Briefly put, whereas teleology deals with final end-goals, causes, and ideas
of some innate essential direction present within an organism, teleonomy acknowledges that
certain “rules,” conditions, specific physical and environmental contexts, phenotypic constraints
or phylogenetic constraints, may all act as limiting principles to evolutionary development. For
example, an evolutionary biologist would not appeal to teleology but rather natural selection to
explain the evolution of an oak tree. And yet teleonomic limits ensure that an acorn will grow
into an oak tree and not a cat. This does not suggest, however, that the genetic “rules” that
govern the development of the acorn cannot, over fundamentally long periods of time, evolve
and allow the eventual emergence of a new “speciation event.” Rules that govern evolution may
themselves evolve although there are limiting aspects to this development. In this way, I am
suggesting an analogy for our purposes regarding the development of doctrine. I propose using
the notion of a “teleonomic Caritas” that is, in a sense “uncontrollable,” and even “undeconstructable,” and which can provide a “limiting influence” to what might otherwise appear
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as totally open-ended conceptions of doctrinal change. To my mind, it is Caritas that provides the
guardrails to prevent a religion from evolving into something potentially unrecognizable. I would
suggest that this is an Augustinian concept in contemporary terms. As we saw in Chapter Two, it
is Caritas that is the ultimate hermeneutical key for interpreting Scriptures for Augustine. For
Augustine, the Infinite Love of God has revealed an indefinitely rich Word into history and time.
And given the endless play of signification possible in both Scripture and the World the only
controlling limit is the uncontrollable hermeneutical key of Caritas. It is neither doctrine nor
scripture that constitute the “res” of Christianity for Augustine. Once again, it is Caritas which
for Augustine is the true ‘res’ of the Christian faith. This is what enables Augustine to boldly
assert that once one understands the double command to love as the end of all Scripture, one
cannot interpret those Scriptures incorrectly (DDC. 1.36.40). We will have occasion to return to
this Augustinian point in the next and final section of this project.
George Coyne and Some Implications for Future Discussions of Doctrinal Development
At the close of this text, I would like to approach the issues dealt with in this project from
a different angle. I suspect that it might shed light on the issue in a new way, and perhaps even
point to some possible avenues for future research related to the overall aim of this project. I will
begin with a close reading of an article by the director of the Vatican Observatory, George Y.
Coyne, S.J.4
Coyne begins by noting the ambiguous influence between ‘science,’ and ‘religion.’
Modern science in the “west” emerged in the seventeenth century amongst scholars that were
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motivated and influenced by theological thinking. Consider the debates in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries between Newton and Samuel Clarke on the one hand, and Leibniz
on the other, regarding the nature of space and time.5 For Newton, (and Clarke), both space and
time were thought to be absolute forms, almost like fixed ‘containers,’ where God’s omniscience
and omnipresence could be understood. In other words, God provided the absolute reference
point for all change and motion. All relative motion or change is measured against the
background of these stable “forms” of God’s omnipresence and omniscience. According to such
a view, space and time exist as “substances” in their own right, regardless of whether any
physical objects or events are “in” them or not. Thinking of space and time as God’s sensorium
in this way led Leibniz to accuse Newton and Clarke of coming dangerous close to Spinoza’s
pantheism. There is a certain irony here, because whether one interprets Leibniz’s monads as
either a type of idealism or panpsychism—If God is understood as the Ultimate Monad whose
awareness includes the experience of the infinity of all other monads, is this not in some way
similar to Spinoza’s notion of everything as “modifications” of some One Substance?6
Nevertheless, Leibniz’s monadology specifically implies the nonexistence of space or time.
According to Leibniz, space and time refer to relations, changes, and measurements only.
Furthermore, the infinity of monads are predetermined by God’s providential and counterfactual
knowledge thus exemplifying the “best of all possible worlds.”7 So, in this all too brief survey,
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we may see that Leibniz’s philosophy, just as in Newton and Clarke, is dramatically influenced
by their theological commitments and assumptions.
But it is the emergence within the seventeenth centuries of the concepts of “method” or
“theory” that Coyne perceives as having had a deleterious effect on the discipline of theology.
The notion of method in the Enlightenment (as we have seen in various places in this work)
interpreted knowledge as universal, and properly founded upon ‘rational grounds.’ The idea is
that if one got the correct methodology, then when properly applied, true knowledge could be
established. According to Coyne, when theology began to think in terms of God as primarily an
“explanation”—as that which is “needed to explain what we cannot otherwise explain”—that
theology began the unhelpful detour from a more fitting understanding of God.8 Debates over
whether God is a necessary hypothesis for explaining the universe is to miss the point of
Christianity. Concentrating on God as a potential “explanation” is to be asking the wrong
question about what God is.
As Coyne points out, God in Scripture and Tradition is revealed as Love “poured out”
into the world.9 God is Love and not explanation. God as Love “poured out” into the world is the
primary point of revelation for Coyne. The Psalmists, and Prophets, and authors of Genesis
speak frequently of the beauty and goodness observed around them, all of which resonated to
them of their experience of liberation and the transforming power of love in the Exodus event.
Coyne contends, therefore, that the Hebrew Scriptural praises of the experience of goodness and
beauty in the world should be read as declaring “more about God than they are about the
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universe and its beginning.”10 The appreciation and awareness of beauty in the universe is a first
moment that leads to a secondary reflection and search for discovering “a rationality innate in the
universe.”11 Only in this second moment was it possible to wonder at the resonance between the
elegance of mathematical equations and the underlying structure of the Cosmos.
So, for Coyne, religion and science together may provide a deeper and more profound
understanding of the universe than either of these disciplines could do alone. Yet it is clear that
Coyne wishes to remind his readers that God is primarily love “poured” out into the world, and
that to treat God as an explanation, or as Mind, or a transcendent Platonic mathematical Theory
of Everything, is to miss this absolutely key understanding of the revelation of God. Coyne
expresses these ideas in the following extended quotation:
In our age, perhaps more than at any other time, the scientific view of the world has been
the principal spur to a more unified view of the world. It has opened our minds to the vast
richness of the universe that cannot be appropriated by any one discipline alone. Science
invites us to that vision. It also cautions us not to absolutize scientific results. We must be
aware of a serious temptation of the cosmologists. Within their culture, God is
essentially, if not exclusively, seen as an explanation and not as a person. God is the ideal
mathematical structure, the theory of everything. God is mind. It must remain a firm tenet
of the reflecting religious person that God is more than that and that God’s revelation of
himself in time is more than a communication of information. Even if we discover the
Mind of God, we will not have necessarily found God. The very nature of our emergence
in an evolving universe and our inability to comprehend it, even with all that we know
from cosmology, may be an indication that in the universe God may be communicating
much more than information to us. Through the limitations of science we might come to
see the universe as a unique revelation of God, that He is love12 [italics mine]
Is there not a similarity or resonance in this passage to what has been argued in this text? What I
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mean is, like Augustine, Coyne is arguing that God is love. But moreover, Coyne, similar to
Augustine, is maintaining that God is more than the mere dissemination of information.
Augustine, we will recall, in his De Doctrina, asserts that the Infinite Love of God has revealed
an indefinitely rich Word into history and time. Given the endless play of signification possible
in both Scripture and the World the only controlling limit is the uncontrollable hermeneutical
key of Caritas. And the most significant point of similarity may be that, for Augustine, neither
Scripture nor doctrine constitute the “res” of Christianity. Rather it is Caritias that is key,
Caritias is the “res” of the Christian faith. Doctrines, theology, and Scripture are all “signs,” or
“pointers,” gestures on to the ineffable God of Love. In Chapter Two of this text, we examined
Augustine’s claim that as soon as one understands that the double command to love is the end of
all Scripture, one cannot interpret those scriptures incorrectly, even if one does not understand
correctly the original (human) authorial intention (DDC 1.36.40). Therefore, “A person
strengthened by faith hope, and love,” Augustine explains, “has no need of the scriptures, except
to instruct others” (DDC 1.39.43). Is there not a resonance here with Coyne’s assertion that God,
as Love poured out into the world, is more than a “communication of information?” As I have
tried to argue in this project, doctrine should be thought of as information flow given the mutable
and intangible quality it exhibits. The metaphor of information may hopefully avoid turning
doctrine into a “Res”—either the “Res” of the faith itself, or by conceiving of doctrine as having
a res. May we say, using Coyne’s phrase, that doctrinal development conceived of as information
movement, may point beyond itself towards God. And God as Love—in a sense perhaps as the
expression of Caritas—is more than the doctrines could express. Considered in this way, perhaps
we may begin to think of doctrine (and by extension doctrinal development) as ‘signs’ gesturing
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towards God—and doctrine as the transformable intangible flow of information—so that we do
not “confuse the finger pointing towards the moon with the moon itself.”
Let us continue with this exploration of Coyne’s thought. Now, God’s revelation to us
involves a certain anthropocentrism. How else could human beings encounter God? God pours
out God’s Love into the world that we evolved in. The Divine-Human-Nature encounter would
be the necessary “point of contact” for any revelation or experience. But does this
anthropocentrism entail exclusivity?13 Interestingly, Coyne answers, “no.” Coyne makes this
point through the elaboration of two factors. First, there is the complexity of the universe and the
unpredictable elements of evolution. In reference to the precise and finely tuned initial conditions
that emerged from the Big Bang, Coyne asks whether an exact knowledge of these fine-tuned
parameters would allow for an accurate prediction of the emergence of life. As Coyne puts it “I
am asking whether, given antecedently all the physical constants and conditions necessary for
life from our a posteriori knowledge of it, could we have predicted that it would have to come to
be?”14 Even with knowledge of the “Mind of God,” a full unified theory, would we really
“understand life?”15 “As I understand it,” Coyne explains, “there is no intentionality associated
with the mind of God of the new physics. Can life be understood without that intentionality?”16
The unpredictable emergence of life, and especially conscious life is truly remarkable. And in
reading Coyne’s account, I am also reminded of Stephen Gould’s thought experiment of
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“replaying life’s tape.”17 In such a scenario such as if we could (hypothetically) return to the
“seas of the Burgess Shale” and observe the process of evolution unfold all over again—we
would be struck by the radical contingency (or perhaps unpredictability) of it all—the likelihood
of an utterly different development of fauna is very high indeed.18
The second factor Coyne considers is the probability of life evolving elsewhere in the
universe. Coyne argues that the probabilities are quite high. I think it is worth reading this is
Coyne’s words:
Since there are about 1011 stars in the Galaxy and 1011 galaxies in the universe, there are
1022 stars in the universe. From our knowledge of the distribution of stars by mass in the
galaxy, we can estimate that about 30% of stars are solarlike. We know that about 30% of
stars are double or multiple, a fact that may, for dynamical reasons, exclude the formation
of planets. It would be difficult to estimate the percentage of solarlike stars that would
have developed a planetary system, but from our knowledge of the formation of the solar
system we know that the probability is neither 0 nor 100 percent. Let us say it is 10
percent. How many of these planets would be like the Earth: tis mass, distance from the
Sun, an atmosphere, and so forth? This may be even more uncertain, but again from
geological knowledge of the formation of the atmosphere, we know that there is a finite
probability. Let us say it is 2 percent. Now, if we put all these considerations together, we
have, from these statistical considerations, 1017 Earthlike planets in the universe.19
Now, first let us sum up the preceding two factors from Coyne’s text: (1) the radical contingency
of the evolution of life and the possibility of laws and physical constants being radically different
(either at different points or places in our universe or throughout a multiverse where perhaps an
infinite number of universes arise throughout hyperspace; and (2) the quite high probability of
life evolving throughout the universe.
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The theological implications following from the preceding two factors can be very
complex indeed. To begin with, let us briefly consider the possibility of life evolving under
radically different conditions in our universe. For example, what might the experiential
“apparatuses” or cognitive processes be like for life that evolved near the surface of a neutron
star? Would these categories of sensation/experience, or cognitive abilities be so different as to
be quite unrecognizable to us? Very likely they would. Or again, what might they be like if life
evolved in an atmosphere toxic (to us) such as in a gas giant? This is the stuff of science-fiction,
but the theological implications are vast. What might such implications entail for our discussion
of doctrinal development? For example, what is the implication under such conditions for the
doctrine of Incarnation? Or soteriology? Or any other doctrine? Such life might well have a very
different sense of time and other experiential and thinking processes too. Or again, what if we
consider the very different conditions that may have evolved within other universes, and that
might exhibit very different laws of nature? We might well paraphrase or adopt a version of the
saying that God is not only different, stranger, and unexpected that we think, but God is
different, stranger, and more unexpected than we CAN think!
Yet I think that Coyne would also claim that this would not be quite true. I suspect that
Coyne would assert that we can know the transforming power of the God who “pours” God-self
out into the universe, and thus we may be confident of the Love and Caritas of God, regardless of
the manifestation or articulation of this revelation. Again, does this not present something of
another analogy to this work? For instance, doctrines might evolve or develop in totally different
ways under very different situations. And we may accept this even if we restrict our theologizing
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to this “pale blue dot.”20 The overarching principle that Coyne suggests, and as we have seen, is
quite Augustinian, which is the insistence upon the centrality of the Love of God. This is a
constant in both of their texts. And it is this centrality of Love that I have been suggesting should
be “expanded” in our theological musings over the category of doctrinal development to the type
of teleonomic Caritas that provides the sole guardrail to any future development of doctrine. God
is more than a source or dissemination of information—including doctrine conceived of as
transformable flows of information. Just as Augustine asserts that doctrine and scriptural
interpretation may be open-ended and uncontrollable—limited only by the double command to
Love—we may include an “expanded” appreciation of Caritas to include an emergent ethics of
belief, and thereby provide an irreducibly important aspect or criterion for any future discussions
of the categories of doctrinal development, criticism, or construction.
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